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Abstract
Chapter 1: Introduction. This chapter describes the three main questions of the
thesis: the link between railroads and the spatial distribution of jobs, the elasticity of
land supply and the spatial segregation in cities, especially issues related to spatial
mismatch and sorting based on social status. Besides, this introductory chapter
details the empirical evaluation methods used in the thesis.
Chapter 2 – The Impacts of Urban Public Transportation: Evidence from
the Paris Region. This chapter was co-authored with Thierry Mayer. It estimates
the impact of the Regional Express Rail (here after RER) on the distribution of jobs
and firms within the Paris Region. Evaluating the impact of transport infrastructure
always meets a major challenge since rail lines are not randomly located. The
opening and progressive extension of the RER between the 1970s and the 2000s
offers a natural experiment to address this usual endogenity issue.
In the outskirts of the metropolitan area, on which this paper focuses, RER
development was mainly an improvement of the existing suburban rail infrastructure.
We take advantage of this feature to provide two identification strategies focusing on
two samples of municipalities initially connected to the suburban train network. In
some of them, the suburban train station has been upgraded and integrated in the
RER network, these municipalities constitute the treatment group. Conversely, the
control group includes municipalities that did not benefit from this enhancement.
Each identification strategy exploits a specific subsample within which the treatment
can be reasonably considered as exogenous.
The first identification strategy relies on the fact that the RER network specifi-
cally aimed at connecting the city of Paris, namely the historical city center of the
metropolitan area, to new subcenters in the outskirts, namely the two international
airports, the business district of La De´fense and five new towns. By doing so, the
RER network also happens to serve intermediate municipalities, located in-between
previously stated economic centers. We use these municipalities as treatment group,
given that they are not explicitly targeted by the policy and benefit fortuitously from
the RER system.
The second identification strategy is based on the important differences between
the 1965 masterplan that launched the RER project and the actual network. Instead
of the ambitious project that envisioned the construction of hundreds kilometers of
new rail tracks across the Paris region, the actual RER system was built in a more
economical way by, as stated before, upgrading the existing suburban train network.
This program change appears to be due to a combination of tougher budgetary
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constraints and a political changeover. Using this dissimilarities, we include in the
treatment group municipalities that are linked to the RER network but that should
not have been, according to the 1965 masterplan.
Afterwards, we estimate the effect of the treatment with a simple difference-in-
differences method and we add some control variables to take into account some
initial differences between control and treatment groups. Running the model on
the time period preceding the RER construction yields no significant differences be-
tween the two groups with both strategies, which gives support to our identification
strategy. The last important point of our empirical method is the computation of a
continuous treatment variable, namely the variation in the mean travel time to the
city center (i.e. the City of Paris). Such a precise measure of the improvement in
the transport service is necessary, given that the RER network is not a fully new
infrastructure but an evolution of the suburban rail system.
We find that the employment increases by 5.9% when travel time to the city
center deceases by one minute between 1975 and 1990. It corresponds to the creation
or the relocation of 800 jobs in each municipality connected to the RER network,
compared to the level that would have prevailed in the absence of this transport
system improvement. Assuming our estimate can be extended to the whole suburbs
of the Paris region, it would imply that the RER caused the location of 66,200 jobs
in connected municipalities. By way of comparison, it represents a tenth of the total
number of jobs decentralized from the city center to the outskirts.1
The RER effect is explained by a better access to the metropolitan labor market.
Workers live further from their workplace in treated municipalities. Besides, we find
a positive impact on firm location, except on those that are foreign-owned, probably
more responsive to the improvement of public transportation. We notice no clear
shift in the distribution of employment across industries. On the opposite, there
may be no effect of the RER on the overall population growth. Our results suggest
however that the commissioning of the RER may have increased the competition for
land since highly-skilled households are more likely to locate in the vicinity of RER
stations.
Chapter 3 – Is High-Speed Rail a Business Communication Technology?
Evidence from French Multi-Plant Businesses. This chapter was co-authored
with Pauline Charnoz and Claire Lelarge. We document the impact of travel time
between affiliates and headquarters of geographically dispersed corporate groups on
the management of such business organizations. Theory suggests that the easier
circulation of managers might facilitate the transmission of information between
production plants and headquarters. This would thus foster the growth and the
functional specialization on production activities at remote affiliates and decrease
operational costs at the group level. We test these predictions on French corporate
groups, using the expansion of the High Speed Rail (hereafter HSR) network as an
arguably exogenous shock on internal travel times.
The French high-speed rail service has been introduced in 1981 and is still ex-
1Employment growth in treated municipalities may also be due to relocation of firms coming
from other suburban areas and other agglomerations, as well as to the creation of economic activities
that would not have existed otherwise.
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panding. It combines the construction of new high-speed railway lines, the modern-
ization of regular railway lines, the introduction of new business practices and the
commissioning of new high-speed trains. The first high speed line linked Paris to
Lyon and Marseille, which are the three main French cities. The network has been
then expanded toward many other French cities and regions: the Atlantic coast in
1989-1990, Lille in 1993, London in 1994, Strasbourg and Frankfurt in 2007.
Our main identifications strategy takes advantage of the dyadic nature of the
data, meaning affiliate-headquarters couples. Using a large set of fixed effects, we
quantify the link between the travel time to the headquarters and the employment
structure of the affiliate. To assess the effect of the variation of travel time, which is
clearly less endogenous than its level, we include affiliate fixed effects. We also add
commuting zone × time fixed effects. This takes into account that the location of
HSR lines may be driven by the local economic situation and that the commissioning
of a high-speed line could boost the local growth. In the end, we compare affiliates
located in the same commuting zones, controlled by distant headquarters located in
different places. Consequently, affiliates are not affected in the same extent by the
treatment and experience different changes in the travel time required to reach the
head office.
In addition, we propose an alternative identification strategy based on the 1991
high-speed rail masterplan. Back then, the Government envisioned a very ambi-
tious high-speed system and ranked each projected line, according to its expected
profitability. In practice, this ranking was not fully followed to select projects to
be carried out. Taking advantage of this setting, we run our model keeping only
affiliate-headquarters couples that should have been affected by the 1991 master-
plan, after excluding all unrealized projects which did not reach the profitability
level of the least profitable realized line. We argue that this reduced control group
is more similar to our treatment group, and thus limits the potential endogeneity
problem.
For data availability reasons, we focus on the 1993-2011 period. Results are
more pronounced in the service industries, where information to be transmitted is
softer. We estimate that HSR induced the creation of one production job for the
average affiliate in these industries (against 0.2 job in retail, trade or manufacturing
industries), and the shift of around one managerial job from affiliate to headquar-
ters. These results are robust to alternative identification strategies addressing the
problem of the endogenous placement of the HSR infrastructure. We find similar
estimates focusing on affiliates and headquarters only partially linked by high speed
tracks. We also highlight a similar impact using the strategy based upon the 1991
high-speed rail masterplan. At the group level, descriptive regressions suggest that
the impact on the operational profit margin is around 0.5 percentage points in most
industries.
Chapter 4 – A Long-Term Evaluation of Enterprise Zones: The First
Generation of the “Zones Franches Urbaines”. This chapter was co-authored
with Pauline Givord and Simon Quantin. It evaluates the impacts of the French
enterprise zone initiative (“Zones Franches Urbaine”, ZFU hereafter) on firm location
and local employment. This program grants very generous tax breaks to small
9
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and medium size firms which accept to locate in one of the 44 selected deprived
neighborhoods. The rationale behind this policy is to bring job opportunities to
unemployed people living in disadvantaged areas. In contrast to previous works
which mainly evaluate the impact of this policy after 2004, we focus on the first
generation, implemented in 1997 in France. It allows us to follow the effects of the
program over a period of nearly two decades, which is an important contribution of
this chapter.
Our identification strategy relies on two exogenous features of the zone selection
process. First, ZFU designation was supposed to be based on a deprivation index
summarizing the socio-economic characteristics of eligible areas. In facts, the index
had been only partially followed. Some very disadvantaged areas should have been
involved in the program given their level of deprivation but were left apart. Such
zones offer a good control group and have been widely used in previous evaluation
works of the ZFU program. Of course, this index still influences the probability of
ZFU selection, even if not in deterministic way. We use a matching method to take
into account differences between control and treatment groups.
The first ZFU wave provides another useful source of exogeneity, since program
eligibility is limited to zones inhabited by more than 10,000 people. Unlike the
deprivation index, this second criterion have been almost strictly followed. Given
that eligible zones were delineated years before the implementation of the policy, it is
unlikely that this population threshold could have been manipulated to influence the
program selection process. We compute a specific propensity score that takes into
account the two selection criteria. We also present a RDD regression as a robustness
test, using only the population threshold criterion.
Our results validate a strong and positive impact of the ZFU program on both
employment and plant location, robust to several identification strategies. After five
years, the whole caused the location of 11,000 plants, employing 50,500 workers.
This corresponds to 250 new firms and 1,400 new jobs in each zone. After 2002,
meaning beyond the first five years of the program, the number of plants located in
ZFU no longer increases, due to a higher rate of business closure. This questions the
ability of the policy to initiate a self-sustainable economic development in deprived
neighborhoods. We also find that the treatment impact is stronger on firms belong-
ing to “footloose” industries (for example business services) and on firm relocation,
which evidences a clear windfall effect.
The policy seems to fall short of its main goal, namely helping unemployed people
plagued by urban segregation to find a job, because of insufficient targeting. In fact,
the treatment effect is not higher for unskilled workers and previously unemployment
people and is even weaker for residents of municipalities in which ZFU are located.
Besides, the impact of program is smaller on firms depending on the local demand
(for example trade).
Finally, our findings are much larger that previous results on the French case. We
argue this difference is due to the specific context of the first wave of the program:
land availability was greater compared to zones selected for subsequent generation;
the level of payroll tax was higher at the national level, strengthening the com-
parative fiscal advantage of enterprise zones; the “local employment clause”, which
requires a minimum share of local residents in the workforce, was poorly enforced
10
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before 2002, which could have allowed firms to get around the shortage in the local
supply of skilled workers.
Chapter 5 – The Impact of Housing Subsidies on the Rental Sector: the
French Example. This chapter was co-authored with Ce´line Grislain-Letre´my.
It evaluates the effect of subsidies on prices and quantities in the housing market.
Housing allowance to tenants is a main tool for housing policy in France and ac-
counted for 0.8% of the public spending in 2014. It aims to limit the budget share of
housing for eligible tenants and to improve their housing conditions for a given bud-
get share. Despite the increasing spending allocated to housing subsidies since the
end of the 1970s, the proportion of household expenditure that low-income tenants
devote to rent has continued to increase. This policy may have missed its goal due
to the adverse effect of housing subsidies on the level of private rents, empirically
proven in the United-States and in several European countries. This phenomenon
is the consequence of a subsidized demand in the context of an inelastic housing
supply.
The contribution of this paper is to provide a new assessment of the upward
effect of housing subsidies on rents, using an identification strategy based on the
geographical variation in the amount of the allowance. In fact, the housing subsidies
are 15 to 40 euros higher per month in cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants
and some other smaller metropolitan areas with a specific housing market,2 all other
things being equal. Zone designation cannot therefore be considered as exogenous,
when studying the level of rents. However, the population threshold, which has
not been updated after the delineation of the three zones in the late 1970s, offers a
suitable instrumental variable for treatment evaluation.
We assess the impact of housing subsidies on price, quality and quantity in the
private rental sector from the early 1980s to the early 2010s. We show that housing
subsidies had an upward impact on rents in the 1990s and the 2000s. Rents are 4%
higher in the second zone, namely 20 euros per month, where housing subsidies are
higher. This result is robust to several tests: the effect is higher when the tenant
benefits from the allowance; there is no similar discontinuity in the level of rents
depending on the population of the metropolitan area; the impact is insignificant in
the 1980s, when the housing benefits were lower.
Higher subsidies seem to have almost no effect on housing quality, meaning that
higher rents are not explained by bigger or more comfortable dwellings in treated
areas. Finally, we provide evidence of the inelasticity of rental housing supply in
France. We notice that the impact of housing subsidies on the rents is significant
only in metropolitan areas with a higher population growth. Additionally, we find
no difference in the size and characteristics of the private rental sector, in relation
to the level of housing subsidies. The only exception to this statement is that the
proportion of one-room dwellings in the rental housing stock, which are likely to be
occupied by allowance recipients, slightly increases where subsidies are higher.
2Especially tight, such as costal or border zones, or especially depressed, such as areas affected
by industrial decline.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis raises three research questions, that are addressed in the four composite
chapters. First, chapters 2 and 3, on transportation, take up the question of the
impact of railroads on the spatial distribution of jobs, in urban and regional con-
texts. Second, chapters 2, 4 and 5 (respectively on RER, ZFU and housing subsidy)
highlight the differential elasticity of commercial and housing land supply. Third,
chapters 2 and 4 question the characteristics of spatial segregation in cities, on the
specific points of spatial mismatch and sorting based on social status. In this intro-
duction, I also describe the variety of empirical methods used in this thesis, which
leads me to discuss their limits in quantifying displacement effects.
1.1 Rail and the spatial distribution of jobs
Both chapters 2 and 3 focus on passenger rail infrastructure, within Paris metropoli-
tan region in the first case and between French cities in the second case, and highlight
interesting facts on the spatial distribution of employment. Unlike the majority of
transport infrastructure, RER and HSR lines are mostly served by passenger trains1.
These framings allow to disentangle the differential impact of transportation on peo-
ple and goods. In the chapter 2, we focus on commuting patterns. In the chapter
3, we study the impact of long distance transportation costs on the circulation of
information.
In chapter 2, we notice a clear job decentralization phenomenon in the Paris
region between the 1960s and the 1990s. As similarly described by Glaeser and
Kahn (2004) for the United-States, we find that job decentralization occurred after
population decentralization. We also highlight that jobs remain more concentrated
in the city centers than households and that car ownership probably played a major
role. Indeed, car ownership widely expend during this period. In 1990, 77% of
French households owned at least one automobile, up from 21% in 1953 (Me´ot,
2009). Additionally, in the same time, the share of employees working locally seems
1In the case of the French HSR, four trains are dedicated to mail shipment, which is marginal
compared to the 500 passenger trains operating on the high speed rail network. In the case of RER,
the existing tracks are partially used by freight trains before and after the development of the RER
network, but this is not case of the new tracks, which caused the most significant improvements in
the mass transit system.
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to have fallen, suggesting that firms moving to the outskirts do not seek to follow
workers increasingly living away from the city center.
Chapter 2 highlights the important role of public transportation in job decen-
tralization. Firms face an intricate trade-off when considering the opportunity of
relocating from the city center to the outskirts (Fujita and Ogawa, 1982). While the
land is cheaper in the suburbs, agglomeration spillovers may be weaker because of
more distant interactions with other firms. Commuting costs also play a role, con-
sidering that firm should compensate for longer commuting trip by paying higher
wages. One could argue that moving to the outskirts would reduce commuting costs
as population is less concentrated in city centers that firms. In contrast to this
idea, Duranton and Puga (2015) document the existence of “wasteful” commuting
patterns, namely the fact that workers do not necessarily commute to the closest
workplaces. This occurs due to the presence of preference for specific amenities,
location choice of two-earner couples or costs of a move when changing job.
We find that the RER modifies this trade-off. First, the average commuting
distance of workers increases in RER municipalities, which confirms a diminution of
commuting costs that allows firms to locate further from worker’s home. Second,
manufacturing firms did not locate more frequently in the vicinity of a RER station
than other firms. This is not in line with the results found in the United-States
for highways as reported Duranton and Puga (2015). This probably reflects that
highway proximity decreases transportation costs of goods, while passenger rail does
obviously not.
Chapter 3, on HSR, is also related to the question of employment distribution
between regions, as multi-plan businesses employ a large share of the workforce. In
the United-States, Lindley and Machin (2014) notice rising spatial inequalities in
skill distribution. Indeed, between 1980 and 2010, the supply in high-skilled workers
rose faster in places where it was initially higher. They also notice a stronger low-
skilled employment growth in places where highly educated people are increasingly
concentrated. This is the spatial representation of the well-known job polarization
phenomenon (Autor et al., 2006). This means that the demand in both high-skilled
workers (professional and managerial) and low-skilled workers (personal services)
increases, while the demand in medium-skilled workers (routine office jobs) drops,
also resulting in a polarization of wages. According to Autor et al. (2013), job po-
larization has been mainly caused by a skilled-biased technological change (and not
by job offshoring). The development of information and communication technolo-
gies lead to the automation of routine office jobs, that were previously occupied
by medium-skilled workers. On the opposite, low-skilled tasks in personal services
cannot be done by computers.
For France, similar results hold. The demand for medium-skilled workers declined
(Goos et al., 2009), due to skilled-biased technological change which is nevertheless
not associated with an increase in wage inequalities (Charnoz et al., 2014). Finally,
Charnoz and Orand (2016) confirm a growing spatial polarization, explained by the
automation of medium-skilled occupations.
Our work on HSR proposes an alternative mechanism to explain the spatial
concentration of high-skilled workers. Our argumentation is based on the spatial
organization of firms and, more precisely, on their ability to separate headquarters
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from production activities. We follow Duranton and Puga (2005), which specify the
trade-off between single-location versus multiple-location organization. In fact, if
headquarters and production activities are integrated in the same place, manage-
ment costs are lowered. However, firms may gain to separate their activities if cities
offer different opportunities, it would then be more effective to locate headquarters
in places with a large variety of business services (Davis and Henderson, 2008) and
production plants close to intermediate good suppliers. At the equilibrium, head-
quarters end up being concentrated in few large cities where they share business
services suppliers. Given that agglomeration economies are weaker in production
activities, firms choose to split among different locations. Consequently, manufac-
turing plans are placed in smaller cities, with low congestion costs and specialized
in production.
On this question, the contribution of the HSR chapter is to show that lower
transportation costs facilitate remote management. Given that headquarters are
concentrated in big cities (and especially Paris), HSR may lead to a specialization
of affiliate in production tasks and reinforce the concentration of skilled workers in
big cities.
1.2 Supply of land
The various chapters bring to light some specific topics related to the issue of land
use and land supply. Chapter 5 directly highlights the capitalization of housing
subsidies in rents and the inelasticity of housing supply. This capitalization effect
has been already proved in the French case on both rents (Fack, 2006, Laferre`re and
Blanc, 2004) and housing prices (Bono and Trannoy, 2012). Similar results have
been also found in the UK (Gibbons and Manning, 2006) and in the US (Hilber and
Turner, 2013, Susin, 2002). Furthermore, the very low impact of RER infrastructure
on population growth, pointed out by chapter 2, is striking. Indeed, the Alonso
monocentric model predicts that a drop in commuting costs should result in a higher
population density in the outskirts and a lower density in the city center. We
also show that high-educated people move more frequently nearby RER stations,
suggesting a capitalization of the better accessibility in housing prices. Besides, the
positive and large impact of RER on employment suggests a different elasticity of
commercial and housing land supply. Finally, the chapter 4 highlights a stronger
impact of tax cuts on firm location where the land is more available. This is in line
with the results of Poulhe`s (2015). She shows that subsidies granted to firms located
in ZFU were partially capitalized in commercial building prices but to a lesser extent
where land was more available before the policy implementation.
The central issue is therefore to understand whether low land supply is due to
a lack of available land or to restrictions in land use. In the American case, there
is a strong empirical link between the low elasticity of housing supply and land
use regulation. Glaeser and Ward (2009) show that the simultaneous rise in home
prices and decrease in dwelling construction in the Greater Boston is not due to a
lack of land but to stricter land use policies. More directly related to housing policy
impacts, Hilber and Turner (2013) highlight that the impact of home-owner subsidies
is closely linked to land use regulation. Mortgage interest deduction raises the share
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of home-owners where land use regulation is lax while it should be capitalized in
housing prices where land use regulation is strict.
The assumption was made that homeowners should be strong supporters of land
use regulation, in order to protect the value of their housing by preserving the local
amenities. However, empirical evidence are less clear (Gyourko and Molloy, 2015).
Considering that the homeownership rate is slightly lower in France (58%) than in
the United-States (65%), homeownership impact on land use regulation could thus
apply to France.
Another mechanism is that small jurisdictions are more likely to restrict land use.
Residents may benefit from positive externalities of urban development in neighbor-
ing jurisdictions without suffering from negative externalities of new residents in
their own place of living. This mechanism could also be valid for France given that
municipalities are especially small and play a prominent role in land use regula-
tion. In addition to this, Verdugo (2011) finds that social housing supply in a given
metropolitan area decreases with its fractionalization in independent municipalities.
Gyourko and Molloy (2015) also states that land use regulation could be an at-
tempt to sort households across municipalities. We lack evidence to prove the link
between residential sorting and restrictive land use regulation in the French case.
Nevertheless, the controversial sociology work of Pinc¸on and Pinc¸on-Charlot (2007)
suggests that the rich would lobby to limit a greater social diversity in wealthy
neighborhood. They argue that some of the richer municipalities in the Paris Re-
gion prefer to pay the penalty imposed by the SRU law in case of shortage of social
housing,2 in order to prevent low income households from settling down. Gobillon
and Vignolles (2016) however show the effectiveness of such intensives. The imple-
mentation of the SRU law caused a faster growth of social housing construction,
especially in municipalities where the initial stock was scarce.
Lastly, land use regulation could be linked to fiscal situation, local authorities
are more likely to impose strict land use regulation if they do not need to increase
their fiscal income by attracting new residents. This mechanism could fit the French
case as local authorities do not depend substantially from household taxes. Con-
versely, before recent reforms, the corporate tax was considered as a key factor of
local authority income. Even if the median resident tax revenue was higher,3 the
dispersion of corporate tax revenue was greater.4 This heterogeneity could perhaps
signify that, for a given municipality, attracting firms would be a better way to
increase financial resources. In fact, this could partially explain why there was no
population growth in municipalities linked to the RER network while employment
significantly increased. It was fiscally more advantageous to attract firms rather
than residents.
2According to the 2000 SRU law (Loi relative a` la solidarite´ et au renouvellement urbains)
urban municipalities should reach a 20 percent share of social housing in the total housing stock
and must pay a penalty if they do not.
3In 2002 in the Paris region, the medium resident tax revenue per inhabitant (taxe d’habitation)
was 106 euros to 62 euros for local corporate tax (taxe professionnelle), across municipalities.
4Concerning corporate tax, the first quantile is equal to 25 euros and the third quartile is equal
163 euros while respectively 71 and 152 euros for resident tax. Same results hold for the total tax
revenue.
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1.3 Spatial segregation in cities
Finally, this thesis also examines the effect of urban policies on residential segrega-
tion. Chapters 2 and 4, on RER and ZFU program, provide insights on two different
questions: spatial mismatch and income sorting.
As presented in the chapter 4, the ultimate goal of the French enterprise zone pro-
gram is to help unemployed workers living in deprived neighborhoods to find a job.
The rational of this policy is a spatial mismatch hypothesis. Residents of deprived
neighborhoods are unemployed because there are not enough job opportunities close
by. Empirical evidence supports this assessment for the Paris region (Gobillon and
Selod, 2007), plausibly explained by redlining and weak social networks.5
While we find a very impressive impact of ZFU on firm location, the effect on
unemployed resident is much lower, as confirmed by Gobillon et al. (2011) and
Charnoz (2015). The program suffers from a clear targeting problem. As stated
before, the treatment effect if similar on skilled and unskilled workers, on workers and
unemployment people, and even lower on ZFU municipalities’ residents compared to
other municipalities’ residents. Manning and Petrongolo (2011) offer an interesting
explanation for this dilution effect, they show that in Britain: “as labor markets
overlap, a local stimulus or transport improvements have modest effects on local
outcomes, because ripple effects in job applications dilute their impact across a
series of overlapping market”. Even more problematic, the ZFU impact seems weaker
from the moment the “local employment clause”, requiring a minimum share of local
residents in the workforce, was actually enforced. It may signify that firms located
in deprived areas encounter a skill mismatch issue, due to the fact that unemployed
persons living nearby do not have appropriate qualifications to fill the available
positions.
On question of spatial sorting of population based on income or skills, chapter
4 offers no evidence. However, it should be mentioned that Charnoz (2015) finds
that the ZFU policy caused an increase in the share of highly-educated residents.
This underlines that impacts of urban policies, even aiming at helping the poor, can
often be weakened by the migration of better-off people, wishing to benefit from the
policy advantages.
Chapter 2 gives support to the idea that public transportation infrastructures
may induce spatial sorting based on social status, since our findings suggest that the
proportion of highly-skilled residents increase in connected municipalities. Baum-
Snow and Kahn (2000) also finds that the development new mass transit projects
lead to higher housing prices in the vicinity of new stations. Having noted that
wealthier households live in the city center in Paris while they live in the suburbs in
Detroit, Brueckner et al. (1999) explain this difference by the presence of amenities
(such as historical monuments, restaurants, museums) in the city center. Even
if better-off households value more such amenities, they also have higher housing
consumption and may thus be attracted by low housing price in the suburbs. In
5On the American case, Bayer et al. (2008) show the importance of very local social interac-
tions on labor market outcomes, especially for low-skilled workers. Besides, L’Horty et al. (2012),
using a testing method on three municipalities of the Paris region, confirm the spatial segregation
hypothesis, but only for women.
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Paris the first effect is stronger, which could explain why we find more high-skilled
residents when the accessibility to city center is better. However, we find no clear
evidence of a reduction in the share of poor households, as we should expect from this
amenity based explanation. This could be explained by an alternative mechanism
proposed by Glaeser et al. (2008). They argue that the income elasticity of the
demand for land in the US is too low to fully explain why wealthier household are
over represented in suburban areas. The reason why poor household do not move
in the outskirts is that car-based mobility is too expansive. Consequently, they are
constrained to stay in the city center, where public transportation is available.6 In
the French context, we should also add to the picture the role of social housing
which is overrepresented in the inner ring and strongly influence the location choices
of poor households.
1.4 Empirical methods
The four chapters of this thesis are challenged by the issue of selection related
endogeneity. The designation of beneficiaries is specific to each evaluated policy:
ZFU are especially disadvantaged neighborhood, transportation infrastructures are
never located independently of local economic prospects, subsidized households often
occupy dwellings with specific characteristics. We implement a variety of empirical
methods: difference-in-differences, regression on discontinuities, propensity score
matching, fixed effect methods and instrumental variables.7
Regression discontinuity design, or instrumental variable methods using discon-
tinuities, are used in chapters 4 and 5. Unlike many papers in empirical spatial
economics, we do not compare areas located on one side or the other of a boundary
(see for example Black, 1999). In the case of housing subsidies, we are limited by
the availability of data, meaning that we do have not enough observations close to
the border between the two zones. In addition, given that boundaries cross agglom-
erations, we cannot exclude general equilibrium effects of the treatment from either
side. In the case of the ZFU program, using the areas surrounding the Enterprise
zone would lead to overestimate the treatment, due to displacement effects (Givord
et al., 2013). In both chapters, we therefore use non spatial thresholds, which limit
the potential contamination effect of the control group by the treatment. An other
important issue of the regression on discontinuity method is to ensure the threshold
has not been manipulated. In our cases, thresholds are based on “round numbers”,
less likely to be endogenous. Even though, there could be a concern for potential
endogenous ZFU delineation, but the contours of the zones were fixed several years
before the treatment implementation.
In both chapters 2 and 3, on transportation, identification strategies are based
on past masterplans, similarly to Duranton and Turner (2012) or Donaldson (2016).
6This explanation could also be valid in France. Even if a four households on five possess at
least one car, only a quarter possesses two cars or more, that are essential for a two-earner couples,
according to census results.
7Note that the instrumental variable method is not per se used, but chapters 2 and 3 rely
on subsampling methods that are very similar to the existing literature using past transportation
plans as instrumental variables.
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More precisely, we use past projects to choose a subsample among which treatment
can be considered as (more) exogenous. We use the French 1991 masterplan for
high-speed rail. Considering that, among feasible abandoned projects, line selection
has not been driven by economic reasons, we restrict our control group to couples of
affiliate-headquarters that should have been connected faster by rail, according to
the 1991 plan. In the RER chapter, we use the deep differences between then 1965
RER master plan and the actual network. They both link the economic centers of
the Paris region, that is to say places intentionally connected by the infrastructure,
but they use different itineraries to reach the same points, because of budgetary
constrains. Using this setting, we keep only stations that should not have been
connected to the RER network, according to the initial plan, but that actually are.
Related to the general question of the external validity of our findings, a com-
mon problem of interpretation is whether urban public policies create new economic
activities or simply reorganize the spatial distribution of jobs and people, as pointed
at by Redding and Turner (2015) for transportation infrastructures and Neumark
and Simpson (2015) for place-based policies. Clearly, the identification strategies of
all chapters aim primarily to quantify the differences between control and treatment
groups that are attributable to the treatment.
These methods are ill-equipped to measure general equilibrium effects, except
possibly in chapter 5, on housing subsidies. In that latter case, we are less concerned
by potential displacement effects. Even if inter-regional migrations are supposed to
equalize utilities across locations, we think that it is unlikely to happen in our case
because the difference in housing subsidies between zones is too low (around 15 to
40 euros per month), and certainly far below the fixed costs associated with a move.
In chapter 4, we show that the impact of tax cuts is especially strong on firm
relocations, which sometimes happen over long distances. The estimated effect is
also high on firm creation, but we cannot rule out that such firms would have been
created elsewhere is the absence of the treatment. Consequently, our results clearly
indicate that a certain part of the enterprise zone effect is due to a displacement
effect, but we are unable to quantify this proportion.
The case of the chapter 2 is even more undetermined concerning the respective
share of growth and displacement due to urban public transportation. We know that
both phenomena are likely to occur, empirical papers on the United-States have for
example shown that highways can simultaneously redistribute residents within a city
(Baum-Snow, 2007) and increase its total population (Duranton and Turner, 2012).
In our work, we do not know if the RER effect is either due to the attraction of new
businesses in the Paris region or to a decentralization from the city center to the
outskirts or even to a displacement effect from control to treatment group. We can
only assert there is a difference between our two groups because of the treatment.
Finally, in the chapter 3, we try to quantify the HSR effect on the whole enterprise,
even if our identification strategy does not allow for a robust estimation at this level.
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Chapter 2
The Impacts of Urban
Public Transportation:
Evidence from the Paris
Region
This chapter is cowritten with Thierry Mayer (Sciences Po, Banque de France, CEPII
and CEPR).
2.1 Introduction
Urban public transit is considered as a key policy to ease urban congestion and
promote environmentally-friendly transportation. In Europe as in the United States,
multiple projects demonstrate the belief of policy makers in the efficiency of public
spending for transportation. Mention may be made of the “Crossrail”1 project in
London, the “Grand Paris Express”2 in France or the plan for high speed rail in
California.3 Besides, spending for inland transport infrastructure is significant: 0.7
percent of the GDP in North America and 0.8 in Western Europe and even 0.9
in France (OECD, 2011). Empirical evaluations are needed to assess the return
of costly infrastructure investments. Following this idea, this paper offers evidence
of the way urban rail transit can shape urban development. To do so, we use the
natural experiment offered by the improvement of the Paris commuter rail system
from the 1970s to the 1990s. During this period, Paris metropolitan region spread
and the population rose from 9.2 millions of inhabitants in 1968 to 11.5 millions of
inhabitants in 2006 (INSEE, Census).
This growth was accompanied by the improvement of the commuter rail system
and the commissioning of the so-called Regional Express Rail (RER thereafter).
While this policy mainly led to the improvement of the existing network, it also
1http://www.crossrail.co.uk/
2http://www.societedugrandparis.fr/english-version
3http://www.hsr.ca.gov/
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encompassed the construction of new stations and lines. The improvement of the
suburban rail system into a fast and high capacity network offers an interesting iden-
tification strategy to estimate the causal impact of public mass transit on firm, em-
ployment and population location across the metropolitan area. In fact, we estimate
the effect of a one-minute reduction in travel time by public transport on various in-
dicators at the municipality level.4 We implement a difference-in-differences design,
using a continuous treatment variable (instead of a binary measure), on a specific
subsample chosen to address the endogeneity bias (explained below). We find that
the number of jobs grew by 5.9% in a municipality when travel time decreases by
one minute on the 1975-1990 period. We obtain similar results for firm location.
However, we find no robust impact on the whole population growth.
The literature gives support to the idea that transportation plays a key role in the
economics of cities. There are both empirical and theoretical evidence that transport
infrastructures influence the location of people and economic activities within cities,
and also between cities (which is not covered in our work). The standard monocentric
city model predicts that a decrease in transportation costs should increase the share
of the population who lives in the suburbs (Alonso, 1960). According to this model,
it will also cause a rise in the global size of the city due to lower congestion costs.
Empirical results support this theoretical prediction. Baum-Snow (2007) studies
the effect of highways on the shape of US cities. He shows that roads explain one
third of the observed population displacement from city centers to the outskirts.
Similar results hold for Spain (Garc´ıa-Lo´pez et al., 2013). Duranton and Turner
(2012) highlight the positive impact of highways on city growth: a 10% increase in
the stock of highway causing a 1.5% rise in local employment in the US. However,
in line with theoretical models of economic geography, Faber (2014) confirms that
transportation could decrease economic activity in some cases. Indeed, he finds that
highways caused a reduction in the GDP growth of peripheral counties in China.
Empirical studies on firm location choices also highlight a positive link with
transport infrastructures. Coughlin and Segev (2000) show that highways foster
foreign-owned manufacturing plant location in US counties. Holl (2004a,b) finds
similar results in Portugal and Spain. Strauss-Kahn and Vives (2009) show that
the proximity to an airport is a significant factor for headquarter relocation in the
United States. More generally, transport infrastructure is positively associated with
the productivity of cities. According to Fernald (1999), highway construction in
the US increased the productivity of vehicle-intensive industries at a metropolitan
level. The contribution of our work is to provide results for firms, employment and
population, in order to assess the different impact of transportation depending on
the type of economic agent.
Evaluations of public transportation highlight the fact that the development of
mass transit has specific effects on cities, compared to other means of transporta-
tion. First, commuter rail systems help reduce air pollution in cities. Chen and
Whalley (2012) show that the opening of the metro of Taipei reduced measured
concentration in carbon monoxide by 5 to 15 percent. Second, rail influences the
location of people and jobs in cities, in a different way than other means of trans-
4We will use the terms municipality and city interchangeably to design the administrative unit
which is our unit of observation (more than 1300 of them in the Paris region).
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portation. According to Baum-Snow and Kahn (2000), commuter rail investments
cause a slight increase in the local value of properties in five major American cities.
It also encourages switching from driving to using public transportation. Besides,
Burchfield et al. (2006) show that cities, where public transportation was embedded
in the initial urban development plan, are less sprawled than cities built for cars,
because of higher commuting costs. Our results emphasize once again that Euro-
pean and American cities work differently (Brueckner et al., 1999). In the Parisian
case, we find suggestive evidence of a gentrification effect of commuter train in the
inner ring of Paris suburbs. Finally, considering the case of a major European city
appears relevant as urban mass transit plays a bigger role in commuting than in
Northern America. For example, only 5.3 percent of American workers use public
transportation to commute5 (McKenzie and Rapino, 2011), while 13.3 percent of
French workers do (Franc¸ois, 2010) and even 22.6 percent of Japanese commuters6
(Japan Census, 2010). Besides, car is prevalent in the US (90.0%), less prominent
in France (72.3%) and even rarer in Japan (46.9%).
Because transportation infrastructures are not randomly located, evaluation of
its impact faces up to a severe endogeneity issue. The consequence is that a naive
evaluation, comparing directly connected to unconnected areas, would certainly be
biased. In addition, intentions of policymakers are not clear; they may intend to con-
nect either dynamic or deprived areas depending on the public policy goal at the time
of decision. The sign of the endogeneity bias is thus undetermined. The literature of-
fers some examples of identification strategies to address this issue. Such strategies,
based on natural experiments or clever instruments, yield the causal impact of new
infrastructures. Duranton and Turner (2012) evaluate the impact of the highway
network in the United States on the local evolution of employment. They use an
instrumental variable strategy, based upon the 1947 plan of the interstate highway
system, partially based on military purposes, and on the 1898 network of railroads,
to address the endogeneity of the location of highways in 1980. Michaels (2008)
also uses the 1947 plan as an exogenous source of variation of roads for evaluating
the impact on interstate trade. Donaldson (2013) shows that railway extensions in
India led to a decrease in interregional trade costs and increased both incomes and
trade. To do so, he uses a natural experiment provided by 40,000 km of planned
lines which were never built for arguably exogenous reasons. Banerjee et al. (2012)
find a moderate positive effect of transportation access on income growth in China.
Their strategy relies on the fact that railroad lines were built in China to connect
European concessions on the coast and inland historical cities in the 19th century.
They argue that crossed areas, which were located in between these two sorts of
cities were “quasi-randomly” linked to the railway network and can be compared to
similar unconnected areas.
We provide two identification strategies to solve this endogeneity issue. The first
method is inspired by the approach of Banerjee et al. (2012). The RER network
was developed with the aim of connecting new economic subcenters to the historical
5Without people working at home.
6Workers and students over 15 years; public transportation includes company’s or school bus;
two modes of transport can be given, in that case, users are shared between the two modes, on a
half-half basis.
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center of the city. These economic subcenters are located between 15 and 30 km
away. Doing so, RER lines happen to cross areas which are located between the
historical core and these subcenters. Such stations were “quasi-randomly” included
in the RER enhancement program, as there was no “intention to treat” from the
policy makers. They can therefore be compared to similar untreated stations to
estimate the causal impact of railway improvement.
Our second identification, presented as a robustness test, is inspired by the
method of Donaldson (2013), Duranton and Turner (2012), Michaels (2008). An
urban plan has been presented in 1965 to improve the Paris suburban train system
and envisioned the construction of hundreds kilometers of new lines in the outskirts.
The actual RER network differs from this initial proposition, as its development
mainly consisted of an upgrade of the existing suburban rail lines. This this project
modification occurred after a political change and was mainly driven by budgetary
reasons. This incidental divergence from the initial project points out the exoge-
neous selection process of some parts of the RER network. We thus use it as an
alternative way to identify the causal impact of the treatment.
Lastly, data availability and precision is a key issue when trying to estimate
the impact of improved transport systems. Gibbons et al. (2012) insist on the fact
that, when networks are already dense, it is indeed not sufficient to observe the
fact of being connected to the transportation system, as it should already be the
case for a large range of locations, including untreated areas. On the contrary,
a precise measure of the improvement of rail service quality is required, to assess
to what extent a better public transport system affects the behavior of economic
agents. Therefore, we do not use the simple fact of being connected to the RER
as treatment. We develop a method to compute the average journey time by train
across the Paris metropolitan region, from 1969 to 2006. Of all the lines in the
RER network, some saw their travel time drastically reduced, thanks to substantial
investment while transportation conditions were hardly improved for others.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 relates the history of urban
planning in Paris region. The second section explains our estimation strategy. The
third section details the econometric model we use and section 2.5 presents the data
used in estimation. The fifth section sets out the results and finally, section 2.7
concludes and discusses our findings.
2.2 The development of the Paris region
A massive development of the Paris region7 occurred during the second half of the
20th century. While the population rose from 6.6 millions in 1946 to 9.2 in 1968 and
10.5 in 2006, job and population dramatically decentralized from the city center to
the outskirts of the city (see Table 2.1). The share of the population who lives in the
City of Paris, which precisely corresponds to the historical center of the metropolitan
area, decreased from 41% in 1946 to 28% in 1968 and 19% in 2006. Job location
followed the same phenomenon but remained unsurprisingly more centralized. The
proportion of workers who commutes to the city center dropped for both people
7Here, the administrative region Iˆle-de-France.
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Table 2.1: Distribution of population and employment in Paris region (ˆIle-de-France)
from 1946 to 2006
Percentage distribution
Paris
Suburbs
Total <15km 15-25km <25km
Surface (sq. km) 12,012 1 5 10 84
Population
1946 6,577,127 41 38 10 11
1968 9,229,592 28 43 17 12
1990 10,660,075 20 38 22 20
2006 11,528,869 19 37 22 22
Employment
1968 4,209,536 46 35 10 9
1990 5,062,338 36 35 15 14
2006 5,497,598 32 35 17 16
Sources: Population Census 1968-2006.
Table 2.2: Commuting pattern across Paris region (ˆIle-de-France) in 1968 and 2006
(in percent)
Place of work
Place of residence
Paris
Suburbs
<15km 15-25km >25km Total
1968
Paris 87 11 1 1 100
<15 km 31 65 2 1 100
15-25 km 27 19 51 3 100
>25 km 11 5 4 80 100
2006
Paris 68 24 5 3 100
<15 km 29 60 8 3 100
15-25 km 19 28 43 9 100
>25 km 12 14 16 58 100
Reading note: in 2006, 29% of the workforce living in the suburbs, within 15km from Paris,
commutes to Paris.
Sources: Population Census 1968-2006.
living in the City of Paris and people living on the outskirts of the metropolitan
areas (except for those living more than 25 km away from Paris, see Table 2.2).
Interestingly, the diagonal terms of the table, describing people working and living
in the same part of the Paris region, are always lower in 2006, compared to 1968.
This indicates that movements across the Paris region are more frequent than before.
While the development and organization of the suburbs was uncontrolled until
the 1960s, the coming to power of President De Gaulle can be seen as a turning point
(see section 2.A in the appendix for more details on the previous period). Indeed,
his government decided to implement a new planning policy to organize the scat-
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Figure 2.1: RER and new subcenters
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Source: IAU – Iˆle-de-France.
tered and under-equipped suburbs8 and to support the economic and demographic
development of the Paris region. The SDAURP9 urban plan, presented in 1965
embodied this change in policy. This plan included the redistribution of adminis-
trative boundaries, the construction of new infrastructures, the decentralization of
job and population in “new towns”. This SDAURP plan especially envisioned an
ambitious commuter rail system, the so-called Regional Express Rail. The RER
was supposed to upgrade the suburban train network by the construction of hun-
dreds of kilometers of new lines crossing the historical core of Paris towards the new
subcenters of the Paris metropolitan area, namely the five new towns10 (Marne-
la-Valle´e, Cergy-Pontoise, Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, Melun-Se´nart and E´vry), the
two airports (Orly and Roissy) and La De´fense business district.
8During a helicopter tour over the metropolitan area, President De Gaulle would even have
ordered Paul Delouvrier, General delegate for the Paris region, to “Put this mess in order!”
9Sche´ma directeur d’ame´nagement et d’urbanisme de la Re´gion Parisienne.
10New towns designate planned sub-cities located between 15 and 35 km away from the center
of Paris in relatively underdeveloped areas. They were supposed to receive between 500,000 and
1,000,000 inhabitants and thus disperse the population over the Paris region, in order to reduce
urban congestion.
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This ambitious project was implemented in the two subsequent decades in a more
modest way that initially planned. Eventually, the RER project mainly consisted
of upgrading existing lines by connecting them together with tunnels under the
historical city core of Paris. It also included the construction of new branch lines in
the outskirts, the commissioning of new trains and high-frequency services. In fact,
only 71 of the 433 RER stations are fully new; 98 km of railways were built and 22
km were reopened out of a 600-km network.
However, the five-line network, progressively opened between 1969 and 2004,
reaches the goals assigned by the 1965 plan to connect the new subcenters to the
historical center of Paris (see Figure 2.1). Despite only few new track segments,
the RER led to a significant improvement of the commuter rail network and made
commuting much easier (see Figure 2.4 in the appendix for an example). According
to our simulations, the mean travel time to Paris11 was 49.9 minutes in 1969. Be-
tween 1969 and 2009 it decreased by 5.8 minutes for the municipalities connected to
the RER while it decreased only by 1.3 minutes in the municipalities outside of the
new network. Thus, the RER offered about a 10 percent drop in commuting time
for connected municipalities. This improvement may seem limited but the average
effect hides a wide variety of situations. First, the journey time may only change for
some neighborhoods. In addition, some lines did not improve much the travel time
because they almost exclusively used existing rail tracks.
2.3 Identification strategy
One of the core challenges raised by this study was the need for an identification
strategy addressing the endogeneity issue. A significant problem of transportation
system evaluation is that new infrastructures are obviously not randomly located.
As new lines and new stations were actually rare, our empirical strategy focuses
on existing stations. We build a control group containing some suburban train
stations that were not connected to the RER in 1990. We compare it to some
stations that already existed in 1960 and that have been upgraded to RER stations
before 1990. This section describes precisely which stations we select to obtain an
exogenous treatment. We first present our main identification strategy, based on
intermediate stations that are located between Paris city center and new economic
subcenters and explain why such stations were upgraded “by accident”. Then, we
introduce an alternative identification strategy, as a robustness test, which relies on
the comparison between the initial plan and the actual RER network.
2.3.1 Comparison of intermediate cities
Our main identification strategy focuses on intermediate cities. As stated above, the
RER network was developed with the aim of connecting the historical center of Paris
to new subcenters. Consequently, RER lines happen to cross municipalities located
in-between. We argue these municipalities have been connected to the RER network
11Travel time to Paris is the mean of the minimum travel times to the 20 boroughs of Paris. In
addition, we only consider the municipalities between 5 and 35 km from Paris which are the most
likely to benefit from the RER, excluding the underground catchment area.
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without intention to treat, in a similar approach than the one developed by Banerjee
et al. (2012). In addition, the RER project mainly consisted of the enhancement
of the existing commuter train network. This means that most of the intermediate
stations were built in the 19th century, thus leaving no possibility of RER route
manipulation. Besides, urban planning policies were highly centralized until the
1982 decentralization law, which invalidate the argument that local authorities may
have influenced the RER project definition.
In our regressions, we only consider municipalities with at least one commuter
rail station in 1975. We first exclude termini areas from both control and treat-
ment groups as they might have been explicitly targeted by the RER policy. By
termini areas, we mean the historic city of Paris and municipalities which are part
of a new town, host an airport or the business district of La De´fense (see Figure
2.1). Treatment is clearly not exogenous in these cases. In addition, as all new
towns, airports, historic city center or business district were connected to the RER
network, it is impossible to find a proper counterfactual for these municipalities. We
also exclude municipalities connected to the underground network because it is not
possible to use our identification strategy for them, that is to say a strategy based
on intermediate municipalities.
Among the municipalities selected in our subsample, some were connected to the
RER network because they happened to be located on the itinerary between the
historical city center and new economic centers. We logically use them as a treat-
ment group, excluding municipalities which were treated for other reasons.12 Other
municipalities, which are still served by commuter train but not by the RER, are
used as a control group. Finally, we only include municipalities within 25km from
Paris in our sample because outer ring municipalities, located further, were often
rural in the 1960s and makes up only 11% of the Paris region population and 9% of
jobs in 1968 (see Table 2.1). In addition, these municipalities are too far from Paris
to be located on the itinerary to new economic subcenters (see Figure 2.2). Finally,
Table 2.10 (in the appendix) shows that there is no significant difference in the em-
ployment growth of control and treatment groups before the RER implementation,
providing support for the hypothesis of treatment exogeneity in this subsample.
We argue that the location of the new economic centers in the Paris metropolitan
region is exogenous. Indeed, the initial 1965 project mentioned the construction of
eight new towns while only five have been actually built. Moreover, experts of that
12Collardey (1999) details many technical reasons which explain the selection of RER lines
amongst suburban rail lines. First, some lines were totally out of date and needed a major im-
provement. For example, the Vincennes line which serves the South East part of the region, was
still served by steam-engine trains in 1969. Second, three stations in Paris required an underground
extension in order to relieve traffic congestion, and were logically connected to the RER. In Auster-
litz station, suburban train interfered with main-line traffic when crossing the station; St-Lazare
station was the first station in terms of suburban traffic; free surface railway tracks were needed
in Lyon station for high speed rail. Third, Gerondeau (2003) interestingly describes the difficult
relationships between the two public companies in charge of Paris suburban train network, RATP
(the subway company) and SNCF (the national railway company). RATP envisioned the RER
project as a regional subway which would be independent of SNCF suburban network. The first
two lines and the SDAURP plan of 1965 have been planned according to this idea and consequently
required SNCF to sell local lines, without any main-line traffic, or to build brand new lines. This
would not be the case anymore from the 1980s.
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Figure 2.2: Control and treatment groups
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Source: IAU – Iˆle-de-France.
process (Alduy, 1983) insist on the fact that they were located in mostly rural areas
and not in already developed places. Besides, the Orly airport was established on
a WWI military base. The Roissy airport was located in a large agricultural land
plot. Consequently, it is very unlikely that the location of these subcenters (airports
and new towns) was determined to facilitate the connection of intermediate cities to
the RER.
2.3.2 Differences between plans and realizations
Our alternative identification strategy, used as a robustness test, relies on the dif-
ference between the initial RER project and the actual network. Even if tunneling
works for the East-West line started in 1961 (see section 2.A in the appendix for
more details), the RER project was actually launched in 1965 with the SDAURP
plan. As stated before, this very ambitious plan has been deeply modified during
the development of the actual RER network. When possible, existing lines were
improved instead of building sections of new rail tracks. We use this substantial
difference between the 1965 SDAURP plan and the eventual network to build an al-
ternative identification strategy. The treatment group contains municipalities which
31
Chapter 2 – The Impacts of Urban Public Transportation
were not supposed to be treated according to the initial 1965 plan, but were even-
tually connected to the RER network (see Figure 2.3 in the appendix). The control
group remains unchanged compared to the main identification strategy.
In addition, this turnout in the RER project is largely due to non-economic
factors, independent from growth perspectives of treated municipalities. Zembri
(2006) shows that the election of President Pompidou, following the resignation of
President de Gaulle in 1969, played a major role in the way the RER project was
developed. The cost of the projected new lines was his main reason to deviate from
the initial project, the new administration considered it was possible to achieve
similar goals, largely relying on the existing network. As stated before, this turned
out to be true. Such sudden changes in the RER program also suggest that long-
term economic anticipations were not pivotal in the choice of RER routes except
for new subcenters. Moreover, there is no chance that development perspectives do
change that quickly when considering the construction of a transport infrastructure
designed to last more than a century. Finally, we find similar results with both
identification strategies for employment (see Table 2.13 in the appendix).
2.4 Econometric method
This section presents how we measure the effect of the RER on firm location, em-
ployment and population, applying the two identification strategies presented in the
previous section. As stated before, we work at the municipality level and our main
treatment variable is the variation in travel time by public transportation from our
stations of interest to the city center (defined as the City of Paris). This accounts
more precisely for the heterogeneity in the RER treatment. We also run robustness
checks using a dummy variable taking value one if a RER station is located in the
municipality.
The period covered by our estimation stretches from 1975 to 1990. Considering
the fact that the RER network progressively spread over the Paris metropolitan
region, the treatment group enlarges over time while the control group becomes
smaller (see Figure 2.2). Consequently, there are too few untreated municipalities
in the inner ring after 1990, it is thus difficult to use our identification strategy after
that date. In addition, major network improvements were put into service in the
1970s and the 1980s; RER impact consequently fades out in the subsequent period,
even if we find significant but smaller RER effect between 1990 and 2006 (see Table
2.12 in the appendix).
∆ lnYi,75→90 = ∆timei,75→90 + βXi,1975 + i (2.1)
The dependent variable is the growth rate in population, employment or count
of firms (Y ) in municipality i between 1975 and 1990, ∆ lnYi,75→90 = lnYi,1990 −
lnYi,1975. We regress this variable on the treatment which is the variation in the
travel time between 1975 and 199013. We also add initial socio-demographic and
geographic controls Xi: initial density of the considered variable, land availability
(i.e. the share of farm land in 1960), distance to Paris, surface, geographic dummies
13Alternative time spells and variables are tested as robustness tests, see part 2.6.4.
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Table 2.3: Comparison of control and treatment groups – Mean values and standard
deviations
Untreated Treated
Pop. density in 1975 (people per sq. km) 3420
(3266)
5800
(2909)
Empl. density in 1975 (worker per sq. km) 989
(1317)
1759
(1510)
Firm density in 1975 (firm per sq. km) 109
(140)
167
(105)
Travel time to Paris in 1975 (minutes) 47
(8)
41
(7)
∆ travel time to Paris 1975-1990 (minutes) 1.4
(1)
2.8
(1.5)
Distance to Paris (km) 16.5
(4.6)
13.6
(4.4)
Surface (sq. km) 6
(3.3)
6.6
(4.9)
Job growth rate 1968-75 (in pct) 24
(48)
12
(29)
Job growth rate 1975-90 (in pct) 32
(62)
22
(38)
Number of cities 64 32
Note: treatment status in 1990, a treated city includes a RER station. Standard deviations in
parenthesis.
Sources: Population Census, SIRENE.
(North, South, East or West of Paris), initial travel time by mass transit and mea-
sures of alternative transportation infrastructure (highways, and commuter train for
some specifications).
Table 2.3 shows initial discrepancies between control and treatment groups in
1975. Treated municipalities, i.e. municipalities with at least one RER station, are
denser and closer to Paris. We also noticed that the growth rate of employment is
higher for untreated municipalities compared to treated ones. It is due to the fact
that control group municipalities are smaller and grew more rapidly because of a
catch-up phenomenon.
We investigate further on those differences in Table 2.4, where we regress travel
time reduction and a dummy variable indicating the presence of a RER station on
the characteristics of the city. Column (1) shows a clear link between RER and
travel time reduction. Travel time decreased by 2.8 minutes between 1975 and 1990
in treated municipalities while it only dropped by 1.4 minutes in municipalities
outside of the RER network. Column (2) to (3) shows that very few variables
are significantly correlated with travel time variation, which validates the choice of
the treatment variable. On the opposite, as stated in column (4) and (5), there is a
clearer link between RER stations location and demographic characteristics of cities,
confirming descriptive statistics presented in Table 2.3. It is a second important
argument in favor of using time variation as treatment variable, it does not only
provide a more accurate quantification of the treatment, it is also more exogenous.
Finally, we provide an additional robustness test based on the weighted propensity
score method (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2008), to ensure that our estimation of the
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treatment effect is not biased by non-linearities.14 The results presented in Table
2.11 (in the appendix) are very similar to baseline results. This confirms our model
controls for the preexisting differences between control and treatment groups.
Finally, an important caveat should be added regarding interpretation of the
results. There may be two effects of RER: attractiveness and displacement. If
employment rises due to increased attractiveness, untreated municipalities should
not be affected. In that case, the RER network increases employment or the total
number of firms in the whole region. On the contrary, if employment increases
in a treated municipality because of a displacement effect, it necessarily implies a
decrease for other municipalities, and even potentially municipalities belonging to
the control group. Obviously, the reality is most likely in between. To discriminate
between the two effects in the case of firm location, Schmidheiny and Bru¨lhart
(2011) suggest the use of a nested logit model in order to separate the respective
share of relocation and attractiveness. The estimation of such a model requires
to consider outside options for individual firms (for example, the rest of France and
other European countries). We leave this more ambitious exercise to future research,
as focusing on effects inside the Paris area will not allow us to isolate the two effects
rigorously.
2.5 Data
We use data at the municipality level from different sources to provide informa-
tion on firm counts, employment and population. We also build a new dataset to
precisely describe the evolution of the urban transportation system between the
1970s and the 2000s. Municipality is the most accurate geographical scale available
since more desegregated data are computed only from the 1990s. Although, French
municipalities are particularly small in comparison with other European countries
(1300 in the Paris region) which is an adequate geographical scale for this type of
estimation. Finally, there are 96 municipalities in the regression sample (see Figure
2.3).
Most of the data used in our analysis are Census data. Census provides a large
set of variables at the municipality level, directly comparable over time. This dataset
includes population level, employment broken down in four industries (agriculture,
manufacturing, construction and services), commuting patterns and the social com-
position in terms of diploma at each census year (e.g. 1968, 1975, 1982, 1990, 1999
and 2006). Data about firms come from the French administrative business register
“SIRENE”between 1974 and 2004, which is less reliable than the Census for use over
a long period of time (changing structure, new nomenclatures). SIRENE provides
information on the industry and location of each firm, along with its opening and
closing years. We calculate the firm stock at the municipality level, at each census
year. We also use information on foreign investments over the period under study.
Until the 1990s, foreigner investors had to register every investment in France at the
French Treasury. We computed a dataset of foreign investment direct investment
14We weight treated municipalities, i.e. municipalities with a RER station in 1990, by 1/e
and control municipalities by 1/(1− e) in our baseline regression, where e is the propensity score
estimated with the regression presented in the column (5) of Table 2.4.
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(FDI), using this administrative requirement. As this compulsory registration was
phased out in the 1990s, reliable data on FDI are available only until 1994.
Our first treatment variable is the variation in travel time by public transporta-
tion. It partly accounts for the RER effect on train service quality. To build this
variable, we assume that RER did not increase the speed of trains, but improved
travel time by public transportation thanks to fewer train changes (see Figure 2.4
for an example). This assumption is likely to hold as a large majority of the electri-
fication of the commuter train network, which increased the train speed through the
phasing out of steam traction, was completed several years before. The observed
variation of travel time is therefore due to the connection of isolated lines. In fact,
we consider the commuter train and metro networks as one graph. The train and
metro stations are the nodes of this graph while lines which link the stations are
the edges of this graph. We apply a simple shortest path algorithm to calculate the
journey time between two stations of the transportation system. To compute this
journey duration for a given year, we remove edges corresponding to lines opened
after this date. We thus obtain a matrix of travel duration between every station of
the transportation system, year by year, from 1969 to 2009.
We aggregate the matrix in a single variable which is the mean of the travel time
to the 20 districts of the City of Paris. This variable, hereafter the mean travel
time to Paris, is a good summary of the transportation system as the network is
highly centralized towards Paris. We consider the travel time to all districts of Paris
because the RER development mainly consisted of the digging of four tunnel inside
Paris to connect isolated lines. The travel time to the closest districts possibly did
not decreased while a new tunnel may allow a better connection, and thus a lower
travel time, to more distant districts.
However, this treatment variable may not fully account for the improved train
service due to the RER, such as higher frequency, new trains, better reliability.
To test the robustness of our approach, we use alternative variables, namely the
presence of a RER station in the municipality and the number of RER stations in
the municipality. A natural measure of the improved quality of the network would
be the increased frequency of trains, which played a big role in the improvement
of the Paris commuter train system. Unfortunately, data are not available over our
period of reference.
Note also that all treatment variables are aggregated at the municipality level,
while they only affect economic agents located in the vicinity of a station. Conse-
quently, we do not know exactly who benefit from such improvements. Indeed, in
a given municipality, there are both treated (in the catchment area of a RER sta-
tion) and untreated (in other parts of the municipality) economic agents. In other
words, a higher number of RER stations or a greater reduction in travel time do
not necessarily imply a transport service improvement of same magnitude, at the
municipality level.
We do not want highway accessibility to bias RER effect estimation, that is why
we also control for proximity to the highway network. Indeed, highways are not
uniformly distributed among Paris metropolitan region, car-based accessibility was
improved in some municipalities while it is stable in other. For a given municipality,
we create a dummy taking value one if the nearest highway is less than 1km away.
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Table 2.4: Determinants of municipality selection for RER treatment
Dependant variable: ∆timeParis 1975−90 RER station
Model: OLS Logistic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 1.351∗∗∗
(0.128)
2.381∗∗
(0.97)
0.501
(1.758)
−0.439
(0.924)
5.65∗
(2.902)
RER1990 1.445
∗∗∗
(0.295)
Pop density1975 < 1000 −1.165
(1.012)
−2.058
(1.349)
−1.817
(1.442)
−6.026∗∗
(2.468)
Pop density1975 [1000, 2500] −1.294
(1.023)
−2.196∗
(1.308)
−1.21
(1.208)
−5.527∗∗
(2.279)
Pop density1975 [2500, 5000] −0.751
(1.022)
−1.611
(1.27)
0.796
(1.073)
−1.791
(1.879)
Pop density1975 [5000, 10000] −0.079
(1.036)
−0.648
(1.132)
1.073
(1.015)
0.463
(1.58)
Pop density1975 > 10000 ref. ref. ref. ref.
Pop growth1946−75 0.049
(0.043)
0.007
(0.041)
−0.177
(0.128)
−0.362∗
(0.214)
timeParis 1975 0.052
(0.034)
−0.113∗∗
(0.052)
< 1km highway 0.427
(0.422)
2.708∗∗
(1.173)
5km ≤ dParis < 10km −0.399
(0.764)
−3.456∗
(2.1)
10km ≤ dParis < 15km 0.409
(0.497)
−1.389
(1.623)
15km ≤ dParis < 20km 0.508∗
(0.275)
0.601
(1.419)
20km ≤ dParis < 25km ref. ref.
Share of farmland1960 −0.425
(0.543)
4.317∗∗
(2.14)
West 0.031
(0.375)
0.289
(1.017)
North ref. ref.
East −0.019
(0.628)
−1.005
(1.316)
South 0.272
(0.416)
−0.206
(1.007)
Surface 0.017
(0.037)
0.064
(0.096)
Number of observations 96 96 96 96 96
R2 0.246 0.125 0.258
AIC 111 109
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions are
run on cities that had a train station in 1975, excluding economic subcenters and located between
5 and 25 km away from Paris. Treatment group includes only intermediate cities.
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2.6 Results
2.6.1 The RER effect on employment
Table 2.5 provides our benchmark results on employment growth. The first column
presents the simplest way of estimating the parameter of interest. All municipalities
connected to the suburban rail network are included except for the most central
part of the Paris region, very urbanized and equipped with a dense subway system.
We also control for some basic characteristics of the municipalities. A dominant
feature of the city-level growth in Paris region seems to be the catching up, since
the effect of initial job density declines steadily with the level of density. We obtain
a positive and significant impact of 5.7%. Besides, this column shows that the
economic subcenters of Paris region grew extremely quickly between 1975 and 1990.
Excluding these subcenters in column (2) hardly decreases the coefficient associated
to the treatment to around 5.6%.
The results of our preferred identification strategy are reported in column (3) and
(4). The treatment group includes only intermediate cities, located between Paris
and economics subcenters. In the regression whose results are reported in column
(3), we include a large set of controls that are likely to drive job location whereas
we only keep influential variables in column (4). Finally, our preferred regression
is reported in column (4). We find that employment grows by 5.9% when reducing
travel time to Paris by one minute, between 1975 and 1990. Note that distances to
the closest airport and the closest new town are not significant in column (3) and
do not change much the magnitude of treatment effect when removed in column (4).
This means that the larger employment growth in RER intermediate municipalities
is not due to a potential spillover effect deriving from their proximity to economic
subcenters. We argue that the effect we find is due to improved transportation.
This RER effect appears to be important, our explanation is that treatment
measurement does not only capture the fact that the RER system shortens travels
by public transportation, thanks to more direct routes. It probably also accounts
for all other RER improvements: new trains, more frequent services or renovated
stations. As a robustness test, we interact the RER dummy variable with our
baseline treatment variable (see Table 2.9 in the appendix). We interestingly find
that employment increases only if the travel time reduction is associated with the
the opening of a RER station. This confirms that our treatment variable captures
multiple dimensions of RER improvement.
2.6.2 Different tastes for accessibility
We now turn to the effect of RER on the number of firms and across sectors for
employment. Table 2.6 indicates that the positive effect of the Regional Express
Rail is also valid for firm location choices. However, we note that the estimated
impact on the number of firms is lower than the one obtained for employment.
Striking differences arise when we look at the effects of the RER system on foreign-
owned firms. First, initial density does not seem to exhibit the same catch up effect
as in column (1). Second, the RER treatment effect is much larger in magnitude for
this set of firms. The number of foreign-owned firm grows by 12.5% when travel time
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Table 2.5: Effect of RER on employment at the municipality level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependant variable: ∆ ln employment1975−90
Sample restriction:
- No economic subcenters X X X
- Only intermediate munici-
palities in treatment group
X X
Intercept −0.194
(0.381)
−0.155
(0.384)
0.031
(0.59)
−0.252
(0.269)
∆timeParis 1975−90 0.057∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.056∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.066∗∗∗
(0.02)
0.059∗∗∗
(0.019)
timeParis 1975 −0.005
(0.005)
−0.003
(0.005)
−0.006
(0.006)
−0.006
(0.005)
Job density1975 < 200 0.819
∗∗∗
(0.133)
0.72∗∗∗
(0.135)
0.657∗∗∗
(0.181)
0.652∗∗∗
(0.157)
Job density1975 [200, 500] 0.643
∗∗∗
(0.118)
0.588∗∗∗
(0.115)
0.488∗∗∗
(0.173)
0.519∗∗∗
(0.137)
Job density1975 [500, 1000] 0.318
∗∗∗
(0.094)
0.339∗∗∗
(0.092)
0.308∗
(0.163)
0.317∗∗∗
(0.116)
Job density1975 [1000, 2500] 0.217
∗∗∗
(0.081)
0.206∗∗∗
(0.077)
0.172
(0.143)
0.199∗∗
(0.1)
Job density1975 > 2500 ref. ref. ref. ref.
< 1km highway 0.082
(0.081)
0.076
(0.079)
0.082
(0.1)
0.086
(0.097)
5km ≤ dParis < 10km 0.355∗∗∗
(0.135)
0.353∗∗∗
(0.128)
0.09
(0.175)
0.157
(0.133)
10km ≤ dParis < 15km 0.172∗
(0.094)
0.167∗
(0.095)
0.008
(0.128)
0.088
(0.102)
15km ≤ dParis < 20km 0.114
(0.083)
0.135
(0.082)
0.025
(0.107)
0.05
(0.106)
20km ≤ dParis < 25km ref. ref. ref. ref.
Share of farmland1960 0.245
∗∗
(0.123)
0.231∗
(0.121)
0.207
(0.145)
0.245
(0.157)
Surface −0.002
(0.005)
0.002
(0.005)
0.008
(0.007)
0.011
(0.008)
West 0.055
(0.083)
−0.014
(0.071)
0.036
(0.084)
North ref. ref. ref.
East 0.062
(0.124)
−0.023
(0.109)
0.022
(0.132)
South −0.021
(0.131)
−0.093
(0.125)
−0.111
(0.166)
Dist. to new town −0.007
(0.01)
−0.008
(0.01)
−0.0005
(0.0156)
Dist. to airport −0.004
(0.007)
−0.007
(0.007)
−0.009
(0.011)
New town 0.707∗∗
(0.302)
Airport 0.04
(0.112)
La Defense 0.491∗∗∗
(0.13)
Number of observations 143 128 96 96
R2 0.508 0.38 0.398 0.379
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions are
run on cities that had a train station in 1975 and located between 5 and 25 km away from Paris.
Sources: Population Census.
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decreases by one minute. This suggests that mass transit affects foreign firms more
intensely than local ones. It is also to be noted that highways have a much stronger
impact. Therefore, transport infrastructure, and access to the city center appears to
play a major role in decision to invest for foreign investors. The last four columns
show the effect of the RER on the industry specialization of the municipality, broken
down into agriculture, construction, manufacturing and services. The point estimate
is similar across industries, except for agriculture. Based on these results, we can not
conclude that RER caused a shift in industry composition in treated municipalities,
except obviously for agriculture.
Table 2.7 reports results for the overall population growth. We find a weak and
significant effect of travel time decrease on the population. However, this effect is
not robust to the use of alternative treatment variables (see Tables 2.9 and 2.14) or
of the second identification strategy (see Table 2.15 in the appendix).
We find suggestive evidence of a gentrification effect. We do not observe either
income or housing prices at the city level in the 1970s and the 1980s. Given this data
limitation, the skill level of the population can be considered as an acceptable first
approximation. We break down the population into three categories: low-skilled
(primary- or middle-school), middle-skilled (vocational- or high-school) and highly-
skilled (higher education). We find a significant impact of the RER on the highly-
skilled population and this effect is robust across specifications (see Tables 2.14 and
2.15 in the appendix). This suggests a greater attractiveness of land nearby RER
stations, meaning that more accessible areas end up being inhabited by households
with a higher willingness to pay for housing. Given that the inner ring was already
widely urbanized in the 1960s, especially in the vicinity of suburban train stations,
a global population growth would have required to densify treated municipalities.
However, chapter 5 highlight a low supply elasticity on the French housing market
in the long-term, suggesting that the RER is unlikely to increase the housing stock
in previously developed areas.15 In a word, our results suggest that the increased
accessibility resulted in a population displacement effect.
2.6.3 A better access to metropolitan job market
We test our model on the length of commuting trips to better understand the re-
lation between firm location choice and transportation. For a given municipality,
we calculate the mean distances traveled by residents to go to work and the mean
distance traveled by workers to commute from home. Then we regress the change in
the distance traveled between 1975 and 1990 on the variables of the model. Table
2.8 shows that workers commute significantly further from home in treated munici-
palities. When travel time to Paris decreases by one minute, the mean commuting
distance of workers increases by 4.1%. On the contrary, we find no impact of RER on
the commuting distance of residents. Such results are in line with the fact that RER
affects more clearly firm location than resident location. It also means that firms
choose to locate in treated municipalities because they can reach a broader labor
market. RER is probably a driver of job decentralization within the Paris region be-
15This question would need to be linked with regulation of land use and building height, but
here again lack of data limits the possibilities for further investigations.
39
Chapter 2 – The Impacts of Urban Public Transportation
Table 2.6: Effect of RER on firms and employment by industry
Dependant variable: ∆ ln firm75−90 ∆ ln employment75−90
Sample: All firms Foreign Agricul- Manufac- Construc- Services
firms ture turing tion
Intercept −0.446∗
(0.229)
0.754
(0.633)
−0.946
(0.867)
1.434
(0.972)
3.139∗∗∗
(0.986)
2.256
(1.522)
∆timeParis 1975−90 0.031∗∗
(0.014)
0.125∗∗
(0.048)
0.022
(0.068)
0.08∗∗
(0.037)
0.094∗∗∗
(0.03)
0.056∗∗
(0.022)
timeParis 1975 0.009
∗∗
(0.004)
−0.013
(0.014)
0.003
(0.015)
−0.018
(0.012)
−0.01
(0.008)
−0.009
(0.006)
5km ≤ dParis < 10km 0.161
(0.108)
0.945∗∗∗
(0.329)
0.811∗
(0.439)
0.524∗∗
(0.216)
0.086
(0.225)
0.049
(0.136)
10km ≤ dParis < 15km 0.102
(0.094)
0.821∗∗∗
(0.262)
−0.153
(0.318)
0.348∗
(0.195)
0.103
(0.214)
0.012
(0.103)
15km ≤ dParis < 20km 0.051
(0.094)
0.537∗
(0.308)
−0.396
(0.253)
0.351∗
(0.195)
0.022
(0.177)
0.021
(0.122)
20km ≤ dParis < 25km ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Share of farmland1960 0.278
∗
(0.156)
0.032
(0.624)
0.896∗
(0.501)
0.22
(0.377)
0.06
(0.248)
0.161
(0.17)
Surface 0.002
(0.007)
0.019
(0.018)
−0.009
(0.023)
0.004
(0.012)
0.014
(0.013)
0.007
(0.009)
< 1km highway 0.022
(0.076)
0.526∗∗
(0.21)
−0.328
(0.242)
0.4∗∗
(0.162)
−0.19
(0.161)
0.098
(0.128)
Firm density1975 < 50 0.327
∗∗
(0.133)
−0.342
(0.55)
Firm density1975 [50, 100] 0.186
∗
(0.111)
−0.653
(0.506)
Firm density1975 [100, 200] 0.115
(0.082)
−0.395
(0.422)
Firm density1975 [200, 500] 0.017
(0.066)
−0.523∗
(0.275)
Firm density1975 >500 ref. ref.
ln dens. foreign firms1975 −0.51∗∗∗
(0.097)
Job density1975 < 200 0.995
∗
(0.533)
0.316
(0.509)
−1.233∗∗∗
(0.406)
−0.412
(0.597)
Job density1975 [200, 500] 0.554
(0.458)
0.268
(0.358)
−0.661∗
(0.369)
−0.222
(0.431)
Job density1975 [500, 1000] 0.964
∗∗
(0.399)
−0.002
(0.274)
−0.703∗∗
(0.299)
−0.176
(0.317)
Job density1975 [1000, 2500] 0.524
(0.331)
0.085
(0.163)
−0.375∗
(0.2)
−0.103
(0.179)
Job density1975 > 2500 ref. ref. ref. ref.
ln dens. agricult.1975 −0.504∗∗∗
(0.098)
ln dens. manufa.1975 −0.303∗∗∗
(0.095)
ln dens. building1975 −0.548∗∗∗
(0.158)
ln dens. services1975 −0.263
(0.192)
Number of observations 96 74 69 95 96 96
R2 0.485 0.506 0.53 0.484 0.398 0.319
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions are
run on cities that had a train station in 1975, excluding economic subcenters and located between
5 and 25 km away from Paris. Treatment group includes only intermediate cities. The regressions
on skill level are run on the labor force.
Sources: Population Census, SIRENE.
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Table 2.7: Effect of RER on population by level of education
Dependant variable: ∆ ln population75−90
Sample: All Primary Vocational Higher
or middle or high education
school school
Intercept 0.23
(0.172)
−0.275
(0.818)
1.537∗∗
(0.755)
2.182∗∗∗
(0.382)
∆timeParis 1975−90 0.022∗∗
(0.009)
0.026∗∗
(0.012)
0.03∗∗
(0.013)
0.046∗∗∗
(0.016)
timeParis 1975 −0.005
(0.003)
−0.003
(0.004)
−0.01∗∗
(0.004)
−0.0001
(0.0036)
5km ≤ dParis < 10km −0.167∗∗
(0.08)
−0.247∗∗
(0.099)
−0.369∗∗∗
(0.104)
0.158
(0.13)
10km ≤ dParis < 15km −0.113
(0.072)
−0.186∗∗
(0.086)
−0.283∗∗∗
(0.088)
0.025
(0.095)
15km ≤ dParis < 20km −0.053
(0.065)
−0.072
(0.075)
−0.177∗∗
(0.078)
−0.025
(0.089)
Share of farmland1960 0.074
(0.138)
0.18
(0.152)
0.055
(0.149)
−0.187
(0.144)
Surface −0.003
(0.005)
0.003
(0.007)
−0.001
(0.006)
−0.007
(0.007)
< 1km highway 0.047
(0.065)
0.028
(0.073)
0.069
(0.066)
0.016
(0.075)
Pop density1975 < 1000 0.185
∗
(0.106)
−0.024
(0.286)
−0.103
(0.315)
−0.223
(0.172)
Pop density1975 [1000, 2500] 0.236
∗∗∗
(0.088)
0.107
(0.183)
0.09
(0.196)
0.093
(0.154)
Pop density1975 [2500, 5000] 0.049
(0.059)
−0.039
(0.124)
−0.08
(0.13)
0.039
(0.105)
Pop density1975 [5000, 10000] −0.0007
(0.0217)
−0.026
(0.063)
−0.036
(0.066)
0.012
(0.087)
Pop density1975 > 10000 ref. ref. ref. ref.
ln dens. prim. or midddle school1975 0.027
(0.09)
ln dens. voc. or high school1975 −0.093
(0.103)
ln dens. higher education1975 −0.284∗∗∗
(0.059)
Number of observations 96 96 96 96
R2 0.359 0.3 0.43 0.567
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions are
run on cities that had a train station in 1975, excluding economic subcenters and located between
5 and 25 km away from Paris. Treatment group includes only intermediate cities.
Sources: Population Census.
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cause firms can hire workers that used to be reachable only from the central part of
the metropolitan region before RER implementation. Better public transportation
allows to hire them in a peripheral location.
2.6.4 Robustness checks
The central assumption of difference-in-differences models is that the control group
and the treatment group would have grown by the same amount in absence of the
treatment. To test for this common trend assumption, we provide a placebo test.
We run our model on the 1968-1975 period to be sure there is no ex-ante trend gap
between groups. The placebo test gives support to our identification strategy as we
do not find any significant impact of RER before 1975 using two different treatment
variables for both population and employment (see Table 2.10 in the appendix). It
also shows that the RER did not induce significant anticipation effects on firms. We
generalize these placebo tests, in Table 2.12 (in the appendix). We estimate the
effect of travel time variation on population and employment growth across different
periods (1968-1975, 1975-1990 and 1990-2006). We find no significant impact of
RER before 1975 and a smaller impact after 1990.
Table 2.9 (in appendix) presents the estimation of the treatment effect using
alternative treatment variables: a dummy variable indicating whether a municipality
is connected to the RER network or not in 1990, the interaction terms of the previous
dummy variable with the travel time decrease, and the number of stations in a given
municipality in 1990. All variables yield significant results for job location confirming
the robustness of mass transit impact on employment. Indeed, employment increases
by 12.3% in municipalities connected to the RER network compared to municipalities
which are only served by suburban train. Besides, employment increases by 12.7%
with an additional station. As stated above, the reduction in journey duration causes
an increase in employment only in municipalities connected to the RER network.
Finally, this robustness check is not conclusive for population, treatment effect is
weakly significant in only one out of three specifications and no significant at all in
the two other cases.
Finally, we run our model using the second identification strategy presented in
section 2.3.2 using the differences between the actual RER network and the initial
1965 project. As explain before, we do not use intermediate stations, located on
RER lines linking Paris and economic subcenters, as a treatment group. We select
instead municipalities that should not have been connected to the RER network
according to the 1965 SDAURP plan but that happened to be actually treated. We
obtain a very similar RER effect for employment and placebo tests (see Table 2.13 in
the appendix). However, as mentioned before, we do not find any significant impact
of a reduction in journey duration on the total population growth.
2.7 Conclusion
The Regional Express Rail was an important enhancement of the Paris suburban
train service. From 1969 to 2003, it progressively improved the mass transit system
by connecting isolated lines, serving new economic sub-centers and introducing more
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Table 2.8: Effect of RER on commuting distance
Sample: Workers Residents
(dist. to home) (dist. to the workplace)
Dependent variable: ∆ ln mean commuting distance
1975-1990 1968-1975 1975-1990 1968-1975
Intercept 0.931∗∗∗
(0.188)
0.256
(0.297)
0.953∗∗∗
(0.098)
0.893∗∗∗
(0.208)
∆timeParis 1975−90 0.041∗∗∗
(0.014)
−0.015
(0.015)
0.0007
(0.0029)
−0.003
(0.006)
timeParis 1975 −0.004
(0.003)
0.013∗∗
(0.006)
−0.002∗
(0.001)
0.0006
(0.0018)
5km ≤ dParis < 10km 0.066
(0.076)
0.183
(0.131)
−0.155∗∗∗
(0.037)
−0.262∗∗∗
(0.085)
10km ≤ dParis < 15km 0.082
(0.073)
0.103
(0.102)
−0.095∗∗∗
(0.025)
−0.177∗∗∗
(0.06)
15km ≤ dParis < 20km 0.082
(0.065)
−0.06
(0.121)
−0.037∗
(0.02)
−0.123∗∗
(0.052)
20km ≤ dParis < 25km ref. ref. ref. ref.
Share of farmland1960 −0.035
(0.108)
0.463∗∗
(0.191)
−0.075∗∗
(0.032)
−0.11
(0.087)
Surface 0.014∗∗
(0.006)
0.00007
(0.00845)
−0.002
(0.001)
0.002
(0.003)
< 1km highway 0.162∗∗
(0.078)
0.019
(0.073)
−0.005
(0.016)
−0.059
(0.04)
Job density1975 X
Job density1968 X
Population density1975 X
Population density1968 X
ln dist. to home1975 −0.424∗∗∗
(0.102)
ln dist. to home1968 −0.446∗∗∗
(0.088)
ln dist. to the workplace1975 −0.344∗∗∗
(0.037)
ln dist. to the workplace1968 −0.334∗∗∗
(0.078)
Number of observations 96 96 96 96
R2 0.493 0.454 0.766 0.401
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions are
run on cities that had a train station in 1975, excluding economic subcenters and located between
5 and 25 km away from Paris. Treatment group includes only intermediate cities.
Sources: Population Census.
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frequent trains. This natural experiment allows us to estimate the impact of urban
transit on population, firm and employment growth.
A classic endogeneity issue arises from the fact that transport infrastructures
are not randomly located. We address this problem by comparing suburban train
stations, which existed before RER introduction. Among them, some were upgraded
into RER stations and other were not, for reasons we document to be, to a large
extent, exogeneous to their future growth. First, one of the main goals of the RER
program was to connect the city center to the new economic subcenters (airports,
the business district of La De´fense and new towns). We restrict our analysis to
municipalities located between the two latter types of places, arguing there is no
intention to treat such municipalities crossed by the RER. Secondly, the discrepan-
cies between the 1960s’ projects and the 1990s’ network confirms there were no clear
intention to connect some areas rather than others except for economic subcenters.
We find that a one-minute drop in travel time by public transportation increases
employment by 5.9% in the 1975-1990 period at the municipality level. We obtain
similar results for firm location. We find no effect on the population as a whole, but
there is a significant link between RER and location choice of highly-skill households,
suggesting a different willingness to pay for accessibility depending on the type of
economic agent. We run a placebo test for both strategies, showing there were
no significant differences between control and treatment groups before the RER
introduction.
Finally, our results suggest that the RER network caused the location of 800
additional jobs in each municipality between 1975 and 1990.16 This corresponds to
a total increase of 26,000 jobs in the whole treatment group, and even 66,200 jobs if
we consider that our treatment estimation is valid for all peripheral municipalities
connected to the RER.17
16Travel time decreased by 2.8 minutes in the treatment group to 1.4 minutes in the control group.
Using the point estimate of our baseline regression (Table 2.5), RER thus caused a 8.5 percent
increase of employment in connected municipalities. Besides, considering that 9,500 employees
worked in each treated municipality in 1975, we obtain that the total employment stock grew by
800 between 1975 and 1990 because of the RER.
17The treatment group includes 32 municipalities. Besides, the average employment stock
amounts to 900 in 1975, in the 73 municipalities that are connected to the RER network within
25km from Paris. We exclude the most central part of the Paris region connected to the subway
network in this quantification work.
44
Chapter 2 – The Impacts of Urban Public Transportation
Bibliography
Jean-Paul Alduy. Quarante ans de planification en re´gion d’ˆIle-de-France. Cahiers
de l’IAURIF, (70):10–91, 1983.
William Alonso. A Theory of the Urban Land Market. Papers in Regional Science,
6(1):149–157, 1960.
Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, and Nancy Qian. On the Road: Access to Trans-
portation Infrastructure and Economic Growth in China. NBER Working Papers
17897, 2012.
Nathaniel Baum-Snow. Did Highways Cause Suburbanization? The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 122(2):775–805, 2007.
Nathaniel Baum-Snow and Matthew E. Kahn. The Effects of New Public Projects
to Expand Urban Rail Transit. Journal of Public Economics, 77(2):241–263, 2000.
Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan. How Much Should We
Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates? The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
119(1):249–275, 2004.
Jan K. Brueckner, Jacques-Francois Thisse, and Yves Zenou. Why is Central Paris
Rich and Downtown Detroit Poor?: An Amenity-based Theory. European Eco-
nomic Review, 43(1):91–107, 1999.
Marcy Burchfield, Henry G. Overman, Diego Puga, and Matthew A. Turner. Causes
of Sprawl: A Portrait from Space. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2):
587–633, 2006.
Yihsu Chen and Alexander Whalley. Green Infrastructure: The Effects of Urban
Rail Transit on Air Quality. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4
(1):58–97, 2012.
Bernard Collardey. Les trains de banlieue, tome II de 1938 a` 1999. Editions La Vie
du Rail, 1999.
Claude Cottour. Une bre`ve histoire de l’ame´nagement de Paris et sa re´gion. Tech-
nical report, Direction re´gionale de l’e´quipement d’ˆIle-de-France, 2008.
Cletus C. Coughlin and Eran Segev. Location Determinants of New Foreign-Owned
Manufacturing Plants. Journal of Regional Science, 40(2):323–351, 2000.
Dave Donaldson. Railroads of the Raj: Estimating the Impact of Transportation
Infrastructure. Technical report, 2013.
Gilles Duranton and Matthew A. Turner. Urban Growth and Transportation. The
Review of Economic Studies, 2012.
Benjamin Faber. Trade Integration, Market Size, and Industrialization: Evidence
from China’s National Trunk Highway System. The Review of Economic Studies,
2014.
45
Chapter 2 – The Impacts of Urban Public Transportation
John G. Fernald. Roads to Prosperity? Assessing the Link between Public Capital
and Productivity. American Economic Review, 89(3):619–638, 1999.
Dominique Franc¸ois. Se rendre au travail : Distances et temps de transport
s’allongent. In La mobilite´ des Franc¸ais. Panorama issu de l’enqueˆte nationale
transports et de´placements 2008, volume 4, chapter 48, pages 83–98. 2010.
Miguel-A´ngel Garc´ıa-Lo´pez, Adelheid Holl, and Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal. Subur-
banization and highways: when the romans, the bourbons and the first cars still
shape Spanish cities. Working Papers 2013/5, Institut d’Economia de Barcelona
(IEB), 2013.
Christian Gerondeau. La saga du RER et le maillon manquant. Presses de l’ENPC,
2003.
Stephen Gibbons, Teemu Lyytika¨inen, Henry Overman, and Rosa Sanchis-Guarner.
New Road Infrastructure: the Effects on Firms. SERC Discussion Papers 0117,
2012.
Adelheid Holl. Manufacturing location and impacts of road transport infrastructure:
empirical evidence from Spain. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 34(3):
341–363, 2004a.
Adelheid Holl. Transport Infrastructure, Agglomeration Economies, and Firm Birth:
Empirical Evidence from Portugal. Journal of Regional Science, 44(4):693–712,
2004b.
Guido M. Imbens and Jeffrey M. Wooldridge. Recent Developments in the Econo-
metrics of Program Evaluation. NBER Working Papers 14251, 2008.
Dominique Larroque, Michel Margairaz, and Pierre Zembri. Paris et ses transports
XIXe-XXe sie`cles. Deux sie`cles de de´cisions pour la ville et sa re´gion. E´ditions
Recherches, 2002.
Brian McKenzie and Melanie Rapino. Commuting in the United States: 2009.
Community Survey Reports, United States Census Bureau, 2011.
Guy Michaels. The Effect of Trade on the Demand for Skill: Evidence from the
Interstate Highway System. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(4):683–
701, 2008.
Kurt Schmidheiny and Marius Bru¨lhart. On the Equivalence of Location Choice
Models: Conditional Logit, nested Logit and Poisson. Journal of Urban Eco-
nomics, 69(2):214–222, 2011.
Vanessa Strauss-Kahn and Xavier Vives. Why and where do headquarters move?
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 39(2):168–186, 2009.
Pierre Zembri. La difficile modernisation des transports parisiens. In Pascal Griset,
editor, Georges Pompidou et la modernite´, pages 37–50. 2006.
46
Chapter 2 – The Impacts of Urban Public Transportation
2.A Paris region before the 1960s
2.A.1 Urban policy before the 1960s
The history of the suburban rail is intricate. It reflects the changing place of Paris
in the national planning policies and the complicated relation between the city of
Paris and its suburbs. First, there is a strong and long-lasting opposition between
the city of Paris and the outskirts of the city. The border, marked by a protection
wall in the 19th-century, replaced by a urban highway in the 1960s and the 1970s
(Boulevard Pe´riphe´rique), is still present in the minds.18 The city of Paris has been
strongly renovated by Baron Haussmann19 in the 19th century and is still very much
organized according to the overall scheme defined and followed then. Conversely,
the development and organization of the suburbs have been uncontrolled, which did
not prevent the population from growing rapidly while it stabilized and eventually
declined in the city center.
The first proposals to guide and organize urban growth were presented in the
1930s20 but were only partially put in place. The post-WWII decade is marked by
the attempt to “contain” the Paris region growth (Cottour, 2008), especially strong
in an urban plan issued in 1960, called the PADOG21. This plan intended to limit
urban development to the already built-up areas of the region. This central part
should be reorganized and equipped, partly thanks to transportation infrastructures,
while the rest of the region should remain unbuilt. At that time, the capital city was
regarded as crowded, overdeveloped and its size and growth were seen as detrimental
to the balanced development of the country. This sentiment was best summarized
by the expression “Paris and the French desert” which refers to a French book
by the geographer Jean-Franc¸ois Gravier, that was very influential in the (central)
authorities in charge of regional development in France. As stated before, the coming
to power of President De Gaulle marks the end of this malthusian urban policy.
2.A.2 Underinvestment in suburban rail until the 1960s
After a long period of underinvestment in suburban rail, the introduction of the
RER offers a rapid and unprecedented improvement of the Paris mass transit sys-
tem. The French railways have been mostly built during the 19th century by private
companies. Each company was in charge of connecting a specific part of France to
Paris. This institutional context results in a highly centralized network, the majority
of lines are directed towards Paris and circular tracks are scarcer than radial ones,
especially in the Paris region. In addition, networks of different companies were
hardly connected and each of them ended in a different terminal station in Paris,
even after merging the private companies in a unique public company in 1938. Con-
sequently, it was not possible to go across Paris by train. A very dense and efficient
subway system was built between 1900 and WWII, but it only served the city center.
18Even today, the city of Paris is significantly denoted by the term intra muros.
19Prefect of the Seine Department between 1853 and 1870, which included Paris in until 1967.
20The Plan Prost in 1932 for example.
21Plan d’Ame´nagement et D’Organisation Ge´ne´rale de la Re´gion Parisienne.
47
Chapter 2 – The Impacts of Urban Public Transportation
Contrary to certain initial projects22, the subway was not connected to the exist-
ing railway lines serving the suburbs. Because the Paris city council against these
connections in order to limit urban sprawl (Gerondeau, 2003). Consequently, com-
muting from one suburb to an other required a train change and a metro connection
(see Figure 2.4). These initial decisions deprived the Paris region from an efficient
suburban train system until the 1970s. The deficient mass transit system raised
many proposals in the 1920s and the 1930s aiming at connecting isolated lines by
building railway tunnels through the city of Paris and the suburbs (Larroque et al.,
2002). If the first extensions of the subway to the suburbs were actually built in the
1930s, almost nothing was done at this period for the suburban rail system.23 After
WWII, which logically stopped rail projects, a new suburban train system for Paris
was regularly mentioned, without being actually started.
The first substantial plan for suburban mass transit is included in the PADOG
plan issued in 1960. It summarizes the previous projects and proposes the digging
of several tunnels through Paris in order to connect isolated suburban railway lines.
The plan is rapidly followed by the start of civil works for the East-West line of the
RER network in 1961. As explained before, the RER network project was actually
launched by the SDAURP plan in 1965.
22For example, the Haag project in 1887.
23Except for the electrification of the Sceaux line in the south part of the Paris region.
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2.B Supplementary estimates
Table 2.9: Effect of RER on employment - other treatment variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependant variable: ∆ log employment1975−90 ∆ log population1975−90
Intercept −0.402∗∗∗
(0.149)
−0.233
(0.323)
−0.37∗∗∗
(0.118)
0.024
(0.071)
0.199
(0.193)
0.063
(0.076)
RER1990 0.123
∗∗
(0.053)
0.137
(0.115)
0.067∗
(0.035)
0.035
(0.077)
∆timeParis 1975−90 ×
(RER1990 = 0)
0.032
(0.026)
0.016
(0.016)
∆timeParis 1975−90 ×
(RER1990 = 1)
0.082∗∗
(0.041)
0.019
(0.021)
timeParis 1975 −0.006
(0.007)
−0.004
(0.004)
# RER stations1990 0.127
∗∗∗
(0.044)
0.038
(0.023)
# train stations1990 −0.071
(0.049)
−0.017
(0.024)
5km ≤ dParis < 10km 0.195
(0.144)
0.153
(0.15)
0.234∗
(0.132)
−0.097
(0.066)
−0.155∗
(0.083)
−0.108
(0.068)
10km ≤ dParis < 15km 0.148
(0.101)
0.088
(0.112)
0.113
(0.094)
−0.064
(0.069)
−0.104
(0.072)
−0.075
(0.071)
15km ≤ dParis < 20km 0.08
(0.112)
0.052
(0.109)
0.068
(0.109)
−0.032
(0.064)
−0.051
(0.067)
−0.032
(0.065)
20km ≤ dParis < 25km ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Share of farmland1960 0.172
(0.167)
0.221
(0.165)
0.104
(0.167)
0.061
(0.14)
0.065
(0.141)
0.056
(0.143)
Surface 0.01
(0.008)
0.009
(0.007)
0.011
(0.01)
−0.003
(0.005)
−0.003
(0.005)
−0.003
(0.006)
< 1km highway 0.067
(0.099)
0.048
(0.111)
0.083
(0.095)
0.022
(0.059)
0.036
(0.059)
0.034
(0.064)
Job density1975 X X X
Population density1975 X X X
Number of observations 96 96 96 96 96 96
R2 0.354 0.386 0.377 0.349 0.361 0.344
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions are
run on cities that had a train station in 1975, excluding economic subcenters and located between
5 and 25 km away from Paris. Treatment group includes only intermediate cities.
Sources: Population Census.
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Table 2.10: Effect of RER on employment - placebo tests
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependant variable: ∆ log employment1968−75 ∆ log population1968−75
Intercept −0.618∗∗
(0.269)
−0.069
(0.125)
−0.332
(0.254)
0.135
(0.1)
∆timeParis 1975−90 0.003
(0.014)
0.021
(0.014)
timeParis 1975 0.012
∗∗
(0.005)
0.008∗
(0.004)
RER1990 −0.007
(0.047)
0.019
(0.044)
5km ≤ dParis < 10km 0.173
(0.128)
0.009
(0.114)
−0.061
(0.118)
−0.219∗∗
(0.092)
10km ≤ dParis < 15km −0.011
(0.105)
−0.116
(0.1)
−0.131
(0.101)
−0.208∗∗
(0.092)
15km ≤ dParis < 20km −0.013
(0.1)
−0.065
(0.104)
−0.106
(0.101)
−0.139
(0.103)
20km ≤ dParis < 25km ref. ref. ref. ref.
Share of farmland1960 0.39
∗∗
(0.191)
0.306
(0.186)
−0.041
(0.194)
−0.113
(0.2)
Surface 0.008
(0.01)
0.007
(0.01)
0.008
(0.008)
0.008
(0.009)
< 1km highway −0.014
(0.084)
0.037
(0.084)
−0.077
(0.071)
−0.036
(0.07)
Job density1968 X X
Population density1968 X X
Number of observations 96 96 96 96
R2 0.322 0.271 0.468 0.428
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions are
run on cities that had a train station in 1975, excluding economic subcenters and located between
5 and 25 km away from Paris. Treatment group includes only intermediate cities.
Sources: Population Census.
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Table 2.11: Effect of RER on employment - weighted propensity score matching
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependant variable: ∆ log employment1968−75 ∆ log population1968−75
Intercept −0.161
(0.285)
−0.532∗∗
(0.253)
0.233
(0.179)
−0.331
(0.235)
∆timeParis 1975−90 0.053∗∗∗
(0.017)
−0.0006
(0.0087)
0.027∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.014
(0.012)
timeParis 1975 −0.007
(0.005)
0.011∗∗
(0.005)
−0.007∗∗
(0.003)
0.008∗
(0.004)
5km ≤ dParis < 10km 0.145
(0.161)
0.081
(0.127)
−0.129∗
(0.071)
−0.022
(0.11)
10km ≤ dParis < 15km 0.098
(0.123)
−0.09
(0.106)
−0.077
(0.059)
−0.06
(0.085)
15km ≤ dParis < 20km 0.093
(0.102)
−0.023
(0.079)
0.004
(0.053)
0.048
(0.099)
20km ≤ dParis < 25km ref. ref. ref. ref.
Share of farmland1960 0.211
(0.166)
0.405∗∗
(0.16)
0.171
(0.14)
0.025
(0.178)
Surface 0.009
(0.007)
0.003
(0.009)
−0.007
(0.006)
0.002
(0.008)
< 1km highway 0.174∗
(0.1)
0.073
(0.069)
0.099
(0.06)
−0.023
(0.073)
Job density1975 X
Job density1968 X
Population density1975 X
Population density1968 X
Number of observations 96 96 96 96
R2 0.468 0.412 0.512 0.361
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions are
run on cities that had a train station in 1975, excluding economic subcenters and located between
5 and 25 km away from Paris. Treatment group includes only intermediate cities.
Sources: Population Census.
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Table 2.12: Effect of RER on employment and population across different time
periods
∆ log employment ∆ log population
1968-75 1975-90 1990-99 1968-75 1975-90 1990-99
∆time1968−1975 −0.152
(0.23)
−0.209
(0.191)
−0.236
(0.159)
−0.148
(0.138)
−0.185
(0.117)
−0.06
(0.072)
∆time1975−1990 0.003
(0.014)
0.059∗∗∗
(0.019)
0.007
(0.012)
0.021
(0.014)
0.022∗∗
(0.009)
−0.001
(0.005)
∆time1990−2006 0.016
(0.012)
0.018
(0.015)
0.016∗∗
(0.008)
0.009
(0.015)
0.013
(0.009)
0.012∗∗∗
(0.004)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions
are run on cities that had a train station in 1975, excluding economic subcenters and located
between 5 and 25 km away from Paris. Treatment group includes only intermediate cities. Control
variables are the same as in the baseline regression presented in Table 2.5. Each cell corresponds
to a different regression.
Sources: Population Census.
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Table 2.13: Effect of RER on employment - identification strategy based on the
comparison with the 1965 RER project
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependant variable: ∆ log employment ∆ log population
1975-90 1968-75 1975-90 1968-75
Intercept −0.545∗∗
(0.256)
−0.518∗∗
(0.235)
0.12
(0.179)
−0.471∗
(0.258)
∆timeParis 1975−90 0.058∗∗
(0.028)
0.03
(0.02)
0.007
(0.022)
0.029
(0.019)
timeParis 1975 0.002
(0.005)
0.01∗∗
(0.005)
−0.002
(0.004)
0.011∗∗
(0.004)
5km ≤ dParis < 10km 0.259∗
(0.132)
0.13
(0.107)
−0.139
(0.106)
0.003
(0.113)
10km ≤ dParis < 15km 0.131
(0.111)
−0.136
(0.085)
−0.077
(0.093)
−0.113
(0.086)
15km ≤ dParis < 20km 0.029
(0.104)
−0.045
(0.076)
−0.106
(0.078)
−0.093
(0.078)
20km ≤ dParis < 25km ref. ref. ref. ref.
Share of farmland1960 0.206
(0.171)
0.379∗∗
(0.16)
−0.084
(0.154)
−0.038
(0.205)
Surface 0.003
(0.007)
−0.002
(0.006)
−0.007
(0.006)
0.00006
(0.00653)
< 1km highway 0.104
(0.133)
−0.071
(0.08)
0.102
(0.126)
−0.145∗
(0.078)
Job density1975 X
Job density1968 X
Population density1975 X
Population density1968 X
Number of observations 110 110 110 110
R2 0.368 0.339 0.268 0.455
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions are
run on cities that had a train station in 1975, excluding economic subcenters and located between 5
and 25 km away from Paris. Treatment group includes cities that should have not been connected
to the RER network according to the 1965 plan.
Sources: Population Census.
53
Chapter 2 – The Impacts of Urban Public Transportation
Table 2.14: Effect of RER on population by level of education – alternative treatment
variable
Dependant variable: ∆ ln population75−90
Sample: All Primary Vocational Higher
or middle or high education
school school
Intercept 0.024
(0.071)
−0.351
(0.764)
1.296∗
(0.731)
2.241∗∗∗
(0.35)
RER1990 0.067
∗
(0.035)
0.062
(0.043)
0.076
(0.046)
0.133∗∗∗
(0.049)
5km ≤ dParis < 10km −0.097
(0.066)
−0.223∗∗∗
(0.075)
−0.223∗∗∗
(0.084)
0.124
(0.116)
10km ≤ dParis < 15km −0.064
(0.069)
−0.161∗∗
(0.076)
−0.189∗∗
(0.081)
0.025
(0.092)
15km ≤ dParis < 20km −0.032
(0.064)
−0.059
(0.071)
−0.133∗
(0.074)
−0.027
(0.093)
Share of farmland1960 0.061
(0.14)
0.154
(0.154)
0.042
(0.154)
−0.258∗
(0.139)
Surface −0.003
(0.005)
0.003
(0.008)
−0.002
(0.006)
−0.008
(0.006)
< 1km highway 0.022
(0.059)
0.017
(0.067)
0.03
(0.066)
0.005
(0.073)
Pop density1975 < 1000 0.162
(0.101)
−0.041
(0.286)
−0.23
(0.294)
−0.203
(0.154)
Pop density1975 [1000, 2500] 0.222
∗∗
(0.089)
0.088
(0.182)
0.016
(0.183)
0.087
(0.146)
Pop density1975 [2500, 5000] 0.018
(0.057)
−0.07
(0.129)
−0.154
(0.123)
0.0005
(0.0888)
Pop density1975 [5000, 10000] −0.022
(0.023)
−0.048
(0.073)
−0.076
(0.065)
−0.029
(0.075)
Pop density1975 > 10000 ref. ref. ref. ref.
ln dens. prim. or midddle school1975 0.028
(0.09)
ln dens. voc. or high school1975 −0.117
(0.097)
ln dens. higher education1975 −0.277∗∗∗
(0.059)
Number of observations 96 96 96 96
R2 0.349 0.291 0.39 0.562
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions are
run on cities that had a train station in 1975, excluding economic subcenters and located between
5 and 25 km away from Paris. Treatment group includes only intermediate cities.
Sources: Population Census.
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Table 2.15: Effect of RER on population by level of education – alternative identi-
fication strategy
Dependant variable: ∆ ln population75−90
Sample: All Primary Vocational Higher
or middle or high education
school school
Intercept 0.12
(0.179)
−0.048
(1.21)
3.688∗∗
(1.842)
2.393∗∗∗
(0.441)
∆timeParis 1975−90 0.007
(0.022)
0.001
(0.024)
0.014
(0.028)
0.046∗
(0.025)
timeParis 1975 −0.002
(0.004)
−0.0005
(0.0041)
−0.005
(0.005)
0.004
(0.004)
5km ≤ dParis < 10km −0.139
(0.106)
−0.171
(0.107)
−0.236∗
(0.136)
0.215∗
(0.127)
10km ≤ dParis < 15km −0.077
(0.093)
−0.128
(0.1)
−0.17
(0.117)
0.1
(0.091)
15km ≤ dParis < 20km −0.106
(0.078)
−0.076
(0.08)
−0.188∗
(0.095)
−0.086
(0.085)
Share of farmland1960 −0.084
(0.154)
0.022
(0.187)
−0.337
(0.248)
−0.401∗∗
(0.177)
Surface −0.007
(0.006)
0.0002
(0.0054)
−0.004
(0.006)
−0.01
(0.008)
< 1km highway 0.102
(0.126)
0.051
(0.104)
0.104
(0.113)
0.056
(0.108)
Pop density1975 < 1000 0.447
∗∗∗
(0.152)
0.104
(0.372)
−0.649
(0.64)
−0.119
(0.187)
Pop density1975 [1000, 2500] 0.301
∗∗∗
(0.083)
0.107
(0.216)
−0.313
(0.378)
0.023
(0.143)
Pop density1975 [2500, 5000] 0.064
(0.055)
−0.048
(0.155)
−0.353
(0.238)
−0.034
(0.1)
Pop density1975 [5000, 10000] 0.022
(0.025)
0.002
(0.083)
−0.178
(0.131)
−0.057
(0.088)
Pop density1975 > 10000 ref. ref. ref. ref.
ln dens. prim. or midddle school1975 −0.012
(0.134)
ln dens. voc. or high school1975 −0.406
(0.246)
ln dens. higher education1975 −0.341∗∗∗
(0.071)
Number of observations 110 110 110 110
R2 0.268 0.18 0.416 0.55
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions are
run on cities that had a train station in 1975, excluding economic subcenters and located between
5 and 25 km away from Paris. Treatment group includes only intermediate cities.
Sources: Population Census.
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2.C Maps
Figure 2.3: Control and treatment groups – alternative identification strategy
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Economic centers
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0 10 km
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St.−Quentin−en−Y.
Melun−Sénart
Orly
Roissy
PARIS
Sources: IAU – Iˆle-de-France.
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Figure 2.4: Example of the route between Le Bourget and Cite´ Universitaire with
the RER
l
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Le Bourget
 Metro 4
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Le Bourget
 RER B
1985 (with RER)
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RER/commuter rail line
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Border of Paris
Reading note: before the commissioning of the RER, the journey between Cite´ Universitaire and
Le Bourget required to change train twice. First, one needed to take a commuter train station
to the connection station Denfert-Rochereau. Then, one had to ride the metro line 4 to Gare du
Nord. And finally, another commuter rail line final destination, Le Bourget. Thanks to the RER,
it is possible to cross Paris from Cite´ Universitaire to Le Bourget without any connection, instead
of two connections before, which lowers the journey time from 45 to 26 minutes.
Sources: IAU – Iˆle-de-France.
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Chapter 3
Is High-Speed Rail a
Business Communication
Technology?
Evidence from French
Multi-Plant Businesses
This chapter is cowritten with Pauline Charnoz (RITM-Universite´ Paris Sud and
Crest) and Claire Lelarge (Insee and Crest).
3.1 Introduction
Large corporations operating multiple affiliates located in different locations are
prevalent and account for a disproportionate fraction of output and employment.
Figure 3.1 shows that in France, geographically dispersed corporate groups account
for around 40% (6 million workers in 2011) of total employment in the for-profit
sector,1 and even more when taking account of groups headquartered from abroad.
The splitting and implantation decisions of such corporations involves a trade-off
between the gains to access remote markets and the managerial costs to operate
distant affiliates. That has been the object of study of a large literature in economic
geography (e.g. Aarland et al., 2007, Davis and Henderson, 2008, Henderson and
Ono, 2008, Strauss-Kahn and Vives, 2009) and in trade (see the recent survey about
the prominent role of multinationals in Antra`s and Yeaple, 2014). Yet, empirical
contributions often propose analyzes that are reduced form in nature, such that in
practice, very little is known about the way these business organizations are man-
aged. In this paper, we contribute to fill this gap and provide detailed evidence
about the nature of the higher managerial costs implied by geographic dispersion.
1Excluding workers directly hired by households.
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Figure 3.1: The prevalence of geographically dispersed corporate groups – Employ-
ment by type of business organization
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Note: Employment is measured in terms of days of work, normalized by 360 (to be comparable
with headcounts).
Sources: DADS and LIFI survey, for-profit sector (except agricultural activities and workers of the
personnel service industries directly employed by households).
To that end, we take advantage of large scale administrative and survey data
allowing us to describe the structure of the workforce of all French corporate groups,
over almost 20 years (from 1993 to 2011). We furthermore use the expansion of the
French high-speed rail (HSR) network over that period as a shock on communication
costs between the headquarters and affiliates of groups which benefited from this new
infrastructure.
Our empirical investigation is guided by theoretical predictions. The literature
in corporate finance (Giroud, 2013, Giroud and Mueller, 2015) suggests that the
geographical dispersion of affiliates might hamper information gathering and mon-
itoring by the managers of the group’s headquarters, thus amplifying the moral
hazard problems that characterize the management of remote affiliates. This litera-
ture predicts in particular that lower geographical dispersion, associated with lower
travel times, could affect affiliate size positively. The literature in economic geog-
raphy (Duranton and Puga, 2005) further suggests that the geographical dispersion
of affiliates in a corporate group is related to the optimal mix of “functions” present
in each implantation. A prediction of this strand of literature is that a reduction in
communication costs between headquarters and affiliates lowers the cost of trans-
ferring headquarters services to remote affiliates and therefore decreases the need
to locate the corresponding support activities at affiliates. This in turn increases
the incentives to rationalize the mix of functions at affiliates and make them more
focused on their production activities. Last, the literature in organizational eco-
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nomics (Garicano, 2000, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006, 2012, Antra`s et al.,
2006, 2008) predicts that workers within the corporate groups are differentially im-
pacted by decreases in internal communication costs, depending on their skills. A
robust prediction of this set of papers is that the need for skills decreases at affiliates,
such that wages of the less skilled workers (and the associated labor costs) decrease.2
We test these predictions in the French data and implement different identifica-
tion strategies that have been proposed in the literature to address the problem of
the endogenous placement of the HSR infrastructure (use of high-dimensional fixed
effects controlling for local and affiliate-level shocks as in Giroud, 2013 and evidence
from un-realized lines as in Donaldson, 2014). Our regressions show that the impact
of reduced travel times on affiliate size and functional specialization is higher in
the service industries, where information to be transmitted is arguably softer (Pe-
tersen and Rajan, 2002). Results are also significant in the trade and manufacturing
industries, but point estimates are lower. Our estimates allow to quantify the im-
pact of the expansion of the HSR network on the management of remote affiliates.
We obtain that for the average affiliate benefiting from the infrastructure, moving
back to the 1980 rail network without HSR would induce a shift of roughly one job
from administrative to operational activities in service industries (with associated
increase in the productive capacity of the considered affiliate), against 20% of a job
in other industries (retail, trade or manufacturing). We also obtain that affiliates in
the manufacturing and business services industries experienced decreases in produc-
tion labor costs, of around half the cost of a production job for the average affiliate.
At the group level, our regressions suggest that the impact on the operational profit
margin ranges from 0.5 to 1.5 percentage points depending on the industry.
Our results can also be used to provide estimates of the overall cost of geo-
graphical dispersion: for example, our estimates imply that remote affiliates in the
personnel service industries would operate with roughly 1.5 additional production
jobs if geographical distance could be fully abolished by a perfect communication
technology. The figure would raise to 4 production jobs on average in business
services industries, and to 2 production jobs in manufacturing industries. These
quantifications can be interpreted as an upper bound for the “productivity” effect
that can be expected from internal communication technologies. In this respect, our
results also show (by revealed preferences) that face-to-face interactions made easier
by the HSR technology remain crucial, in spite of the development of other means
of communication (phone, e-mail, visio-conference) over the same period (Storper
and Venables, 2004). Our results also show that business travellers (or their em-
ployers) are willing to pay a significant premium for reduced travel time, in spite of
the arguably high comfort and “workability” of HSR coaches.
Last, our paper also contributes to the large literature investigating the economic
impact of transport infrastructures. However, most papers in this field focus on
standard rail or road infrastructure, which essentially generate a reduction in trade
barriers which pertains mainly to the circulation of goods (Donaldson and Hornbeck,
2015). The impact of such shocks are now well understood (Melitz, 2003). They
induce increases in the global volume of trade activities as well as in firm selection,
2Refer to Bassanini et al. (2015) and Landier et al. (2007) for an in-depth analysis of labor
adjustments on the extensive margin (dismissals) depending on the distance to headquarters.
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and ultimately aggregate productivity (Michaels, 2008, Datta, 2012, Banerjee et al.,
2012, Donaldson, 2014, Faber, 2014, Ghani et al., 2015). In contrast, high-speed
rail is a transportation technology that is almost only accessible to people.3 As
previously explained, the mechanisms involved are therefore very different (Bernard
et al., 2015, Nunn, 2007, Cristea, 2011).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 proposes a
synthesis of theoretical predictions relating communication costs to the managerial
organization of corporate groups and their overall performance. In section 3.3, we
describe our data as well as the French HSR network. We also provide a comprehen-
sive picture of the geographical dispersion of French corporate groups. Our empirical
strategy is explained in section 3.4 and the main regressions results at the affiliate
level are discussed in section 3.5. Section 3.6 provides additional descriptive results
at the (entire) group level and section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 The management of multi-plant businesses: a
review of theoretical predictions
In this section, we review three different (but non mutually exclusive) strands of the
literature analyzing how travel times between headquarters and affiliates of corporate
groups are likely to affect their managerial organization and performance. In each
case, the testable empirical predictions are outlined.
3.2.1 Geographical dispersion and affiliate size
A recent literature in corporate finance (Giroud, 2013, Giroud and Mueller, 2015)
relates travel times to information transmission between headquarters and affiliates
in settings where there are information asymmetries and moral hazard problems.
It delivers predictions linking travel times and affiliate size, as measured by e.g.
employment.
These contributions specifically focus on the dual managerial structure of corpo-
rate groups, with both managers at headquarters (“principals”), who are endowed
with the ultimate decision rights, and managers at remote affiliates (“agents”) who
are not, but who have an informational advantage over managers at headquarters
about the profitability of local investment projects. The management of such busi-
ness organizations features a moral hazard problem if the interests of managers
at affiliates are not fully aligned with the interests of managers at headquarters.
Whether local managers over-invest (over-hire) or under-invest (under-hire) when
decision rights are delegated to them depends on whether managers at affiliates
have preferences for local “empire building” strategies, or conversely if they prefer
an excessively “quiet life”. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) actually show that
3In the case of the French High Speed Rail program, most of the infrastructure is not even
accessible to freight (at the notable exception of mail) because HSR tracks are too steep for the
weight of freight trains. Notice that in this paper, we only focus on the “productivity” effect of
HSR and do not consider the potential market creation impact of HSR, which could be particularly
relevant in industries related to tourism. The analysis of this dimension would require an entirely
different identification strategy.
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the second case is more frequent among US managers, which implies that man-
agers at affiliates are likely to under-invest when investment decisions are delegated
to them. In such a setting, lower travel times between headquarters and remote
affiliates increase monitoring and are therefore associated with higher investment
(Giroud, 2013) and higher complementary employment (Giroud and Mueller, 2015)
at affiliates.4
To test the relevance of such mechanisms in the French data, we replicate the
analyzes in Giroud (2013) and Giroud and Mueller (2015) and investigate the cor-
relations between employment at affiliates and travel time to their headquarters.5
3.2.2 Geographical dispersion and the functional specializa-
tion of affiliates
The literature in economic geography suggests that the geographical dispersion of
affiliates in a corporate group is related to the optimal mix of “functions” present in
each implantation. In Duranton and Puga (2005), firms are considered as bundles
of two broad types of functions: “headquarter services” on one hand, and production
activities on the other hand. These two functions can be either pooled in the same
location or split into different plants. Splitting is costly, for example because of the
agency problems outlined in section 3.2.1.6 However, there are gains to split firms
when there exist “function specific” agglomeration economies, such as the possibility
to outsource certain activities to local suppliers that might be specifically appropri-
ate, the optimization of labor costs across local labor markets (depending on local
labor supply), or simply market access for final products.
The distinctive prediction of Duranton and Puga (2005) is that a reduction in
travel time lowers the cost of transferring headquarter services to remote affiliates,
thus increasing the incentives to specialize affiliates by function.7 We therefore
4This reasoning assumes that investment decisions for affiliates are delegated to local managers.
This needs not be the case (see section 3.2.2) but the same prediction holds (in expectation) under
centralized control at headquarters when HQ managers are risk averse: easier information acqui-
sition about the profitability of investment projects at remote affiliates decreases the “uncertainty
premium” required by them and increases average investment.
5Unfortunately, our data do not enable us to observe investment at the affiliate level, such that
for this variable, we will only be able to estimate regressions aggregated across all affiliates, at the
group level (see section 3.6).
6Duranton and Puga (2005) model such mechanisms in a reduced form, as a fraction of man-
agers’ time that is lost in travels to visit the remote affiliate. Refer to Acemoglu et al. (2007) for
a more detailed description of the trade-offs involved: the optimal organizational choice between
delegation of authority to a local manager or centralized decision taking at headquarters trades
off the gain to rely the local manager’s superior information against the risk that he could use his
informational advantage to make choices that are not in the best interest of the group as a whole.
Shorter travel times ease information acquisition by principals, and shift the trade-off in favor of
centralized control at headquarters.
7Notice that in Duranton and Puga (2005), this result is an equilibrium outcome: a decrease in
the cost of remote management (if sufficiently large) shifts the entire economy from an equilibrium
where no firm is geographically dispersed and cities specialize by sector, to an equilibrium where
all firms adopt a multi-location organizational form and cities specialize by function. The authors
suggest that a “smoother” result would hold in an augmented version of the model incorporating
some firm level heterogeneity, together with (sufficiently large) sunk costs of reorganization. Such
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expect them to be relatively more focused on their production activities and to
discard the administrative tasks which are cheaper to complete at headquarters. This
prediction can be tested by regressing the share of employment at affiliates that is
devoted to production activities (as opposed to managerial activities) against travel
time between affiliates and headquarters: we expect the sign of the corresponding
coefficient to be negative.
3.2.3 Geographical dispersion and wages at affiliates
The literature in organizational economics (Garicano, 2000, Garicano and Rossi-
Hansberg, 2006, 2012, Antra`s et al., 2006, 2008) enables to make predictions about
the way heterogeneous workers (in terms of skills) might be differentially impacted
by decreases in internal communication costs within a same group. These papers
show that business organizations (groups, or sub-units of groups such as affiliates)
tend to organize as hierarchies because these types of organizations allow for the
most parsimonious usage of two costly inputs of production: workers’ time and
workers’ knowledge. In such structures, the bottom layer is specialized in the most
common problems and concentrates the less skilled workers, while the upper layers
only deal with exceptions (Garicano, 2000). Managers in one layer spend their time
communicating with less skilled agents in the layer just below and solving some of
the problems that are transmitted to them. They pass the rest to the layer with
more skilled agents just above them.
This baseline representation of how productive activities organize is plugged into
a two - region model in Antra`s et al. (2006) and Antra`s et al. (2008), which can easily
be transposed to our setting. As in section 3.2.2, lower travel times, i.e. decreases in
communication costs between units located in different regions, always increase the
relative benefit to split businesses in order to take advantage of lower relative wages
in the less dense areas; it also has a positive impact on overall group size. A more
distinctive prediction of these papers is that lower communication costs increase
the incentives to organize in more complex hierarchical organizations (having more
layers) by making them a better “technology” to economize on knowledge. As a
result, the relative role of managers at headquarters increases, while it is profitable
to decrease the knowledge content of bottom production workers at affiliates (and
therefore, their skills), in order to save on their wage. We test this prediction by
regressing the wage of low-skill production workers on travel time, and expect a
positive sign for this coefficient.8
additional dimensions of firm heterogeneity would explain why all firms would not split instanta-
neously and relocate all of their units along the new HSR lines as they open.
8Section 3.2.1 also generates predictions related to wages. In this set-up, a decrease in commu-
nication costs would alter the wage contracts of managers at affiliates from rather high- to rather
low- powered incentive contracts. Unfortunately, we are not able to test this prediction with our
data.
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3.2.4 Geographical dispersion and operational profit at the
group level
In all models of sections 3.2.2 to 3.2.3, decreases in travel time between headquar-
ters and affiliates always decrease the overall costs of operating large, multi-plant
businesses. At the group level, we therefore expect a negative correlation (other
things equal) between the operating profit margin and average travel time to af-
filiates. Furthermore, corporate groups which are cheaper to operate should grow
larger, other things equal. We therefore also expect a negative correlation between
overall group size and average travel time to affiliates. While employment is the only
reliable proxy of affiliate size in the French data (see section 3.3 below), there are
several proxies available at the group level, most importantly: employment, value
added, or tangible investment.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 The geographical organization of corporate groups
The first ingredient of our analysis is the information system allowing us to recover
the structure of French corporate groups. We rely on the LIFI9 files and use the
information on the (direct and indirect) equity stakes of headquarters in affiliate
companies reported in this data source. Prior to 1999, the LIFI files only covered
companies of the private sector whose size was above at least one of three different
thresholds, defined in terms of financial stakes in other firms (higher than 1.2 million
euros), sales (60 million euros) or employment (500 workers). From 1999 onwards,
these files are complemented with the Diane-Amadeus (Bureau Van Dijk) dataset,
which is constructed from commercial court records and which covers smaller busi-
ness groups. For most of our period of analysis, our file therefore contains almost
exhaustive information about corporate groups operating in France.
We follow the standard approach in corporate finance since the classic contri-
bution by La Porta et al. (1999) and define headquarters of potentially complex
group structure as the main plants of units having the actual ultimate control over
all assets in the group, via the direct or indirect ownership of more than half of the
equity in any of the group affiliates.10 Affiliates correspond to all other plants of
the considered group. However, previous empirical work (e.g. Aubert and Sillard,
2005, Picart, 2004) has documented that establishments (and even companies within
groups) might be created, terminated and replaced for reasons that are uncorrelated
9The acronym “LIFI” stands for “LIaisons FInancie`res” (financial linkages). See e.g. Boutin
et al. (2013) for a previous use of this dataset. Complementary exhaustive fiscal data (BRN files,
also used in Boutin et al., 2013) provide the accounting information required in our empirical
analysis.
10In cases where these headquarters are non-employer holdings, we rather choose the employer
company that is most directly related to the holding, in terms of rank of control, and in cases
where several companies meet this criterion, we select those having the largest share of executives
(see section 3.3.2 below). The aim of this procedure is to locate (probabilistically) the upper
management team of the entire group structure.
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with the human resource management practices we want to focus on11. We choose
to abstract from such phenomena by aggregating the information across all plants
of a same group, having the same activity (at the 1 digit level) and located in the
same municipality (“commune”) into a single “affiliate” unit.12
This dataset allow us to complement figure 3.1 in the introductory part and
provide in figure 3.2 a synthetic description of the geography of remote control, as of
2011. Panel (A) provides for each commuting zone, the share of businesses that are
under the control of headquarters located outside the commuting zone, i.e. further
away than the standard daily commuting patterns. This share is higher than 15% in
most commuting zones, and above 20% in a number of zones located in the northern
half of the country. This fact is driven by the disproportionate “sphere of corporate
influence” of Paris over this part of the country.13 The employment weighted version
of the indicator presented in panel (B) shows that in most of the country, more than
30% of employment is managed at arm’s length. This share rises to rates above 50%
in a significant number of commuting zones, mostly located in the northern part of
the country.
3.3.2 The organization of the workforce within corporate
groups
We complement the previous files with exhaustive worker level information sourced
from the DADS14 files. These files are available from 1993 onwards, and include
roughly 14 million workers per year in the recent period. They allow us to track
economically active plants within each group and provide us with a rich description
of their internal workforce and wage structure.
Most importantly, the classification of occupations in the DADS files allows us to
contrast the workforce allocated to production activities with the workforce allocated
to managerial activities, both at headquarters and affiliates. This distinction is in
particular required to test the empirical predictions of section 3.2.2. We interact this
typology of functions with the indicators of hierarchical layers proposed in Caliendo
et al. (2015), in order to test the predictions of section 3.2.3 (see Table 3.1).
Figure 3.3 describes the structure of the workforce obtained with these defi-
11In particular, firm and plant identifiers also change when the legal status of companies evolves,
most often because of regulatory constraints (e.g. upper bounds on the admissible number of
shareholders for certain legal forms, etc.) or for fiscal or administrative reasons which are entirely
orthogonal to the mechanisms described in section 3.2. Our aggregation procedure also enables to
abstract from plant transfers occurring on very short distances (within the same municipality), for
reasons related to e.g. building capacity, etc.
12This aggregation is not drastic, since there are ca. 36,000 such municipalities across France.
Its main benefit is to increase by a little bit the power of our setting by increasing the number of
years an affiliate unit is observed - 3.2 years on average. Notice also that the variations of travel
time induced by HSR line openings are homogenous within municipalities, since they are typically
served by only one single station.
13See appendix 3.B for a comparison of the “spheres of corporate influence” of different French
cities showing the disproportionate weight of Paris, as compared with any other French city.
14The acronym “DADS” stands for “De´clarations Annuelles de Donne´es Sociales”. See e.g.
Caliendo et al. (2015) for a previous use of these files.
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Figure 3.2: Share of affiliates under control of a HQ located outside the considered
commuting zone (in percentages, by 2011)
Un-weighted Weighted by
employment
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Notes: The left panel describes the number of affiliates in each commuting zone that are under the
control of a HQ located outside the zone, as a share of the total number of businesses (affiliates
and HQs) located in each zone. The right panel describes the share of private employment in each
commuting zone that is under control of an external HQ. This indicator can be interpreted as an
employment weighted version of the previous.
Sources: DADS and LIFI survey, covering the for-profit sector (except agricultural activities and
workers of the personnel service industries directly employed by households).
nitions, both at affiliates and headquarters.15 Unfortunately, two methodological
changes in the coding of occupations occurred in 2002 and 2009 and produced two
breaks in the series.16 However, abstracting from this difficulty, panel (A) of fig-
ure 3.3 shows that managerial functions represent a similar share of the workforce,
on average, at headquarters and affiliates. What differentiates HQs from affiliates
sharply is not the weight of these activities, but the structure of skills within them.
Headquarters employ 15 to 20% of their workforce in higher management positions,
against 5 to 10% in the case of affiliates. Conversely, affiliates employ around twice
as many middle managers (ca. 20%) as headquarters. In contrast, the structure of
the workforce allocated to production activities (panel B in figure 3.3) is not highly
contrasted between headquarters and affiliates: headquarters only tend to concen-
trate more high-skilled production workers. However, unreported complementary
descriptive statistics confirm (unsurprisingly) that the structure of the workforce at
affiliates is highly differentiated across industries. For example, skilled production
and managerial workers represent 11% of the workforce in manufacturing industries
and 21% in business services. In contrast, the share ranges between 6 and 8% in the
personnel services, retail and trade, or transport industries. The share of managers
15In these graphics, employment in each occupation is measured in days (between start and end
of the labor contract of each worker) to take part time work into account.
16Our empirical strategy, which saturates each regressions with rich temporal fixed effects, is
relatively immune to this measurement issue (see section 3.4).
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Figure 3.3: Structure of the workforce at affiliates vs. headquarters between 1993 and
2011
Workforce at affiliates Workforce at headquarters
(A) Administrative functions
As a share of total employment
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(B) Operational functions
As a share of total employment
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Notes: Employment is measured in days. The breaks in the series in 2002 and 2009 were generated
by a change in the codification procedure for occupations in the DADS files.
Sources: DADS and LIFI, units which are part of geographically dispersed groups.
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Table 3.1: Type of occupation and the French occupational classification (codes in
parentheses)
Management position Production occupation
Low-skilled Office workers (clerks, 54) Skilled industrial and manual
workers (62 and 63), drivers
(64), skilled transport and
wholesale workers (65), un-
skilled industrial workers (67)
Medium-skilled Mid-level managers and pro-
fessionals and related (42-46)
Technicians (47), supervisors
and foremen (48)
High-skilled Heads of businesses (2), top
managers and professionals
(35, 37). These correspond to
the “managers” in section 3.2
Science and educational pro-
fessionals (34), technical man-
agers and engineers (38)
Note: we allocate commercial low-skilled workers to production activities, which is of particular rel-
evance for the retail and trade industries. For medium and high-skilled workers, unfortunately, the
classification available in our file does not allow to distinguish between managerial and commercial
activities.
(high-skill managerial workers) is around 4% in all industries, except in the business
services (10%).17
3.3.3 HSR network and rail travel times
The last ingredient for our empirical analysis is the detailed information about the
evolution of the rail network over time, which allows us to compute rail travel times
between any two points of France, and more specifically, between the headquarters
and affiliates of French corporate groups. We collected detailed information from
the archives of the French national rail company and from its open-data platform,
and complemented it with various technical publications available from rail fan web
sites to reconstruct the expansion of the HSR network over time. The outcome
of this task is represented on figure 3.4. The first HSR segment was opened in
1981 on the track between the two French largest cities, Paris and Lyon. This line
was subsequently extended in 1994 and 2001 to ultimately reach Marseille on the
Mediterranean Coast. The network was also extended towards the Atlantic coast
in 1989-1990, towards Lille and London in 1993 and 1994, and towards Strasbourg
and Frankfurt (in Germany) in 2007.18
The expansion of the HSR network had a huge impact on rail travel times across
the territory because high-speed trains operate at twice the maximum standard rail
speed, ca. 320km/h on the dedicated infrastructure. While the actual procedure we
17In the latter case, most probably part of them are in fact allocated to production (but non
“technical”) activities, which might unfortunately generate some attenuation bias in our analysis.
18As of today, high-speed rail service also includes cross-border services to UK, Belgium, Nether-
lands, Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Spain. However, this feature of the network in not analyzed
in the present paper, since we are not able to locate HQs abroad with our data.
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Figure 3.4: Evolution of the French HSR network between 1981 and 2011
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Sources: Archives and open-data platform of the French national rail company; rail fan web sites.
Authors’ computations.
implemented to compute rail travel times is relegated to appendix 3.C, figure 3.5
shows how the expansion of the HSR network translated into reductions in travel
times for selected destinations over our period of analysis. Between 1993 and 2011,
new line openings mainly benefited the Eastern and Southern regions, which ex-
perienced the largest accessibility gains, both in terms of time and geographical
range. Paris experienced the symmetric gains towards the Mediterranean zone and
the Eastern zone. A few examples enable to gauge orders of magnitude: rail travel
time between Marseille and Paris decreased from 6h40 to 4h40 in 1982, to 4h18 in
1994 and ultimately to 3h00 in 2001. Between Strasbourg and Paris, travel time
decreased from 3h55 to 2h20 in 2007, when the Eastern line opened.
In our empirical analysis, all of the indicators of travel times between headquar-
ters and affiliates are based on the above rail travel time computations, and all travel
time variations (reductions) are driven by the opening or extension of new HSR lines.
One important concern is of course that our indicator misses all travel time reduc-
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Figure 3.5: Reduction in rail travel times to selected destinations (in minutes, be-
tween 1993 and 2011)
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Sources: archives and open-data platform of the French national rail company; rail fan web sites.
Authors’ computations.
tions which might be driven by other means of transportation, and more specifically,
by airlines. Appendix 3.A however shows that over our period of analysis, HSR be-
came one of the most popular means of transportation for long distance travels,
such that rail travel times became of practical relevance to managers. Appendix 3.A
also shows that the airline industry did not seem to be a strong competitor of HSR
over the same period, since it rather lost market shares in spite of the liberalization
episode of the 90s. This is most presumably because travel time by air (incorporat-
ing access time to airports, which are often located in the outskirts of cities while
train stations are typically located at city centers) is not lower than rail travel time
for most domestic trips.19 In all cases, as also argued in detail in appendix 3.A, we
expect our approximation to bias our regression results against finding any impact
19See Behrens and Pels (2012) for a similar argument in the case of the London-Paris passenger
market.
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of travel time on management practices.
A second, more minor problem is that HSR line openings were almost always as-
sociated with improved rail service beyond travel time.20 For example, new and more
comfortable coaches were most of the time introduced, with increased “workability”
and a higher frequency of train services, at least for terminal cities.21 Conversely,
the quality of service offered by standard rail might have suffered from the realloca-
tion of resources of the rail company towards HSR. In our empirical analysis, such
unobserved differential evolution of the rail services provided by HSR and standard
rail (which is correlated with our indicator of travel time variation) would bias our
estimates somewhat upwards.
3.4 Empirical strategy
3.4.1 Baseline identification strategy
Our equations of main interest are estimated at the affiliate level, and investigate
the correlations between travel time and the various outcome variables discussed
in section 3.2, typically: affiliate employment, the share of employment allocated
to production activities, or the wages of those production workers. They take the
following generic specification:
yijlt = β.Tijlt + εijlt (3.1)
where subscript i denotes the affiliate, j its headquarters, l denotes the commut-
ing zone were the affiliate is located and t denotes time. Tijlt denotes travel time
between the affiliate and its headquarter and yijlt is the outcome of interest.
We first argue that travel time variations, which are all driven by the evolution
of the HSR network, are less likely to be endogenous in our setting than levels of
travel times, since the location of affiliates (relative to their headquarters) is po-
tentially endogenously driven by unobserved characteristics that are also correlated
with the outcome variables. For example, a higher specificity of the production of
the affiliate22 might be correlated with both a higher proximity of the considered
affiliate to its headquarters, and higher wages paid to its production workers. To
address these concerns, we insert affiliate level fixed effects αijl into our regression
20A related concern is that our results might be driven by standard market access mechanisms
rather than by those described in section 3.2 if the new HSR infrastructure was accessible to
freight and also impacted the transport of goods. This is however not the case of the dedicated
HSR infrastructure, which is too fragile and sometimes too steep to be accessible to freight trains
(because of their weight). Note furthermore that our empirical strategy would anyway address this
potential concern (see sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.3).
21This last point is more debated for the case of certain smaller or middle size cities, more
precisely those that are bypassed by HSR services while they were previously served by traditional
rail service (FNAUT, 2011, Emangard and Beaucire, 1985). For example, the number of direct
services per day from Paris to Charleville - Me´zie`res fell from 7 to 3 in 2007, and from 9 to 4
between Paris and Tourcoing.
22Regressions are estimated industry by industry to further address this concern and to investi-
gate industry level heterogeneity.
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framework, such that in all regressions, the relation between travel time and the
various outcome of interest is identified by changes in travel time, namely those
generated by the expansion of the HSR network over time.
However, this regression framework is still affected by the fact that the place-
ment of the HSR infrastructure might be endogenous. For example, there might
exist some local unobserved heterogeneity, e.g. local growth potential, which could
have determined the governmental decision to build the HSR infrastructure, and
which might be also correlated with our outcome variables, thus biasing our results.
Furthermore, the HSR infrastructure itself might have boosted local growth, a phe-
nomenon we want to control for in our regressions. We address these two issues
using an identification strategy similar to Giroud (2013) and Giroud and Mueller
(2015), by introducing large sets of commuting zone × time “fixed” effects (αlt), on
top of the affiliate level fixed effects (αijl):
yijlt = αijl + αlt + β.Tijt + γ.Xjt + εijlt (3.2)
These many dummy variables capture the time varying local heterogeneity which
could generate the above endogeneity problems. Notice that all of these fixed effects
are identifiable in our setting, because the impact of variation in travel times on the
outcomes of interest is identified jointly from the locations of affiliates and from the
location of their headquarters, i.e. travel time is a dyadic variable. More intuitively,
our identification strategy amounts to use as a control group, the set of local affili-
ates located in the same commuting zone as the considered affiliate: indeed, these
affiliates are therefore exposed to the same local shocks, but they are unaffected (or
differently affected) by travel time reductions because of a different location of their
headquarters23.
Such specifications that are saturated with fixed effects require the explanatory
variables to be measured accurately, since fixed effects tend to amplify the attenua-
tion bias arising from measurement errors.24 However, we argue in appendix 3.C.3
that if travel times might be affected by some measurement problems, variations in
travel times are likely to be measured much more accurately. Since identification in
equation 3.2 is in differences, this is what is required. Furthermore, this problem
should if anything lead us to minimize the true impact of travel time on our outcome
variables.
In terms of the estimation method, the inclusion of several sets of high-dimensional
fixed effects renders estimation non-trivial, despite the fact that equation 3.2 is fully
linear. We choose to apply the iterative procedure proposed by Guimaraes and
Portugal (2010): its principle is to iterate on sets of normal equations that are
conveniently defined. The only practical constraint in our implementation of their
methodology is to use continuous empirical proxies for the explanatory variables of
main interest, in order to insure identification (see appendix 3.E for full details).
23In the reported regressions, we exclude affiliates which are not part of a multi-implantation
group, mainly for practical reasons (this reduces drastically our file size and the associated com-
puting time). However, these observations could serve as additional controls for local shocks.
Un-reported regressions show that results are basically unaffected by this choice.
24This problem is well known in the literature about the estimation of production functions,
where capital is typically not measured accurately (Griliches and Hausman, 1986).
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3.4.2 Robustness Checks
We also provide a bunch of checks to test the robustness of our results to additional
potential sources of endogeneity. First, additional controls for group level market
conditions Xjt, both on the domestic and the international markets, are incorporated
in all specifications to control for group-wide shocks which might be spuriously tem-
porally correlated with travel time reductions (and our outcome variables) in our
sample. This strategy is however not sufficient in cases where group-wide shocks are
endogenously correlated with HSR line openings: this would happen, for example,
in cases where the group lobbied in favor of certain HSR line openings and exten-
sions.25 To mitigate this concern, we first estimate regressions where we simply
remove the most “suspicious” observations, namely the largest affiliates in each area.
Second, we experiment with specifications where we remove large HSR beneficia-
ries, i.e. affiliates benefiting from HSR for more than 50% of the rail track to their
headquarters.26
3.4.3 Further evidence from un-realized lines
To mitigate an even broader set of endogeneity concerns, but at the cost of discarding
a larger fraction of the sample, we also implement an additional strategy along the
lines of Donaldson (2014). This strategy makes use of the fact that a governmental
plan was drafted in 1991 (ahead of our period of analysis) and endorsed by the Prime
Minister of the time. It described an ambitious network of HSR lines to be built in
the years to come, based on local development and profitability criteria (Ministe`re de
l’E´quipement, 1991).27 However, some of the lines were not implemented (Zembri,
1997). In some cases it was because their expected profitability was deemed too
low:28 we choose to discard these lines. For the remainder, non-implementation
was explained by the fact that budgetary constraints imposed some phasing and
rescheduling of projects, or because of unexpected technical difficulties29 that are
arguably exogenous in our empirical setting.
25Giroud (2013) also considers the possibility of lobbying at the affiliate (rather than group) level.
We think that this case is very unlikely for HSR given the cost of the infrastructure. However,
the specifications suggested in the previous case, where we remove the largest affiliates or discard
affiliates benefiting from HSR on a too large proportion of the track to their headquarters, would
also mitigate the concern of lobbying at the affiliate level.
26This strategy is very similar to what is implemented in Giroud (2013), in specifications where
he only considers indirect flights where either the last leg of the flight (involving the plant’s home
airport) or the first leg of the flight (involving headquarters’ home airport) remains unchanged.
27See appendix 3.D for a map of the foreseen infrastructures. The lines which were ultimately
realized as of 2011 are: the Eastern line, the Rhin/Rhone connection, the Parisian inter-connection,
the Provence and Rhone-Alps line. Unrealized lines are: the Auvergne, Limousin and Normandy
lines (featuring low expected profitability even in the initial blueprint document of 1991), and
our actual “counterfactual lines”: Aquitaine, Brittany, Far South, inter-connection in the Alps,
Mediterranean Coast (French Riviera), Languedoc-Rousillon, Midi-Pyre´ne´es, Pays de la Loire and
Picardy.
28This is the case of lines connecting Paris to the center of the country (Auvergne, Limousin), or
to Normandy, which all had expected profitability below 4.3% - the minimum attained for actually
implemented lines (Eastern line).
29For example, in some cases, expensive art works or deviations were required by local authorities
or lobbyists to preserve the environment (e.g. protected areas, vineyards, etc.) - see Zembri (1997).
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We suggest that affiliates which would have benefited from the latter subset of
the 1991 plan are likely to have the same un-observables (potentially correlated
with travel time reductions) as affiliates which actually benefited from realized HSR
lines. In more technical terms, this would imply that conditional on being part of the
1991 plan, travel time is orthogonal to the error term in equation 3.2. We therefore
propose to estimate our baseline specification on the corresponding sub-sample, after
discarding affiliates which could never expect benefiting from the HSR technology
because of their location relative to their headquarters. This is an even more flexible
procedure than simply inserting the variable indicating insertion into the 1991 plan
as a new control, as a strict implementation of the Donaldson (2014) methodology
would imply. In our specific setting, it also clarifies the fact that the coefficient
of interest is in fact mainly identified from this sub-sample of affiliates. Indeed,
the actually implemented HSR network is broadly nested into the 1991 plan, such
that there remains very little variation in travel times in the sub-sample of affiliates
outside the 1991 plan to contribute to identification. Notice that this procedure is
not strictly speaking an instrumental variable strategy. Indeed, we do not argue
that the placement of the 1991 plan was more exogenous than the placement of
the actually implemented network, as would have been required for an instrumental
variable. We only suggest that the factors determining actual implementation (i.e.
the mapping between the 1991 plan and the actually implemented network) are
likely to be relatively orthogonal to our relation of interest, such that the information
about insertion into the 1991 plan captures the unobserved heterogeneity potentially
generating remaining endogeneity issues.
3.4.4 Sample descriptive statistics
Table 3.2 provides a comprehensive description of our sample. About 40% of the
affiliates of geographically dispersed corporate groups benefit from HSR on the track
to their headquarters. This high share is mainly driven by the fact that the first HSR
lines, opened between 1981 and 1993, connected particularly dense areas (Paris and
Lyon). Only 4% of affiliates of geographically dispersed corporate groups benefited
from the rail travel time reductions induced by the HSR network expansion which
occurred between 1993 and 2011. In terms of corporate groups, we obtain that a
slightly higher share (7%) were affected via at least one of their affiliates.30 These
affiliates are on average located further away from their respective headquarters than
affiliates which did not experience any rail travel time reduction: this is due to the
fact that HSR is typically a long distance mean of transportation (section 3.3.3 and
appendix 3.A). Their headquarters are also more often located in Paris, which is
explained by the shape of the HSR network: it is typically organized as a spider web
centered on the capital city (see our earlier comment of figure 3.4). Table 3.2 shows
that the average travel speed between an affiliate and its headquarters is around 80
km/h when the HSR technology is not available, and around 110-120km/h when it
is available on at least part of the track. The latter value is much lower than the
30Figures 3.10 and 3.12 in appendix 3.F complement table 3.2 and provide a full description of
the distribution of travel time reductions at the dates of the main line openings, as well as the
precise geographical location of affiliates which benefited from them.
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HSR commercial speed (320km/h), which indicates that most affiliates only benefit
from HSR on a small portion of the track to their headquarters.
Table 3.2 also provides a breakdown of the industry structure of our sample.
It shows that the sample of affiliates which benefited from the 1994 line opening
was somewhat specific and presented a higher share (than the population average)
of affiliates active in manufacturing and transport industries. This specificity is
explained by the industrial specialization of the areas which became connected to
the HSR network at that date, and translates into somewhat differentiated struc-
tural characteristics: larger affiliate sizes, and somewhat lower shares of production
workers.
Table 3.2: Summary statistics for affiliates of multi-location firms – 1993-2011
Affiliates experiencing reductions in Affiliates
travel time between 1993 and 2011 never
At main years of change: affected
1993- 1993/ 2000/ 2006/
2011 1994 2000 2007
Geography:
Distance to HQ (km) 402 475 482 326 195
HQ in Paris 40% 46% 37% 37% 34%
Travel times (hours):
Travel time 3.84 4.13 4.11 3.10 2.06
Speed - 115 117 105 95
HSR user 82% 100% 100% 100% 41%
Employment of affiliates:
# of employees 38 40 31 31 32
Share of prod. workers 65% 61% 63% 66% 66%
Prod. wkr wage (ke/yr) 15.5 14.8 14.5 16.9 15.9
Share of managers 6% 8% 7% 6% 7%
Indsutry affiliation:
Manufacturing industries 19% 24% 17% 16% 19%
Personnel services 9% 12% 9% 7% 11%
Retail and trade 48% 35% 46% 51% 46%
Business services 17% 20% 20% 19% 18%
Transport 7% 10% 8% 6% 6%
Counts of business units:
Nb obs (aff. × year) 198,088 5,802 9,728 7,253 2,109,167
Nb affiliates 28,207 // // // 699,928
Nb HQs (groups) 9,114 2,161 3,568 2,429 126,745
Notes: The main “years of change” correspond to the opening dates of the Northern line
(1993/1994), of the connection to Marseille (2000/2001) or of the Eastern line (2006/2007).
Sources: DADS and LIFI; business units (HQs or affiliates - see section 3.3.1 for definition) which
are part of multi-location groups between 1993 and 2011. Employment is measured in days of work
but is reported in this table as headcount equivalents (days divided by 360).
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3.5 Results at the affiliate level
3.5.1 Main specification
Table 3.3 contains our main results at the affiliate level. Petersen and Rajan (2002)
suggest that the mechanisms relating organizational structure and the use of infor-
mation presented in section 3.2 are most relevant in industries where information
(e.g. about investment opportunities) to be transmitted is particularly “soft”. In
their view, this is the case when activity relies heavily on relationship building, such
as consulting, research and new product development, and more generally service in-
dustries. Consistently with this hypothesis, we obtain that the negative relationship
between the functional specialization of affiliates and travel times (column 1) and
between affiliate size (as measured by production workers, in column 4) and travel
times are significant in all industries, but highest in industries related to services:
personnel services, business services and transport. In the latter industries, the
functional specialization of affiliates into production activities increases by around 2
percentage point when travel times to their headquarters decrease by one hour. In
the personnel and business service industries, the functional shift is associated with
increases in production capacity (as measured by production workers) of more than
5 percent by hour saved on travel times. Since the average travel time between affil-
iates and headquarters is around 2 hours (table 3.2) and given that average affiliate
size is around 15 and 30 in the personnel and business services industries respectively,
this indicates that the average cost of geographical dispersion in terms of production
capacity amounts to roughly 1.5 production jobs in the personnel services industries,
and to 4 production jobs in the business services industries. However, these effects
are exactly compensated by the symmetric decreases in managerial jobs (most of-
ten, high-skilled managerial jobs), such that the overall impact on total affiliate
employment is not significant.
In the manufacturing, retail and trade industries, point estimates are lower, but
still highly significant. In these sectors, the functional specialization of affiliates into
production activities increases by a little less than 1 percentage point when travel
times to their headquarters decrease by one hour. Production capacity as measured
by production workers increases by around 2 percent per hour saved, which translates
into an average cost of the geographical dispersion of around 2 jobs in manufacturing
industries and two thirds of a job in the retail and trade industries. These results
broadly confirm the empirical findings of Giroud (2013) and Giroud and Mueller
(2015) for the US manufacturing industry.
Last, in column (5) of table 3.3, we investigate the relationship between travel
times and the wage of production workers. The obtained coefficient is most often
positive, but only significant in the manufacturing and business services industries.
This seems unsurprising, since we expect the knowledge based mechanism in sec-
tion 3.2.3 to be more relevant in those most skill intensive industries, which feature
twice as many skilled workers as other industries.31 Associated magnitudes are rel-
atively large: the average geographical dispersion within French corporate groups,
requiring 2h of travel time between affiliates and headquarters, would translate into
31See section 3.3.2 for basic descriptive statistics.
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Table 3.3: Impact of travel time reduction to HQ on the structure of the workforce
at affiliates from 1993 to 2011
Structure of Affiliate Wage (ln)
the workforce (shares) employment (ln)
Production Managers Total Production Production
workers (high-skilled) workers workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Manufact.
industry
−0.009∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.002∗
(0.001)
−0.013
(0.009)
−0.019∗
(0.010)
0.008∗∗
(0.004)
426,595 426,595 426,595 408,861 408,861
Personnel
services
−0.020∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.018∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.005
(0.016)
−0.055∗∗∗
(0.019)
0.009
(0.008)
241,846 241,846 241,846 227,936 227,936
Retail and
trade
−0.008∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.002∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.022∗∗∗
(0.005)
−0.030∗∗∗
(0.006)
−0.004
(0.002)
1,045,869 1,045,869 1,045,869 965,013 965,013
Business
services
−0.018∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.000
(0.002)
−0.009
(0.011)
−0.070∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.013∗
(0.008)
401,844 401,844 401,844 329,68 329,68
Transport
−0.016∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.012∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.018
(0.016)
0.006
(0.022)
0.001
(0.009)
138,865 138,865 138,865 115,205 115,205
Note: the number of observations of the regression is in italic. All regressions include affiliate ×
headquarter level fixed effects, as well as local (commuting zone) × time fixed effects to control for
the local market conditions. Regressions also include group level exports in total sales to capture
the cycle on international markets (but all results are robust to the exclusion of these controls).
Sources: DADS and LIFI; affiliates (see definition in section 3.3.1) which are part of multi-location
groups between 1993 and 2011.
a 2% increase in production costs driven by the higher wages paid out.
3.5.2 More on economic magnitudes: an illustrative quan-
tification exercise
Table 3.4 enables to gauge the magnitudes implied by the regression results in ta-
ble 3.3 in a more intuitive way. In this table, we compute the adjustments that
would take place in the population of affiliates which are in activity in the last year
of our panel (2011), in the counterfactual situation where the HSR network would
be reduced to the lines already in service in 1993, at the beginning of our estima-
tion period, or if it was fully closed (i.e. back to the rail network of the 1980’s).
Of course, this simple exercise does not take account of the potential response of
competing modes of transportation. It is also essentially a partial equilibrium exer-
cise, but as we will show, the aggregate impacts we estimate are not large enough
to be likely to generate large general equilibrium effects, even on local labor markets.
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Table 3.4: Magnitudes at the affiliate level: organizational impact of HSR as of 2011
Manuf. Person. Retail. Bus. Trans-
indus. serv. trade serv. port
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Affiliates benefiting # 10,698 8,322 30,274 15,566 4,489
from HSR in 2011 % 0.438 0.413 0.435 0.518 0.491
Mean 2011 (observed) 3.307 3.315 3.347 3.351 3.502
travel time w/ 1993 network 3.721 3.732 3.775 3.792 3.956
to HQ w/ 1980 network 4.673 4.801 4.714 4.861 4.996
Prod.
2011/1993
jobs 0.196∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗
jobs ppt 0.004∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
2011/1980
jobs 0.633∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 1.168∗∗∗ 1.020∗∗∗
ppt 0.012∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
Manager
2011/1993
jobs -0.046∗ -0.204∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.212∗∗∗
jobs ppt -0.001∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.005∗∗∗
2011/1980
jobs -0.150∗ -0.719∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ -0.018 -0.750∗∗∗
ppt -0.003∗ -0.027∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.017∗∗∗
Wages of
2011/1993
e -4,224∗∗ -1,142 327 -3,978∗ -438
of prod. ppt -0.003 -0.004 0.002 -0.006 0.001
jobs
2011/1980
e -13,744∗∗ -4,108 1,234 -14,687∗ -1,574
ppt -0.011 -0.013 0.005 -0.020 -0.002
Sources: Sources: DADS and LIFI, affiliates (see definition in section 3.3.1) which are part of
multi-location groups between 1993 and 2011. Magnitudes are computed using estimates reported
in table 3.3.
Results obtained from this simple exercise are suggestive:32 for the average affil-
iate in the service industries, the functional shift induced by the availability of the
HSR network (as a whole) amounts to the shift of roughly one job from managerial
(and more precisely, high-skill managerial) activities to production activities. This
represents a reallocation of ca. 3% of the workforce for the average affiliate size. In
the other industries, given the differences in the estimated coefficients in table 3.3
and the differences in average affiliate sizes, the magnitude of the functional shift is
only 20% of a job. Furthermore, we obtain that total savings in terms of production
labor costs induced by the HSR network are of the order of magnitude of half the
cost of a production job for the average affiliate in the manufacturing and business
services industries.
3.5.3 Common trend assumption and non-linearities
The discussion of our identification strategy in section 3.4.1 shows that our setting is
similar to a difference-in-differences setting, where we contrast affiliates experienc-
ing changes in travel times to their headquarters with affiliates located in the same
32The specific impact associated with the subset of HSR lines opened after 1993 is unsurprisingly
lower (by about one fourth) than those discussed in the main text.
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area which did not experience the same changes, because of a different location of
their headquarters. To test the common trend identifying assumption underlying
such a setting, and to investigate potential anticipation effects (or conversely, lagged
adjustment processes), we run a specification where we include lags and leads of our
indicator of travel time. For compactness, we only discuss here the results obtained
for our indicator of functional specialization (the share of employment allocated to
production activities) in the first three columns of table 3.5, but the discussion would
also hold for our other outcome variables.
If anything, we detect anticipation effects in the business and personnel services
industries;33 lagged adjustments only occur in the transport industry. Overall, al-
though the simultaneous inclusion of three indicators of travel times is probably too
demanding in our setting, this experiment shows that the response to changes in
travel times occurs mostly in the year where affiliates experience them in the man-
ufacturing, personnel services, retail and trade and business services industries.
Columns (4) to (6) in table 3.5 propose a different experiment. In this second
specification, we investigate whether our main results in table 3.3 might hide po-
tential non-linearities. We split our travel time variable into three different classes:
short travels, lasting less than 3 hours, medium length travels, lasting between 3
and 5 hours and which would still be feasible (round trip) in one day, and longer
travels, lasting more than 5 hours. We obtain that in all industries, the relation
between travel time and functional specialization is low and insignificant for the
shortest travels. In contrast, the relation is always highly significant for medium
range travels, as well as for the longest trips (except in the case of the retail and
trade industry). These findings are consistent with the fact that the market share
of HSR is highest for the longest trips, as shown in table 3.A of appendix 3.12.
3.5.4 Alternative Identification Strategies
Table 3.6 presents a series of important experiments, where we vary the identifi-
cation strategy in order to test the robustness of our findings. As previously, for
compactness, results are only presented for our indicator of functional specialization
(the share of employment allocated to production activities). Column (1) simply
replicates the results of table 3.3 as a benchmark. In columns (3) and (5), we only
use each third or fifth year in our panel, in order to identify the impact of travel
time on longer time differences than in the baseline specification. The cost of this
strategy is obviously the drastic decrease in sample size that is induced, but re-
sults are fully preserved in this experiment: we actually tend to obtain higher point
estimates when increasing the length of the time difference. This finding might how-
ever partly be driven by the selection of survivors that is induced by this experiment.
In columns (5) and (6), we provide two experiments aiming at testing whether
our results might be driven by “lobbyists”, i.e. by a very specific sub-population
33Unreported regressions using a wider time window show that these anticipation effects do not
exceed one year.
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Table 3.5: Impact of travel time reduction to HQ on the share of production jobs in
affiliates – Anticipation vs. adjustment effects and non-linearities from 1993-2011
Anticipations and adjustments Non-linear impact of travel time
Travel time at: Travel time at t:
t− 1 t t+ 1 shorter 3h to longer
than 3h 5h than 5h
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Manufacturing 0.000
(0.003)
−0.008∗
(0.004)
−0.001
(0.004)
−0.004
(0.003)
−0.009∗∗
(0.004)
−0.015∗∗∗
(0.004)
Personnel serv. −0.012∗
(0.007)
−0.011
(0.008)
−0.002
(0.007)
−0.008
(0.007)
−0.030∗∗∗
(0.007)
−0.024∗∗
(0.009)
Retail & trade −0.004∗
(0.002)
−0.006∗∗
(0.003)
0.002
(0.002)
−0.001
(0.002)
−0.020∗∗∗
(0.003)
−0.004
(0.003)
Business serv. −0.012∗∗∗
(0.004)
−0.010∗∗
(0.005)
0.001
(0.004)
−0.008∗
(0.005)
−0.010∗∗
(0.005)
−0.038∗∗∗
(0.005)
Transport 0.011
(0.007)
−0.007
(0.008)
−0.023∗∗∗
(0.007)
−0.009
(0.006)
−0.023∗∗∗
(0.007)
−0.021∗∗
(0.009)
Note: the dependent variable is the share of production jobs. All regressions include affiliate ×
headquarter level fixed effects, as well as local (commuting zone) × time fixed effects to control for
the local market conditions. Regressions also include group level exports in total sales to capture
the cycle on international markets. Same samples and numbers of observations as in table 3.3.
Sources: DADS and LIFI, affiliates (see definition in section 3.3.1) which are part of multi-location
groups between 1993 and 2011.
of affiliates which might have influenced the placement of the HSR infrastructure
because they would receive disproportionate benefits from HSR, as explained in sec-
tion 3.4.2. In columns (5), we estimate a specification where we remove the largest
affiliates in each commuting zone, assuming that the latter are most likely to be at
the source of the endogeneity concerns related to potential lobbying activity. Our
results are however fully preserved in this regression. In column (6), we propose
another experiment which is directly inspired from Giroud (2013).34 In this spec-
ification, we only use affiliates which only benefit from HSR for less than 50% of
the track to their headquarters. These observations are less likely to have lobbyied
in favor of the HSR line than those benefiting from it on the entire track to their
headquarters. Again, results are fully preserved in this experiment: if anything, we
obtain higher point estimates than in the baseline specification.
Last, column (6) of table 3.6 contains the evidence obtained from unrealized lines
(see section 3.4.3). The rationale behind this alternative strategy is almost opposite
to the two previous experiments: here, we restrict our estimation sample to affiliates
having the same probability to have behaved as lobbyists when the 1991 governmen-
tal plan was decided. Again, results are preserved, and somewhat amplified in the
cases of the manufacturing and business services industries.
34The setting in Giroud (2013) is very similar to ours, since this author estimates the effects of
headquarters’ proximity to plants on plant-level investment and productivity using the opening of
US airlines. To mitigate concerns related to lobbying, he proposes specifications where he only
considers indirect flights where either the last leg of the flight (involving the plant’s home airport)
or the first leg of the flight (involving headquarters’ home airport) remains unchanged.
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Overall, results obtained from the different identification strategies in columns (4)
to (6) suggest that our baseline specification with high-dimensional fixed effects
controlling for shocks at the commuting zone level seem to be sufficient to address
the problem of the endogenous placement of the HSR infrastructure.
Table 3.6: Impact of travel time reduction to HQ on the share of production jobs in
affiliates from 1993 to 2011 – Alternative identification strategies
Baseline Longer time Removing Partial 1991
differences: largest HSR track plan
3 years 5 years only only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Manufacturing
industry
−0.009∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.009∗∗
(0.005)
−0.017∗∗
(0.008)
−0.008∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.014∗∗∗
(0.003)
−0.019∗∗∗
(0.004)
426,595 156,189 86,121 423,677 369,587 209,537
Personnel
services
−0.020∗∗∗
(0.005)
−0.009
(0.011)
−0.049∗∗∗
(0.018)
−0.020∗∗∗
(0.005)
−0.022∗∗∗
(0.007)
−0.026∗∗∗
(0.007)
241,846 89,653 53,552 238,931 209,326 116,566
Retail and
trade
−0.008∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.006∗
(0.003)
−0.002
(0.005)
−0.008∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.008∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.007∗∗
(0.003)
1,045,869 382,129 230,819 1,043,053 917,541 464,929
Business
services
−0.018∗∗∗
(0.003)
−0.016∗∗
(0.006)
−0.035∗∗∗
(0.012)
−0.017∗∗∗
(0.003)
−0.030∗∗∗
(0.004)
−0.025∗∗∗
(0.005)
401,844 148,698 90,025 399,065 334,041 202,592
Transport
−0.016∗∗∗
(0.005)
−0.032∗∗∗
(0.009)
−0.024∗
(0.015)
−0.016∗∗∗
(0.005)
−0.024∗∗∗
(0.007)
−0.015∗
(0.008)
138,865 50,795 30,714 136,052 117,185 65,123
Note: The number of observations of the regression is in italic. All regressions include affiliate ×
headquarter level fixed effects, as well as local (commuting zone) × time fixed effects to control for
the local market conditions. Regressions also include group level exports in total sales to capture
the cycle on international markets.
Sources: DADS and LIFI, affiliates (see definition in section 3.3.1) which are part of multi-location
groups between 1993 and 2011.
3.5.5 Adverse effect of travel time to other affiliates
In table 3.7, we follow Giroud and Mueller (2015) and investigate whether the ad-
justments described in table 3.3 might be affected by travel time reductions affecting
the other affiliates of the group. To that end, we insert into the regression, variables
describing average gains in travel time for other affiliates in the group.
Columns (1) and (2) investigate potential adverse effects on affiliates’ production
capacity (as measured by employment allocated to production). Theory on internal
capital markets predicts that if the group is financially constrained, then a decrease
in the relative cost of operating other affiliates should boost their growth, but lead
to a decline in the resources allocated to other affiliates (Stein, 2002), which would
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negatively affect their size. Consistently with this mechanism, we obtain that while
our earlier estimates of table 3.3 are preserved in column (1) for the relationship
between affiliates’ own travel time and affiliate size, their production capacity is on
average negatively affected by gains in travel times at other affiliates. Point esti-
mates for the latter coefficient are of the same order of magnitude as those obtained
for affiliates’ own travel time, which suggest that the reallocations of production
capacity are of the same order of magnitude.
In contrast, columns (3) and (4) show that functional specialization tends to
be slightly fostered (but not impaired) by gains in travel time at other affiliates,
except in the business services industries. This finding might be driven by the fact
that HQ manager time that is saved at other affiliates (due to shorter travels)35 is
partially reallocated to remote affiliates, thus decreasing the need for local managers
and fostering their functional specialization. Overall, table 3.7 suggest that HQ
managerial time might be a particularly scarce resource (or a particularly costly
input) in large and spatially dispersed groups.
Table 3.7: Impact of travel time reduction to other affiliates in the group from 1993
to 2011
Dependent Production jobs (ln) Share of prod. workers
Variable: Own Gains at Own Gains at
travel time other affiliates travel time other affiliates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Manufacturing ind. −0.023∗∗
(0.010)
−0.023∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.009∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.000
(0.000)
Personnel services −0.058∗∗∗
(0.019)
−0.026∗∗∗
(0.004)
−0.020∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.002∗∗
(0.001)
Retail and trade −0.053∗∗∗
(0.021)
−0.035∗∗∗
(0.005)
−0.007∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)
Business services −0.088∗∗∗
(0.015)
−0.066∗∗∗
(0.004)
−0.018∗∗∗
(0.003)
−0.002∗∗∗
(0.001)
Transport −0.008
(0.022)
−0.021∗∗∗
(0.005)
−0.016∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.002∗∗
(0.001)
Note: All regressions include affiliate × headquarter level fixed effects, as well as local (commuting
zone) × time fixed effects to control for the local market conditions. Regressions also include
group level exports in total sales to capture the cycle on international markets. Same samples and
numbers of observations as in table 3.3.
Sources: DADS and LIFI, affiliates (see definition in section 3.3.1) which are part of multi-location
groups between 1993 and 2011.
35We will show in section 3.6 that managerial jobs which disappear at affiliates are in fact on
average transferred to HQs, such that gains in travel times increase the resources in HQ managerial
time both via time saved during travels and via transfers of managerial jobs to HQs.
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3.6 Descriptive extensions at the group Level
3.6.1 Specification
Some important theoretical predictions hold at the group level rather than at the
affiliate level, most notably predictions relating travel time to overall group size and
profitability (section 3.2.4). We therefore complement the previous regressions with
specifications on the level of the entire group:
yjt = αj +
∑
r
αrt.δjrt + β.Tjt + γ.Xjt + εjt (3.3)
In this equation, identification of the impact of average travel time to affiliates
Tjt on group size or profitability is still identified from variations thanks to the inclu-
sion of the group level fixed effects αj. We also insert a set of dummy variables
36 αrt
capturing market conditions in the areas where the group operates. However, since
corporate groups in our sample are typically geographically dispersed, these dummy
variables are not mutually exclusive, such that it is not possible to implement the
same estimation procedure as previously (appendix 3.E). To render estimation com-
putationally tractable with standard OLS routines, we have to aggregate the circa
300 commuting zones into the 22 French metropolitan regions prevailing over the
period. Additional controls Xjt in equation 3.3 include the number of sites to be
managed (including the headquarters themselves, in logarithm), such that all results
are to be interpreted “per implantation”. As for regressions at the affiliate level, we
also insert export intensity (as previously) to capture international market condi-
tions when relevant.
An important concern for these regressions estimated at the group level is that
average travel time to affiliates Tjt might evolves for two different types of reasons:
either because travel times decrease as the HSR network expands (as previously), or
because the scope of the group evolves, i.e. affiliates enter or exit. This aspect is the
main weakness of our regressions at the group level: indeed, we show in appendix 3.G
that adjustments on this “extensive margin” are not orthogonal to the variations in
travel times induced by the HSR network, but this concern is difficult to address
(Giroud, 2013).37 As a first attempt to control for this problem, we split the travel
time term into two parts:
36Results are robust to the use of employment shares in each zone rather than simply dummy
variables indicating where the group operates.
37This concern was already present, though less severe, in section 3.5.5.
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Tjt =
∑
i∈Fjt T(ij)t
Card Fjt −
∑
i∈Fjt0 T(ij)t0
Card Fjt0︸ ︷︷ ︸
Normalization term
(factored out by group level fixed effects)
=
(∑
i∈Fjt T(ij)t
Card Fjt −
∑
i∈Fjt T(ij)t0
Card Fjt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in average travel time
+
(∑
i∈Fjt T(ij)t0
Card Fjt −
∑
i∈Fjt0 T(ij)t0
Card Fjt0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in group spatial dispersion
(3.4)
where Fjt denotes the set of affiliates in group j at date t and Fjt0 the set of
affiliates in group j in the first year the group is observed in our data (date t0).
As previously, Tijt is travel time between affiliate i and the headquarters of group j
at date t. Of course, the spatial dispersion term is affected by variations in travel
times induced by the wider availability of the HSR technology, but most likely only
marginally, as suggested in appendix 3.G: for example, travel times only explain
around 5 percentage point of a total of 43% of affiliate exits to be explained.38 In
spite of this limitation, this term allows us to purge the term measuring changes in
travel times from changes in geographic dispersion at the group level.
3.6.2 Results
Results depicting the correlations between travel times or geographic dispersion and
group size and profit are reported in table 3.8. We obtain first that the indicator of
spatial dispersion is consistently negatively correlated with all indicators: group size
as measured by value added, employment or investment, and profit margin. Since
all regressions include controls for the number of affiliates, this means that on aver-
age, the production units of geographically dispersed corporate groups are smaller,
and present a lower operational profit margin than production units of concentrated
corporate groups.39
In terms of our indicator of main interest, travel times, the most robust pattern
is the negative relationship that is obtained between travel times and profit margin
across all industries. Table 3.9 provides the associated orders of magnitude using
the same counterfactual exercise as in section 3.5.2: we obtain that if multi-location
groups active in 2011 could not rely on HSR for some reason and only used the 1980
rail network, then their profit margin would decrease by 0.5 percentage point on av-
erage (and even by 2 percentage points in the transport industry), which is sizable.
The correlation obtained between investment and travel times is also consistently
negative, which is consistent with Giroud (2013), but results are only significant in
the retail, trade and transport industries. Last, we obtain a negative relationship be-
tween travel times and group size as measured by value added or employment in the
38Market conditions have much more explanatory power in the regressions modeling affiliate
reshuﬄing of appendix 3.G.
39Note however that it does not imply that total profits of geographically dispersed groups are
lower: by revealed preferences, if such structures exist, then the converse is necessarily true.
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Table 3.8: Spatial dispersion and performance at the group level from 1993 to 2011
Value Employ- Invest- Profit
Added (ln) ment (ln) ment (ln) Margin
Travel time
Manufacturing ind. −0.067∗∗∗
(0.014)
−0.026∗
(0.014)
−0.037
(0.035)
−0.008∗∗
(0.003)
Personnel services −0.107∗∗∗
(0.024)
−0.074∗∗∗
(0.025)
−0.064
(0.067)
−0.010∗
(0.006)
Retail and trade −0.049∗∗∗
(0.013)
−0.049∗∗∗
(0.012)
−0.146∗∗∗
(0.034)
−0.011∗∗∗
(0.003)
Business services 0.029∗∗
(0.014)
0.082∗∗∗
(0.015)
−0.015
(0.030)
−0.007∗∗
(0.003)
Transport −0.017
(0.024)
0.040∗
(0.024)
−0.232∗∗∗
(0.059)
−0.017∗∗∗
(0.005)
Spatial dispersion
Manufacturing ind. −0.017∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.032∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.020∗∗∗
(0.004)
−0.003∗∗∗
(0.000)
Personnel services −0.044∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.042∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.003
(0.006)
−0.004∗∗∗
(0.001)
Retail and trade −0.017∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.028∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.013∗∗∗
(0.004)
−0.004∗∗∗
(0.000)
Business services −0.041∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.059∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.066∗∗∗
(0.004)
−0.003∗∗∗
(0.000)
Transport −0.008∗∗
(0.003)
−0.025∗∗∗
(0.003)
−0.034∗∗∗
(0.007)
−0.002∗∗∗
(0.001)
Note: All regressions include group level fixed effects, as well as dummy variables describing
in which region the group operates, interacted with years (to capture local market conditions).
Regressions also include the logarithm of the total number of sites (HQ and affiliates) as well as
group level exports in total sales to capture the business cycle on international markets. Number
of observations: 225,942 for manufacturing industry, 131,829 for personnel services, 406,310 for
retail and trade, 249,263 for business services and 52,936 of transport.
Sources: DADS and LIFI, groups owning affiliates in different locations (commuting zones) for at
least one year between 1993 and 2011.
manufacturing, personnel services and retail and trade industries. In those sectors,
point estimates that are obtained for value added are consistently higher than those
obtained for employment, which implies that higher travel times are associated with
lower labor productivity - or conversely, that reduced travel times allow managerial
organizations to be more efficient and parsimonious in labor. In the business services
and transport industries, we do not obtain negative correlations between group size
and travel times, but the result for labor productivity still holds.40
To conclude, table 3.10 provides a simple test at the headquarter level of the
overall delegation story that was suggested by regressions at the affiliate level. More
precisely, we check that the geographical dispersion of corporate groups is associated
with fewer administrative workers, and more precisely fewer high-skilled managers
at HQs relative to affiliates, which would be consistent with increased delegation of
40In the business services and transport industries, we actually obtain a positive correlation
between size and travel times, which could be driven by a particularly strong productivity effect.
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Table 3.9: Magnitudes at the group level – operational impact of HSR as of 2011
Manuf. Person. Retail, Bus. Trans-
Indus. Serv. Trade Serv. port
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Groups # 2,723 1,303 4,527 5,216 869
benefiting from HSR % 0.461 0.333 0.363 0.513 0.527
Average in 2011 2.544 2.447 2.242 2.406 2.858
travel time w/ 1993 network 2.811 2.704 2.494 2.710 3.232
to HQ w/ 1980 network 3.384 3.287 2.966 3.402 3.972
2011/1993
jobs 3.082∗ 4.456∗∗∗ 2.134∗∗∗ -6.193∗∗∗ -4.031∗
Employ- ppt 0.007∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.015∗
ment
2011/1980
jobs 11.031∗ 16.706∗∗∗ 7.777∗∗∗ -20.174∗∗∗ -14.062∗
ppt 0.022∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.045∗
2011/1993
ke 114 27 51∗∗∗ 7 2488∗∗∗
Invest- ppt 0.010 0.016 0.037∗∗∗ 0.004 0.087∗∗∗
ment
2011/1980
ke 429 103 194∗∗∗ 36 5136∗∗∗
ppt 0.031 0.054 0.106∗∗∗ 0.015 0.258∗∗∗
Profit 2011/1993 ppt 0.002∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
margin 2011/1980 ppt 0.006∗∗ 0.008∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
Sources: DADS and LIFI, groups owning affiliates in different locations (commuting zones) for
at least one year between 1993 and 2011. Magnitudes are computed using estimates reported in
table 3.8.
authority to local managers of affiliates when travel times are higher. The obtained
patterns are fully consistent with this hypothesis in all industries. Furthermore,
point estimates are higher than those that were reported for adjustments at the
affiliate level in table 3.3: this would imply that the downward adjustments in man-
agerial resources at remote affiliates induced by decreases in communication costs
are more than compensated by the symmetric adjustments in managerial resources
at headquarters.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we documented the impact of travel time between affiliates and head-
quarters of geographically dispersed corporate groups on the management of such
business organizations. Guided by theory, we tested these predictions on the pop-
ulation of French corporate groups, using the expansion of the High Speed Rail
network as an arguably exogenous shock on internal travel times. We obtained that
reduced travel times are associated with increases in affiliates size and foster func-
tional specialization, particularly in the service industries where information to be
transmitted is arguably softer (Petersen and Rajan, 2002). Results are however also
significant in the trade and manufacturing industries, but point estimates are lower.
Our estimates allow to quantify the impact of the expansion of the HSR network on
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Table 3.10: Spatial Dispersion and the balance of managerial jobs at HQ vs. Affili-
ates from 1993 to 2011
Total Share in total High-skilled Share of
(ln) managerial jobs (ln) high-skilled
Travel time
Manufacturing ind. −0.045∗∗
(0.018)
−0.012∗∗∗
(0.004)
−0.095∗∗∗
(0.018)
−0.026∗∗∗
(0.005)
Personnel services −0.114∗∗∗
(0.038)
−0.041∗∗∗
(0.008)
−0.163∗∗∗
(0.048)
−0.027∗∗∗
(0.009)
Retail and trade −0.085∗∗∗
(0.016)
−0.035∗∗∗
(0.004)
−0.167∗∗∗
(0.017)
−0.022∗∗∗
(0.005)
Business services 0.001
(0.016)
−0.040∗∗∗
(0.003)
−0.057∗∗∗
(0.018)
−0.025∗∗∗
(0.005)
Transport 0.010
(0.029)
−0.008
(0.007)
−0.041
(0.033)
−0.019∗∗
(0.008)
Spatial dispersion
Manufacturing ind. 0.004∗
(0.002)
0.004∗∗∗
(0.000)
−0.009∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.000
(0.001)
Personnel services −0.034∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.011∗∗∗
(0.005)
−0.046∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.008∗∗∗
(0.004)
Retail and trade −0.018∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.004∗∗∗
(0.000)
−0.025∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.001∗∗∗
(0.001)
Business services −0.009∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.003∗∗∗
(0.000)
−0.019∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.001∗
(0.001)
Transport 0.008∗∗
(0.004)
0.008∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.009∗∗
(0.004)
0.000
(0.001)
Note: All regressions include group level fixed effects, as well as dummy variables describing
in which region the group operates, interacted with years (to capture local market conditions).
Regressions also include the logarithm of the total number of sites (HQ and affiliates) as well as
group level exports in total sales to capture the business cycle on international markets. Number
of observations: 225,942 for manufacturing industry, 131,829 for personnel services, 406,310 for
retail and trade, 249,263 for business services and 52,936 of transport.
Sources: DADS and LIFI, groups owning affiliates in different locations (commuting zones) for at
least one year between 1993 and 2011.
the management of remote affiliates. We obtain that for the average affiliate ben-
efiting from the infrastructure, moving back to the 1980 rail network without HSR
would induce a shift of roughly one job from administrative to operational activities
in service industries (with the associated increase in the productive capacity of the
considered affiliate), against 20% of a job in other industries (retail, trade or manu-
facturing). We also obtain that affiliates in the manufacturing and business services
industries experienced decreases in production labor costs, of around half the cost of
a production job for the average affiliate. At the group level, our regressions suggest
that the impact on the operational profit margin ranges from 0.5 to 1.5 percentage
points depending on the industry.
We think our analyzes provide precise evidence about the nature of the man-
agerial costs implied by the geographic dispersion of corporate groups, but leave
several questions open. First, our descriptive analyzes of affiliate openings and clo-
sures suggest that the question of the relationship between communication costs and
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the decisions relating to corporate groups’ overall geographic organization is most
likely a fruitful domain of research. We leave the thorough rigorous economic and
econometric treatments of these aspects for future research. Second, we focused in
this paper on within group, HQ to affiliate communication. Natural extensions of
our work would consider communication between affiliates, and more importantly,
communication with external stakeholders, such as suppliers and customers as in
Bernard et al. (2015) and investors. These aspects could drive large productivity
and profitability impacts as well.
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3.A The business travels of managers: HSR or
Air?
3.A.1 Managers represent a significant share of the cus-
tomers HSR
Table 3.11 is constructed from the most recent survey data about transports and
provides a breakdown of the clients of each mode of transportation in 200841. It
shows that most HSR travels have a private motivation, with only 35% of them
having a business motivation - which is a lower share than in the case of air or
standard rail travels. However and strikingly in the case of HSR, this contribution
of business travels to total HSR traffic is largely driven by managers: they account
for 20% of total HSR domestic travels, and to more than half of business HSR
travels. Altogether, these figures suggest that managers, despite their low weight in
the workforce (typically 9 to 10%) are a non-negligible segment of HSR customers,
in particular among “business” customers.
Table 3.11: Long distance domestic travels in 2008 for each mode of transportation
by type of user and main purpose (in %)
Main purpose: Private Trips Business Trips
Type of users: All High Managers All Managers
income
Car 86 33 10 14 5
HSR 65 29 11 35 20
Other Rail 46 13 5 54 19
Bus 89 20 1 12 1
Air 54 28 14 45 32
Note: This survey was collected at the household level. Income is measured at the household (not
respondent) level. “High income” corresponds to the top quartile of the income distribution (total
household income, normalized by units of consumption). The category “Managers” describes the
occupation of the respondent. Managers account for 20% of all HSR trips. This represents 20/35
= 57% of HSR business trips.
Sources: SOES, Transport and travel survey, 2008.
The disproportionate contribution of managers to HSR travels is first driven by
the fact that they travel more in absolute terms: they contribute more to busi-
ness travels, whatever the mean of transportation, than their relative weight in the
workforce. Second, their contribution is even more disproportionate for means of
transportation dedicated to long distance travels: HSR and planes.
41For homogeneity concerns, we restrict the analysis to domestic trips, since in this paper we
focus on domestic HSR routes.
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3.A.2 The market share of HSR for long distance business
travels: 1994 vs. 2008
Table 3.12 investigates what is the precise “market” of HSR, and what are its main
competitors42. First, the market share of HSR is highest, among domestic business
travels, for the longest trips: it reaches 42% on the segment of very long distance
travels (longer than 800km), on which airlines capture the second largest market
share (33%). For travels of intermediate length, the market share of HSR is still of
24%, but the contribution of other rail is larger (31%), while it is negligible in the
category of the longest trips. Symmetrically, air becomes a residual category in the
range of travels of intermediate length. Altogether, these results suggest that over
the recent period, HSR is one of the most popular mean of transportation for the
longest domestic business travels.
Table 3.12: “Market share” of each mode of transportation by market segment -
Domestic business travels only
Unity: Number of trips Distance
Distance: <200km 200 to > 800km All
800km
Market shares in 1994
Car 77 62 17 68 56
HSR 0 19 12 8 14
Other rail 21 11 9 16 12
Bus 1 2 7 2 2
Air 0 6 43 5 13
Not answered 1 1 11 2 3
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Market shares in 2008
Car 76 37 15 56 42
HSR 2 24 42 13 26
Other rail 21 31 9 25 20
Bus 1 2 0 1 2
Air 0 6 33 4 10
Not answered 0 2 0 1 1
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Note: Both surveys are collected at the household level. In 2008, HSR travels account for 13% of
all trips (26% when weighted by distance), while air travels account for 4% of all trips (10% when
weighted by distance).
Sources: Transport and communication survey, 1994, and SOES, Transport and travel survey,
2008.
42Unfortunately, the sample size of the survey does not allow to analyze the break-down of
managers’ travels by distance in a statistically meaningful way, especially for the shortest trips.
Therefore, we only provide a description of the aggregate of all business travels and assume that the
discrete choice patterns of managers does not deviate too much from them (which for the longest
trips at least is a reasonable assumption).
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Figure 3.6: Market shares of rail and air for the passenger market (business and
non-business), 1993 - 2011
Sources: compiled by SOeS - Ministry in charge of Transports from rail operators and DGAC.
Table 3.12 also provides some information about market shares at an earlier pe-
riod, 1994, which corresponds to the beginning of our period of observation. It shows
that the extension of the HSR network and its wider availability was accompanied
by large gains in market shares. This fact is further confirmed by figure 3.6, which
shows that HSR traffic experienced a steep growth while traffic by air and standard
rail did not increase much.
This large market penetration by HSR is consistent with the fact that HSR was
adopted quickly by a significant share of professional users when it was introduced
as a new transportation device.
3.A.3 Further evidence from the evolution of the airline in-
dustry
This section documents the aggregate evolution of the airline industry over our pe-
riod of study: in spite of a structural liberalization episode between 1994 and 2000,
the evolution of the industry did not affect massively the options available to man-
agers for their business travels during the period.
The airline industry was marked by an important liberalization episode between
1994 and 200143, which witnessed the entry of several airlines on the French market
(including the domestic market), and the global increase of the supply of domestic
43For a description, see for example the report to the French Senate Senate (2001).
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flights. This pattern is documented on figure 3.7, which shows that while entry (and
the supply of new flights) increased steeply between 1994 and 2000 (panel (A)), the
number of air passengers however did not follow the same pattern and remained
almost stable over the period (panel (B)). Due to a lack of demand, the number of
domestic flights decreased quickly between 2000 and 2004, to go back to the supply
level of 1993. Figure 3.6 shows that in contrast, transport by rail experienced a
massive increase over the period, with implied volumes that are several orders of
magnitude larger than total air traffic (as measured by total number of passengers,
even when weighted by distance traveled).
(A) Number of domestic flights (capacity supplied) (B) Passengers of domestic flights
100
150
200
250
N
um
be
r o
f f
lig
ht
s 
(th
ou
sa
nd
)
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
 
Flights from or to Paris Other domestic flights         
5
10
15
20
N
um
be
r o
f p
as
se
ng
er
s 
(m
illio
n)
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
 
Passengers from or to Paris Other domestic flights          
Figure 3.7: Supply and demand in the airline industry, 1993 to 2011
Sources: Flux de Trafic Commercial (Commercial Traffic Flows), 1986 - 2013, DGAC (published
in June 2014).
These patterns are suggestive of the fact that in spite of the liberalization episode,
airlines did not actually gain large market shares over other means of transportation,
in particular rail. Figure 3.8 shows that there was no huge change in the relative
price advantage of airlines over rail, neither over our period of analysis (given the
parallel evolution of the two respective price indices), nor today (when comparing
fares for selected destinations). Over the recent period, the number and frequency
of connections by air is lower than the number and frequency of connections by rail,
and many destinations served by HSR are simply not served by airlines.
3.A.4 Discussion of potential biases
What is the likely impact of overlooking air connections in our computations of
travel times? If anything, this should produce an attenuation bias, which we expect
to be small given the previous developments. More precisely:
- Whenever managers use air connections (be they new or not) rather than rail,
then HSR travel time reductions are irrelevant, which generates attenuation
bias in our setting.
- When airline connections appear (resp. disappear), then managers’ demand
might reports to air (resp. rail) in absence of rail travel time reduction. Travel
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Figure 3.8: Prices of Transport by Rail and Air, between 1993 and 2011
(A) Aggregate Consumption Price Indices (B) Selected Prices Posted Online
Computed by the Statistical Institute as of March 2015
(base year 1998) for 38 Destinations with Departure from Paris
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time might change (increase or decrease) in absence of HSR travel time varia-
tion, which would also generate attenuation bias in our setting.
- When airline closures are related to HSR line openings, then actual travel time
might decrease by less than what we compute, or even increase. This would
also generate attenuation bias in our setting.
- Amplification biases could be generated by airline openings as simultaneous
responses to the opening of new HSR lines, in association with shorter travel
times by air than by rail. We however think that these events were relatively
rare. Furthermore, these upward biases are most likely low if travel time
achieved by HSR is close to travel time by air (including access to airport or
train station, see the discussion in section 3.3).
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3.B Remote corporate control in France:
the disproportionate weight of Paris
Figure 3.9 provides a break-down of the indicator of figure 3.2 (section 3.3.1) and
describes in each commuting zone, the share of employment under control of HQs
located respectively in Paris, Lyon, Marseille or Strasbourg. The main take-away
of this comparison is the disproportionate weight of Paris in terms of corporate
control. In terms of geographical range, the map shows that its sphere of “corporate
influence” is particularly wide ranging, since most of the territory is reached by
Parisian headquarters. Lyon and Marseille also reach very distant areas, but only
occasionally and with a lower weight in terms of local employment.
Figure 3.9: Share of total private employment under control of HQs located in four
French cities, in 2011 (
Paris
<1
1−20
20−50
>50
Marseille
Lyon
Strasbourg
Notes: the four maps describe the share of private employment in each “employment zone” that is
under control of HQs located, respectively, in Paris, Lyon, Marseille or Strasbourg (i.e. the sphere
of “corporate influence” of these four large French cities.
Sources: DADS and LIFI, covering the private sector (except agricultural activities and workers
of the personnel service industries directly employed by households).
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3.C Computation of rail travel times
This section describes the construction of rail travel times between headquarters and
affiliates. We relied on a two-step procedure:
- First, we simplify the network of trains stations and select only one “main
station” by commuting zone.
- Second, we collected and constructed time tables for the resulting list of 316
stations.
Rail travel time between an affiliate and its headquarters is then measured by rail
travel time between the respective “main stations” of the commuting zones where
they are located. Travel time between headquarter or affiliate and “main station” is
neglected for two reasons:
- It is typically short, and it does not vary over time (while our identification
strategy typically relies on variations in travel times - see section 3.4).
- Furthermore, managers who are asked to travel for professional reasons might
depart from home rather than from work: in such cases, travel time between
headquarter or affiliate and “main station” is not the relevant quantity. In
absence of precise information about the location where managers live, and
from which station they might depart, the main station in each commuting
zones is by construction44 the best statistical guess we can get about it.
This fact therefore also motivates our choice to allocate each headquarter and
affiliate to the main station in their commuting zone, although the alternative
of choosing the closest station is discussed in detail in section 3.C.3 below (it
does not make much difference since the two candidate stations under each
alternative are typically very close).
3.C.1 Selection of the “main station(s)” in each commuting
zone
We select a set of 316 “main stations”, among the set of stations which existed in
1993, using the following criteria:
- In cases where only one station in the considered commuting zone is served by
HSR, we select it as its “main station”.
- In cases where several stations in the considered commuting zone are served
by HSR, we select the station having the highest long distance traffic using an
adequate score based on the number of long distance services that are available
in each station.45
44Commuting zones are defined “as the geographical area within which most of the labor force
lives and works, and in which establishments hire most of their workforce”.
45To be more precise, we computed traffic scores as of 2013 (for data availability reasons), based
on the total number of services available in each station, but giving less weight to services with
many local stops. The score is computed as the sum of the squared average distance between any
two consecutive stops for each service available in the considered station.
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- In cases where none of the stations in the considered commuting zone is directly
served by HSR, we select the station having the highest long distance traffic
score.
- In the rare cases of ties, we select the station located in the most populated
municipality.
- Stations that were specifically built to accommodate HSR services during our
period of estimation replace the previous “main station” in their employment
zone from the date they enter into service.
Overall, these “new HSR stations” have a large impact on rail travel times.46
3.C.2 Time tables between “main stations”
We then collected past and current timetables in order to recover the fastest train
service between any two directly connected “main stations”:
- Travel times for train services which remained “local” over the entire period
(i.e. those implying no HSR service) were simply approximated by the 2013
timetables, which are available on the open-data platform of the national rail
company.
- For long distance services, we relied on rail fan web sites and the archives of
the national rail company, as well as on the evaluation reports of the French
Ministry for Transportation (LOTI reports). These sources enable us to assess
train travel times both before and after HSR line openings.
The obtained database contains travel times between any two directly con-
nected stations, at any date between 1980 and 201347. We then complement it
with travel times between any two indirectly connected stations, assuming that each
train change takes 15 minutes (a rather lower bound).
3.C.3 Discussion
In table 3.13, we compare travel times obtained with our baseline procedure, where
we allocate each affiliate or headquarter to the main station in their respective
commuting zone, with an alternative procedure where we allocate each affiliate or
headquarter to the closest main station (not necessarily located in the same com-
muting zone). The main take-away of this table is that absolute travel times are
somewhat altered by this alternative choice of measurement, since the average dis-
crepancy for treated affiliates is 12 minutes (while the median is only 2 minutes).
However, changes (reductions) in travel times are far less affected, since they only
occur via new HSR line openings and therefore fundamentally rest on stations served
by HSR, which are the same in the two procedures. The precise distribution of these
changes in our estimation sample is plotted on figure 3.10.
46Which legitimates the investment required by their construction...
47This time span encompasses our period of analysis and enables us to run the “placebo” robust-
ness checks presented in section 3.5.3.
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Table 3.13: Travel Times with Alternative Computing Procedures
Affiliates × years No travel time change Reduction in travel time
in our sample in our sample
Computation of travel time from/to: Com. Clos- Diffe- Com. Clos- Diffe-
Zone est rence Zone est rence
Distance to HQ (km) 160 - 450 -
HQ in Paris 29% - 36% -
Comparison of computing procedures:
Same zone (station) as HQ 42% 40% (4%) 0% 0% (0%)
Travel time after change (minutes) 95 98 7 232 240 12
Variation in travel time (minutes) 0 0 0 35 32 6
Share of firms with travel time change 0% 0% (0%) 100% 81% (19%)
Share of aff. benefiting from HSR service 33% 32% (2%) 100% 96% (4%)
Share of new HSR users 0% 0% (0%) 19% 16% (5%)
Direct track 72% 68% (7%) 47% 37% (13%)
1 change 14% 16% (8%) 25% 26% (16%)
2 changes or more 12% 15% (4%) 28% 37% (11%)
Notes: The classification in columns between affiliates × years experiencing (or not) changes in
travel times is based on the computation of travel time between commuting zone which is actually
used in our regressions. Notice that around 40% of the affiliates × years experiencing no change in
travel time are located in the same commuting zone as their headquarters. For the 60% which are
not located in the same commuting zone as their headquarters: average distance to HQ is 273km,
average travel time (between employment zones) is 162.3 minutes, and the share of direct tracks
(between employment zones) is 52.5%.
Sources: DADS and LIFI, affiliates (see section 3.3.1 for definition) which are part of multi-location
groups between 1993 and 2011.
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Figure 3.10: Distribution of travel time reductions at main dates of HSR line open-
ings – Northern line (1993/94), connection to Marseille (2000/01) and Eastern line
(2006/07)
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Note: Values are expressed in minutes. Firms which did not experience any change in rail travel
time at the respective dates were excluded: observations in the bin labeled by “0” correspond to
strictly positive travel time reductions, but that are smaller than 5 minutes.
Sources: DADS and LIFI, affiliates (see definition in section 3.3.1) which are part of multi-location
groups between 1993 and 2011.
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3.D Map from the 1991 governmental blueprint
document
Figure 3.11: Map of the HSR lines proposed in the 1991 governmental blueprint
document
Sources: Ministe`re de l’E´quipement (1991), French Ministry for Equipment.
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3.E Details of the estimation method
The principle of the estimation method is to iterate on three sets of normal equations
that are conveniently defined. Let us first rewrite equation 3.2 in matrix format as:
Y︸︷︷︸
yijlt
= X B︸︷︷︸
β.Tijt+γ.X(ij)lt
+DI A
I︸ ︷︷ ︸
αij
+DLT A
LT︸ ︷︷ ︸
αlt
+ ︸︷︷︸
εijlt
(3.5)
where X is a vector encompassing our continuous treatment variable and addi-
tional continuous explanatory variables (typically group exposure to international
demand conditions, i.e. export intensity), DI is the vector of the affiliate level dum-
mies (αi), DLT the vector of the commuting zone × year dummies (αlt), B, AI and
ALT are the corresponding parameters to be estimated. The three sets of normal
equations are defined as follows: B = (X ′X)−1X ′(Y −DI AI −DLT ALT )AI = (D′IDI)−1D′I(Y −X B −DLT ALT )
ALT = (D′LTDLT )
−1D′LT (Y −X B −DI AI)

The algorithm is initiated at AI(0) = 0 and A
LT
(0) = 0. The first of equation
provides the first estimated value for B(1), which is plugged into the second set of
equations to get AI(1) = A
I
(1)
(
B(1), A
LT
(0)
)
. Then B(1) and A
I
(1) are plugged into the
third set of equations to get ALT(1) . This procedure is iterated until the sum of squared
residuals no longer decreases.
The benefit of the decomposition of normal equations into the three sets above
is that it renders the estimation computationally tractable. Only the first set of
equations requires an actual matrix inversion, but it is of relatively low dimension. It
can be performed by simple OLS on the modified dependent variable Y −DI AI(n−1)−
DLT A
LT
(n−1). The two last sets of equations simply correspond to the computations
of means: of the variable (Y −X B(n)−DLT ALT(n−1)) by affiliate across years (classes
generated by DI), and of the variable (Y −X B(n) −DI AI(n)) by commuting zone
× time across affilaites (classes generated by DLT ). This algorithm, which consists
in iterating sequentially across each set of equations, falls into the class of so-called
“partitioned” algorithms (“zigzag” iterations) which has been analyzed in full length
by Smyth (1996): while the iteration process is slow in general (unless covariates
are orthogonal, but this is not the case in our setting), the zigzag iteration is found
to admit a global convergence result.
To compute the correct standard errors associated with the estimate of B,
Guimaraes and Portugal (2010) apply a result derived by Abowd et al. (2002), who
show that the total number of identified “fixed” effects is given by N I + NLT − G,
where G is what they call (in their application) the number of “mobility groups”
(classes) generated by the two sets of fixed effects, DI and DLT . In our case, this
simply corresponds to the partition by geographical zones, i.e. G = L. The formula
for the computation of standard errors is then given by:
V (β̂) =
SSR
(N −NX −N I −NLT + L).N.s2time.(1−R2time)
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where N is the total number of observations, NX is the number of variables in
X, N I is the number of affiliates and NLT is the number of commuting zones ×
time. Last, s2time is the sample variance associated with the travel time variable and
R2time is the coefficient of determination obtained from a regression of travel time on
all other remaining explanatory variables.
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3.F Geographical repartition of the estimation sam-
ple
Figure 3.12: Localization of business units benefiting from rail travel reductions
Estimation Sample (Population)
(A) (B) (C)
Headquarters Affiliates Affiliates benefiting
from that year’s
HSR line opening
1994
2001
<200
200−500
500−1000
>1000
2007
1994
2001
<200
200−500
500−1000
>1000
2007
1994
2001
<1
1−50
50−100
>100
2007
Sources: Matched DADS files and LIFI survey; business units (HQs or affiliates - see section 3.3.1
for definition) which are part of multi-location firms between 1993 and 2011.
Note: The different dates correspond to the opening date of the Northern line (1993/1994), of the
connection to Marseille (2000/2001) and to the opening date of the Eastern line (2006/2007).
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3.G Descriptive analysis of the extensive margins
If proximity between affiliates and headquarters facilitates monitoring and informa-
tion transmission, one might expect that it also matters on the “extensive margin”,
for affiliate creations and destruction. These events are not explicitly taken into
account in our main regression framework of section 3.4, although in practice they
are well captured by the affiliate level fixed effects (which “purge” regressions from
most of the selection bias which could arise). A thorough econometric treatment of
these events would require the specification of a discrete choice model of implanta-
tion across commuting zones, which would not fit our identification strategy. We
therefore leave this aspect for future research but propose as in Giroud (2013) a
series of regressions describing the relation between affiliate creation or destruction
and travel time.
3.G.1 Affiliate creations
Table 3.14: Travel time and the reshuﬄing of affiliates: characteristics of entries
from 1993 to 2011
Dependent Distance Travel HSR
variable: (ln) time (to HQ)
(1) (2) (3)
Distance (ln) 0.155∗∗∗
(0.000)
Employment of affiliate (ln) −0.058∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.033∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.006∗∗∗
(0.000)
Gains in travel times at other affiliates 0.084∗∗∗
(0.003)
−0.002
(0.004)
−0.002∗∗∗
(0.001)
Affiliate entry(ies) in same group(dummy) −0.124∗∗∗
(0.009)
−0.153∗∗∗
(0.012)
−0.113∗∗∗
(0.002)
Affiliate exit(s) (dummy) −0.127∗∗∗
(0.009)
−0.081∗∗∗
(0.012)
−0.000
(0.002)
Other affiliates are HSR users 1.960∗∗∗
(0.008)
1.693∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.117∗∗∗
(0.002)
Total number of affiliates in group (ln) 0.046∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.056∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.011∗∗∗
(0.000)
Mean (un-logged) dependent variable 272 2.872 0.504
Observations 323,689 323,689 323,689
Note: All regressions include industry (2 digits) × local (commuting zone) × time fixed effects
to control for the local market conditions, as well as (4digit) industry dummies. Regressions also
include the (ln) number of affiliates in the group as well as the group level exports in total sales to
capture the cycle on international markets.
Sources: DADS and LIFI affiliates (see definition in section 3.3.1) which are part of multi-location
groups between 1993 and 2011.
Our treatment of affiliate creations follows Giroud (2013). We simply choose to
describe the characteristics ZCREAijlt of the new affiliates
48 and investigate whether
48Affiliate “creation” correspond to actual creations or to acquisitions in our setting. We only
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geographic distance, travel time or (conversely) the availability of HSR on the track
to headquarters are related to different characteristics of the group which might
also “tap” into the scarce HQ managerial resources that are to be shared across all
affiliates: the size of the created affiliate, the total number of affiliates within group,
etc. (Xijt). The estimated equation writes:
ZCREAijlt = αlt + γ.Xijt + εijlt (3.6)
In this equation, commuting zone × time fixed effects (αlt) are still identified
and allow to control very precisely for local shocks.
Results are reported in table 3.14. We obtain that larger affiliates, which are
likely to be more difficult to manage remotely (or for which the “size of stake” might
be larger) tend to be created closer to their headquarters, whatever the indicator
of distance. Similarly, when other affiliates experienced gains in travel time, thus
freeing some HQ managerial resources, then affiliates tend to be created at a greater
distance, and they are less likely to be created at proximity of the HSR network. This
suggests that when more managerial resources become available, then the trade-off
underlying the location choice of affiliates (between higher gains from local market
proximity and higher managerial costs from geographical dispersions) shifts in favor
of market proximity. Last, affiliate churning (creation but also destruction), which
might be demanding in terms of headquarters’ managerial resources, are both nega-
tively correlated with distant affiliate creations. Un-reported regressions show that
all of these results also hold industry by industry.
3.G.2 Affiliate destruction
For affiliate destruction, we propose a more powerful treatment which is a direct
extension of the regression framework in section 3.4:
EXITijlt = αj + αlt + β.Tijlt + γ.Xjt + εijlt (3.7)
where EXITijlt is a dummy variable indicating that the considered affiliate is
exiting from the group49 and notations are otherwise similar to those in equation 3.2.
The main difference with equation 3.2 is however that the inclusion of affiliate ×
group fixed effects would capture too much heterogeneity because affiliates are on
average present for only 3.2 years in our panel. We therefore replace the affiliate
× group fixed effects in equation 3.2 with group level fixed effects, which preserve
the identification of the β coefficient from variations in travel time. As previously,
commuting zone × time fixed effects (αlt) are still identified and allow to control
very precisely for local shocks. Equation 3.7 is then estimated as a linear probability
model, using the same estimation procedure as in section 3.4.1, and obtained results
are presented in table 3.15.
consider affiliate creation in pre-existing groups, which were furthermore already operating in the
same industry (to abstract from global market entry decisions).
49Affiliate “destruction” corresponds to actual closures or to resale of affiliates, while the group
itself still operates in the same industry, with other affiliates (to abstract from more global market
exit decisions).
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We obtain that everything else equal, more distant affiliates (in terms of travel
times) have a higher probability to be terminated, either because they are more
difficult to manage and/or because they are less profitable - or simply because they
are also “politically” distant (Bassanini et al., 2015). These correlations tend to be
higher in business service industries, where they could explain around 5 percentage
point for the average travel time (2 hours). This remains a small part of the entire
share (47%) of exits to be explained in this industry. We also obtain that affiliates
who benefited from gains in travel time thanks to the HSR network expansion were
less likely to get terminated, while the probability of closure was also highly sig-
nificantly reduced by gains at other affiliates, which tends to confirm the resource
constraints story in section 3.5.5.
Table 3.15: Travel time and the reshuﬄing of affiliates – Probability of exit of
affiliates of multi-location corporate groups only from 1993 to 2011
Manufacturing Personnel Retail and Business Transport
Industries Services Trade Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Travel time 0.017∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.014∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.014∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.022∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.017∗∗∗
(0.001)
Gains since entry −0.014∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.012∗∗
(0.005)
−0.024∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.015∗∗∗
(0.004)
−0.023∗∗∗
(0.006)
Gains at other aff. −0.011∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.018∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.010∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.011∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.016∗∗∗
(0.001)
Share of exits 0.428 0.354 0.415 0.465 0.423
Observations 426,487 241,677 1,045,416 401,694 138,778
Note: All regressions include headquarter (i.e., group) level fixed effects, as well as local (commuting
zone) × time fixed effects to control for the local market conditions. Regressions also include group
level exports in total sales to capture the cycle on international markets.
Sources: DADS and LIFI, affiliates (see definition in section 3.3.1) which are part of multi-location
groups between 1993 and 2011.
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A Long-Term Evaluation of
Enterprise Zones:
The First Generation of the
“Zones Franches Urbaines”
This chapter is cowritten with Pauline Givord (Insee and Crest) and Simon Quantin
(Insee).
4.1 Introduction
The provision of locally-targeted tax credits and subsidies to kickstart sustainable
economic development has become a widely used policy tool. Indeed, the first so-
called “Enterprise Zone” programs were implemented in the UK in the 1980s, and
others followed in several US states and elsewhere. In France, the French Enterprise
Zone policy “Zones Franches Urbaine” (ZFU hereafter) first came into existence in
1997. This program grants temporary but remarkably generous tax incentives to
small firms which choose to locate in economically distressed areas. The rationale
guiding policy makers when opting for a ZFU program is quite simple: reductions
in tax are meant to offset the numerous disadvantages associated with deprived
areas, such as the shortage of a skilled labor force, the lack of public services, a
dearth of inputs, and poor market potential. The ZFU initiative may stimulate local
economic activity, by attracting firms that will employ the locally resident workforce,
and may “revitalize” these neighborhoods by improving the local amenities (health
services, convenience stores...). The spinoff effects ought to include increased local
demand, and greater incentive for other new firms to choose the same location
because of agglomeration economies. Once this initial boost had been delivered, the
ZFU initiative was expected to terminate.
However, as stressed by Neumark and Simpson (2015) in a critical review of
the already large economic literature on place-based policies, the theoretical foun-
dations of these policies have not been well established (Kline and Moretti, 2014).
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As well, these programs may have potential adverse effects such as inducing firms to
hire workers who are already involved in work-based networks, instead of targeting
local unemployed people for their hires; and they may have negative externalities
on neighboring localities which are often not much better off than the ZFU itself.
The variety of empirical evaluations of these policies, which mostly focus on their
impact on employment, reflects the ambiguity of the theoretical mechanisms. Al-
though most evaluations find no significant increase in employment (see for instance
Bondonio and Greenbaum, 2007 or Neumark and Kolko, 2010, for the US enterprise
Zones, or Accetturo and de Blasio, 2012 for the Italian “Patti Territoriali” ), a sig-
nificant minority do (Ham et al., 2011, Busso and Kline, 2008). For France, several
papers focus on the second wave of the ZFU program, implemented in 2002. They
obtain a significant but small impact on firm locations and related employment (see
for instance Givord et al., 2013 or Mayer et al., 2012). Still, the breadth of the em-
pirical literature on place-based programs notwithstanding, many questions remain
unanswered. Neumark and Simpson (2015) identify a research agenda, suggesting
several fields where evidence capable of guiding policy is still lacking. Investigating
the long-term effect of these programs is the first of them, as one of the main chal-
lenges of place-based policy is to generate self-sustaining economic gains. The other
open questions include: a more precise identification of “what the effects are” and
who gains and who loses from the policy-based question; and “isolating features of
policies that make them effective”.
This paper derives from this research agenda. More specifically, we focus on the
first wave of French ZFU created in 1997, to evaluate whether this initiative was
able to yield long-term economic activity. We try to assess whether the program
has had a positive impact on the living conditions of the inhabitants of these dis-
advantaged neighborhoods. More specifically, while most previous related studies
focus on overall firm employment, we analyze resident employment separately from
non-resident employment. We also focus on firms providing local services, as one
stated objective of the ZFU initiative was to give the local population better access
to the sort of “basic” services (physicians, convenience stores, and tradesmen like
plumbers...) that are more likely to suffer hardship from being located in distressed
urban areas (small market potential in low-income neighborhoods, low accessibility
for non-local employees, high rates of criminality).
Interestingly, while we use similar geolocated data and the same propensity score
method as previous empirical evaluations, which focused on the second wave of this
initiative, the results we obtain for the first wave of the French ZFU initiative are very
different from their findings. While Givord et al. (2013) observe very little impact on
the number of plants and employment, we observe on the contrary that the first ZFU
initiative caused these outcomes to respectively double and triple over a five-year
period, compared to the baseline level that would have been achieved without tax
rebates. These surprising results are robust to an alternative identification strategy,
relying on a discontinuity rule in the selection process (only the most populated
areas were selected).
Apart from this short-term comparison, our results cover a much longer period
(almost twenty years) than previous studies. We highlight that the short-term as-
sessment of the French ZFU initiative may differ sharply from the medium and
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long-term ones. We observe that the number of firms newly located in ZFU in-
creases the first year, and stays at a high level for the next four years. But during
this period, the pace of firm closures progressively grows and finally overtakes the
pace of new firm locations. This suggests that firms that do choose to locate in a
ZFU may be non-economically viable ones, likely to fail when they are not subsi-
dized anymore. Besides, firms are free to relocate outside the ZFU after the end
of the program: the full tax cuts are granted to a given firm for only five years.
Indeed, a significant part of the ZFU effect flows from firm relocations, suggesting
the presence of a windfall effect. This result challenges the intuition that a ZFU can
induce a change in the economic spatial equilibrium, by creating a “virtuous circle”.
And the fact of the matter is that, while the ZFU initiative was originally planned
to be temporary, its lifespan has been prolonged repeatedly.
Concerning the situation of the inhabitants of these disadvantaged areas, our
results suggest that the ZFU initiative achieves its objectives, but only on a limited
scale. This in turn suggests a lack of clear targeting of the ZFU initiative. Overall,
the employment level does increase in the ZFU thanks to tax cuts. It is 3 times
higher than its counterfactual level after five years, and a proportion of this employ-
ees actually live in the municipalities in which the disadvantaged areas are locate.
However, while the ZFU initiative explicitly includes a clause favoring local hiring,
in practice the share of local residents employed in firms located in ZFU tends to
decrease over the period. As regards local amenities, we do observe a positive effect
on location decisions by firms in the corresponding sector (trade, health or commu-
nity services), as the number of these firms increases by 50% after ten years. But
this figure is much smaller than the corresponding one for the “footloose” firms of
the business services sector (office cleaning, security, IT services...). The number
of these firms who do not operate locally and may easily leave the areas when tax
breaks end, increases by 300% after ten years thanks to the ZFU initiative.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the French ZFU program,
the ZFU areas, and the quantification of the magnitude of the financial incentives
provided by the program. The data are briefly presented in the following section.
Identification issues are discussed in section 4.4. Section 4.5 displays the results and
section 4.6 concludes and discusses our findings.
4.2 The French Enterprise Zones
4.2.1 Selection of the Enterprise Zones
Urban decay has become a main topic of French public debate since the 1980s. A
range of policies have been implemented in response to social and economic prob-
lems experienced in the deprived outskirts of France’s cities. Indeed, the so-called
“social fracture” (“fracture sociale”) was an important theme of the 1995 presiden-
tial campaign, with the social and economic circumstances in deprived urban areas
being identified as the main causes. The “stimulus for cities” law (“Pacte de relance
de la ville”), passed in 1996 by the newly elected Government, aimed at addressing
the issue of urban decay and reducing inequalities between urban neighborhoods.
This law resulted in the implementation of tax cuts for businesses located in
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those deprived areas. More precisely, this policy instituted a three-tier classification
scheme for disadvantaged urban areas. The first tier is known as ZUS (“Deprived Ur-
ban Areas” or “Zone Urbaine Sensible” in French). They correspond to the 757 most
deprived areas in France,1 according to various indicators of socio-economic develop-
ment (in particular, high concentrations of social housing and high unemployment
rates). The second tier, the ZRU program (”Urban Renewal Areas” or “Zone de
Revitalisation Urbaine” in French) includes the most disadvantaged ZUS ranked by
a global index of their social and economic position. This index takes into account
the unemployment rate, the population size, the proportion of unskilled people, the
proportion of young people and the potential tax revenue (product of the tax base
by the medium tax rate) of the city. It corresponds to the product of the four first
indicators divided by the fifth one. 436 ZRU were designated in 1996.2 Finally, the
third tier is constituted by ZFU (”Urban Free Zones”). These zones are chosen in
a two-stage process: only the most populous ZRU are eligible, the official threshold
being 10,000 inhabitants, and out of that set the most deprived ZRU, as defined
by the same global rating, are designated as Enterprise Zones. In 1997, during the
first phase of this initiative, 44 areas received the ZFU designation, followed by an
additional 41 in 2004 and 15 more in 2007.
Figure 4.1 illustrates, in the case of the Paris metropolitan region, the uneven
local distribution of the unemployment rate, as well as the location of some ZFU.
This region is the wealthiest in France, but the unemployment rate varies markedly
amongst municipalities. The inner northeast suburbs of Paris are a site of concen-
trated economic difficulty. This large sector apart, municipalities characterized by
high rates of unemployment are spread throughout the region. The ZFU are located
in such economically distressed municipalities, but not always. This is explained by
the fact that the unemployment rate in some neighborhoods (the relevant geograph-
ical level for ZFU) may largely exceed the one estimated at the municipality level.
Besides, due to the political bargaining involved, hence the need to disperse targeted
areas across France, the designation of ZFU does not rely on a deterministic way
on the index indicating the social and economic position. The upshot is that the
ZFU are uniformly spatially distributed across France, while urban deprived areas
are mostly concentrated in a limited number of municipalities.
4.2.2 Advantages granted by the ZFU policy
Enterprise Zones offer remarkably generous incentives (deep tax cuts on property,
labor and business taxes). They target only small firms (with less than 50 employees,
with an additional condition on the volume of sales), whether located in the area
prior the introduction of ZFU policy or not (see Table 4.1 and Appendix A for
details). Full exemption is granted for a minimum of five years. In comparison to the
tax relief available in ZFU, the ZRU and ZUS designations provide much shallower
tax credits. The ZRU program provides limited tax cuts, for newly created firms
only and over a shorter period (one or two years after startup, depending on the tax).
1717 in continental France and 40 ZUS in French overseas departments. 4.73 millions of people
lived in ZUS according to 1990 census data.
2416 in continental France and 20 in French overseas departments in 1996.
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Figure 4.1: ZFU location and unemployment rate in 1990 in the Paris region
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Table 4.1: Tax cuts granted by the French enterprise zone program
Conditions ZRU ZFU
Payroll tax exemptions
Plant eligibility With up to 50 employees
Employee New hires All employees
eligibility Permanent and fixed-term contracts longer than 12 months
Exemption Fraction of salary ≤ 1.5 times the minimum wage
Duration 1 year 5 years
Corporate income tax exemptions
Eligibility New firms All
Exemption 100 % the first 2 years, 100 % during 5 years
decreasing the next 3 years
Local business tax exemptions
Eligibility New firms (< 150 employees) All (< 50 employees)
Exemption 100 % during 2 years 100 % during 5 years
Local property tax exemption
Eligibility None All
Exemption 100 % during 5 years
Source: Legislative texts (Journal officiel, 1995).
Payroll tax exemption applies to all employees in ZFU, while it is limited to newly
hired employees in ZRU. Finally, the ZUS program merely allows local authorities
to exempt firms from local business taxes, without making it mandatory.
The first generation ZFU were implemented in 1997 and scheduled for five years.
As initially planned, the policy ended in 2001, businesses had to locate in an Enter-
prise Zone before December 31, to benefit from the tax exemptions. However, the
ZFU policy was reactivated in 2003 and has been kept alive continuously since then.
New areas were designated successively in 2004 and 2013, for a total number of 100
ZFU today.
The financial incentives depend on the actual financial burden for small firms,
and on the structure of their revenues and costs. To assess the actual generosity
of this program, we simulate the benefit using individual databases that provide
accurate information (see Appendix B). According to these simulations, payroll tax
exemptions account for the largest share of tax reductions. In 1997, the median cut
in payroll taxes associated with ZFU was 6,000 euros and this cut accounted for
about 15% of the median wage bill (see Table 4.7 in the appendix). This relative
advantage was slightly reduced after the introduction of national payroll scheme
changes in 2003 but ZFU remain attractive. Under the scheme of payroll taxes in
use since this date, the median gain for firms from being located in a ZFU still
accounts for about 12% of the median labor cost (with an amount of 4,500 euros).
Eligible firms also benefit from a full exemption from corporate income tax, up
to a limit that cannot exceed 20,000 euros per year. In practice, a closer look at real
data suggests that this exemption is not as appealing as it may seem. Before the
implementation of ZFU, more than three quarters of small firms did not pay any
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corporate income tax. For those which did pay a strictly positive corporate income
tax, the median amount paid was 3,700 euros (see Table 4.8 in the appendix).
4.3 Data
We exploit two exhaustive administrative datasets to gather rich information on
firm demography (number of plants) as well as employment (see details in the ap-
pendix C).
The French business register (SIRENE) follows all French firms and plants. It
displays the location of each plant, its firm’s legal status, its industry and year of
creation, at January 1. This register also tracks plant creations and relocations
during a whole year. It thus enables us to specify whether a new plant location is
an actual creation or a relocation of an existing plant. It also allows us to identify
when businesses cease activity. Above all, SIRENE locates precisely all plants in
continental France. Thus, we can accurately identify which plants have settled in
a ZFU and those which have not, which is crucial as ZFU do not correspond to
administrative boundaries (see also Givord et al., 2013). Indeed, using data even
at the level of the smallest French administrative subdivision (the municipality, or
commune) would have yielded an underestimation of the impact of tax exemptions,
because plants which benefit from ZFU tax breaks would have been grouped with
plants which do not (see Table 4.13 in the appendix).
The second dataset (DADS) is an exhaustive administrative employer-employee
database with information on the workforce of plants. Employment can be measured
in various ways at plant level: full-time equivalents over a year, number of employees
at any point of time or as of 1 January. We use this latter measure, which is
consistent across years and consistent with the French business register. The DADS
thus provides a measure of local employment, meaning employment in plants located
in the area. Moreover, DADS allows us to split our employment measure into low-
skilled, skilled and high-skilled employment, and also into resident and non-resident
employment.
These data allow us to probe the long-run effects of Enterprise Zones, as well
as temporal delays or extenuations. SIRENE and DADS are available from 1995
to 2013. This means that we observe data at least 2 years before the introduction
of the ZFU tax exemptions and up to 16 years after. Finally, the 1990 Population
Census allows us to measure socio-demographic variables used for the designation of
an area as an Enterprise Zone. For this evaluation, the data have been aggregated
at the three-tier classification levels presented in section 4.2: ZFU, ZRU and ZUS.
4.4 Identification issue and empirical strategy
4.4.1 Identification issue and process of selection to ZFU
system
We restrict our estimation sample to the comparison set of non-beneficiary areas
(i.e. the control group) to ZRU, which are areas most similar to ZFU. Panel data
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Table 4.2: Average socio-economic indicators of the urban areas
Zone type: ZFU ZRU ZUS
Population: > 10,000 < 10,000
Number of zones 45 69 282 321
Unemployment rate 21.9 18.2 24.3 17.9
Percentage of social housing 64.4 63.7 66.0 61.1
Percentage of foreign people 21.8 16.3 20.0 17.2
Percentage of unskilled people 43.1 36.4 45.8 37.9
Percent. of young people (< 25) 46.7 43.2 45.5 41.2
Average potential tax revenue (in e) 2,707 3,212 2,609 3,438
Source: 1990 population Census.
allow us to eliminate the potential fixed effect specific to each area. More precisely,
our main variables of interest are (log) outcome-level differentiated based on data
from 1995, meaning two years prior to the introduction of the tax exemptions (the
aim of using such a lag is to avoid capturing potential anticipation effects of the
measure, for instance).
Time-differentiation is not sufficient to accurately estimate the causal impact of
the ZFU system. Indeed, the ZFU were chosen among ZRU suffering from multiple
economic handicaps that may also have had an impact on the economic perspective.
However, the two-step assignment process does provide us with an identification
strategy.
First, the eligibility condition based on the size of the areas (in terms of inhabi-
tants estimated in the 1990 population census) ensures that non-ZFU areas compa-
rable to ZFU in terms of socio-economic development can be found. Indeed, almost
all ZFU have more than 10,000 inhabitants (see Figure 4.2).3 This assumption is
supported by descriptive statistics on socio-economic characteristics (see Table 4.2).
For each criterion (unemployment rate, percentage of social housing, percentage of
young people, foreign people and unskilled people in the area, and potential tax
revenue in the municipality in 1996), average figures in small ZRU (meaning those
populated by less than 10,000 inhabitants) appear close to ZFU; in some cases, they
are worse. For instance, the average unemployment rate is 22% in ZFU while it is
“only” 18% in big ZRU but 24% in small ZRU. The proportion of unskilled people
is 43% in ZFU, while it is 36% (respectively 46%) in big (respectively small) ZRU.
Second, as we know and measure the characteristics used in the ZFU designa-
tion, we can accurately control for differences arising from this selection process.
This suggests the choice, common in this literature, of an estimation based on the
propensity score method. However, we adapt the estimation to take into account the
discontinuity introduced by the eligibility threshold. Moreover, this eligibility condi-
tion provides an alternative identification strategy based on regression discontinuity
that we will use as a robustness check of our results.
3With the exception of four areas: two very small zones that were merged to bigger ZFU, and
two areas that are just below the threshold, with 9,538 and 9,927 inhabitants, respectively.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of ZFU and ZRU according to the number of inhabitants
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4.4.2 Estimator based on the propensity score
Subclassification on the propensity score and regression
In practice, we compare the evolution of outcomes in ZFU by using areas that
do not benefit from the ZFU initiative, but are similar in terms of socio-economic
characteristics. More specifically, our main assumption is the standard “conditional
independence assumption” (CIA) (or unconfoundedness assumption) which states
that, in the absence of the policy, no difference would have been observed in the
evolution of outcomes in zones with comparable observable characteristics. As we use
outcomes in temporal differences, this method is often named “conditional difference
in differences”.
As shown by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983a), if the CIA holds for observables
X, it also holds for the propensity score P (Ti = 1|X) (i.e. the probability of an
area being designated as a ZFU, conditional on observables). In practice, we use
as control variables the indicators formally used for the designation of ZFU, but
also other indicators that may have an impact on both designation and economic
outcomes, namely the proportion of foreigners and executives in the area, as well as
the proportion of stable households and the amount of social housing.
However, as our sample size is small, simple propensity-score matching might
lead us to compare units with different observable characteristics (as areas with close
propensity scores may still have different observable characteristics). To address this
issue, we adopt a strategy that combines regression and propensity score methods
for the final estimate of the impact of the ZFU. More precisely, we define four strata
corresponding to the level of the propensity score, and perform a linear regression
using observable covariates X. As discussed by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), the
linear regression (originally suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983b) helps to
eliminate potential remaining bias and to improve precision. Within each block,
the propensity score does not vary much, and covariate distributions are on average
similar between both groups. This insures that the regression function will not
extrapolate, perhaps erroneously, into regions outside the data range. The estimate
of average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) corresponds to the weighted average
of these local estimates.
Formally, and using notation posited by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), we per-
form the linear regression in each stratum j:
∆1995log(Yit) = Xiβj + δjTi + uij (4.1)
If we denote J the number of strata (four in our estimates), the final estimate of
the impact of the tax subsidies on the ZFU δATT corresponds to:
δˆATT =
J∑
j=1
NjZFU
NZFU
δˆj
and an estimate for its variance is:
Vˆ =
J∑
j=1
(
NjZFU
NZFU
)2
Vˆj
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where (Vˆj)j=1,...,J corresponds to the estimated variances of (δˆj)j=1,...,J (assuming that
the residuals for different strata are independently distributed, which is a standard
assumption in this kind of method) and NjZFU and NZFU respectively denote the
number of ZFU in strata j and in the whole sample. We introduce the number of
inhabitants of the area as an additional covariate in (4.1), as an informal test of the
assumption of conditional independence of outcome and size. It is never significant.
Propensity score estimation
Because of the eligibility condition based on the number of inhabitants in the area,
we adapt the estimation of the propensity score to this specific setting. This size
condition reinforces the credibility of our identifying assumption, but it can impact
the estimation of the propensity score. Indeed, it leads to a censoring for the observed
status (ZFU or not) of an area. If some observable characteristics used for the score
are correlated with the size of the area (or, to put it differently, if the distribution
of observables is not the same in small and large areas as shown in Table 4.2 for
instance), a “naive” estimation of the propensity score may lead to biased estimates
of the correlation between observed covariates and the score.
Formally, we can assume that the fact of being selected as a ZFU, Ti, depends
on covariates X, but an area is selected as a ZFU if Ti = 1 and Si > S. As
we wish to evaluate the impact of being selected as a ZFU, we are interested in
estimating the propensity score P (Ti = 1, Si > S|X), which may be decomposed as
P (Ti = 1|Xi, Si > S)P (Si > S|X). Under mild assumptions,4 we can estimate both
components separately.
In practice, this means that we estimate as a function of the covariates both
the probability of being a ZFU (restricting the sample to areas with more than
10,000 inhabitants) and the fact of having more than 10,000 inhabitants. The second
estimation has no causal interpretation, but corrects for misspecification due to
differences in the distributions of the covariates in large and small areas. In both
cases, we rely on logistic specifications. These estimations are provided in Table 4.3.
The first column displays the estimated impacts, for a ZRU with more than 10,000
inhabitants of various socio-economic criteria, on the probability to be included
in the ZFU program (i.e. P (Ti = 1|Xi, Si > S)). As expected, this probability
is an increasing function of the unemployment rate and the proportion of young
and unskilled people, and a decreasing function of the potential tax revenue of the
municipality, as it corresponds to the criteria in the selection process. ZFU are
also characterized by a higher proportion of social housing and foreigners, and a
lower proportion of executives and stable households. We now turn to the estimates
of the impact of the same range of criteria on the probability for a ZRU to have
more than 10,000 inhabitants (i.e. P (Si > S|X)); the results are displayed in the
second column. They suggest that the distribution of these variables (in particular,
proportion of executives, potential tax revenue and proportion of unskilled people)
are not the same in small and in large ZRU.
4Meaning that in the absence of this eligibility condition, the fact of being ZFU Ti is independent
of being a “big” area Di conditional on the characteristics X, where the dummy Di = 1Si>S
indicates whether the size is higher than 10,000 inhabitants or not. Indeed one may easily show
that the likelihood of the observations (Di, TiDi) is separable in both components.
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Table 4.3: Logit regressions for propensity score estimation
Dependent Zone selected More than 10,000
variable: as ZFU inhabitants in the zone
(1) (2)
Pct. of executives −12.78
(43.33)
54.28∗∗∗
(17.87)
Pct. of stable households −1.69
(1.06)
0.89∗
(0.47)
Unemployment rate 13.24∗
(7.38)
−2.24
(2.76)
Pct. of young people 16.22∗
(8.90)
4.99
(3.26)
Pct. of social housing −3.45∗
(2.06)
−0.85
(0.73)
Potential tax revenue −0.001∗∗∗
(0.73)
0.0003∗∗
(0.0001)
Pct. of foreigners 14.22∗∗∗
(5.45)
−0.62
(1.87)
Pct. of unskilled people 61.86∗∗
(27.53)
22.36∗
(12.05)
Pct. of unskilled people2 −78.58∗∗
(33.18)
−32.10∗∗
(14.40)
Notes: The first column corresponds to logit regression of the conditional probability of being
selected as ZFU, restricted on the areas with more than 10,000 inhabitants. The second column
corresponds to the logit regression of the fact of having more than 10,000 inhabitants. Confidence
intervals at 95 % in brackets. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
Source: 1990 population Census.
Finally, the estimated propensity score for one ZRU corresponds to the product
of the two predicted probabilities (see Table 4.3), given the observed covariates of
this area. Figure 4.3 shows the density of the propensity score for both the treated
and control groups. The treated group contains 45 zones, and the control group
contains 351 zones. As expected, we observe two distinct modes, meaning that the
distributions of the covariates are different in both groups. However, the common
support is large, meaning that comparable areas may be found for most ZFU.
4.4.3 Regression Discontinuity Design
We also use the eligibility threshold to propose an alternative strategy. Indeed,
the probability that a given ZRU will be chosen to benefit from the ZFU program
increases sharply at the 10,000-inhabitant threshold (see Figure 4.7 in the appendix).
The design is only“fuzzy,”as the ZFU selection process is not a deterministic function
of population size : numerous large ZRU have not become ZFU, and a few small ZRU
have become ZFU. Our setting is very similar to that of Battistin and Rettore (2008),
where endogenous selection occurred amongst a pool of eligible units. One threat to
the validity of this approach arises when the selection variable can be manipulated
by economic agents in order to be on the “favorable” side of the threshold. In our
case, this selection variable was measured in the 1990 population census, meaning
five years before the selection process, so manipulation appears very unlikely.
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The fuzzy estimator can be obtained using a two-stage-least-square on the linear
regression (for detail, see Imbens and Lemieux, 2008), restricting the estimation
sample to units in a small neighborhood to the left and right of a threshold S,
defined with a bandwidth h by [S − h;S + h].
Formally, we estimate
∆1995log(Yit) = α + δTi + β(Si − S)1Si>S + γ(S − Si)1Si<S + γXi + ui (4.2)
by two-stage least squares using the indicator 1Si>S as an excluded instrument.
A common tradeoff has to be made between increasing precision using a large
bandwidth at the risk of using non-comparable units, and a small bandwidth that
shrinks the estimation sample. In our case the tradeoff is constrained by the initial
small sample size: for instance considering the rather narrow window [9,000;11,000]
inhabitants left us with only 34 areas (including 5 ZFU) that compromise statistical
analysis. We have tested several sizes of the window around the threshold and have
verified that only the precision is altered by this choice. As is commonly done, we
correct for potential dependency in the selection variable by a linear specification.
Because of the small sample size, it appears difficult to control for more complex
dependence of outcomes on size areas using a polynomial specification of higher or-
der. For the same reason, it is not possible to include variables used in the selection
process of ZFU, in contrast to a more flexible method such as the propensity score
method. For this reason, and also because it makes our results more directly com-
parable to the results obtained by previous studies that evaluate the (second wave
of) the ZFU initiatives, we thus keep the propensity score matching method as our
main specification.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Short-term effects
According to our results, Enterprise Zones have a strong impact on economic activ-
ity in targeted areas. Figure 4.4 displays the cumulative impact of the ZFU program
over time on number of plants and (salaried) employment. Tax exemptions result in
a steady rise in the number of firms over the first five years. In 2001, the estimate of
the impact of ZFU on the time-differentiated log number of plants located in Enter-
prise Zones is 0.7. This means that the level reached in 2001 is e0.7 ≈ 2 times higher
than the level that would have prevailed without the policy. The estimated impact
of ZFU on salaried employment is similar. From 2001, the number of salaried em-
ployees in ZFU firms is 3 times higher than its counterfactual level, according to our
estimates. More concretely, a back-of-the-envelope estimate derived from our results
suggests that the whole program would have resulted during the first five years in
the location of around 11,000 firms employing 50,500 workers.5 It is worth stressing
that this effect strongly exceeds the findings of previous studies that evaluate the
second-generation of the French Enterprise Zones (see Rathelot and Sillard, 2008,
Givord et al., 2013). We discuss this point in section 4.6.
5The impact of the ZFU in the outcome in level corresponds to (1− e−δt)Yi,t.
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Figure 4.4: Impact of ZFU on the stock of plants (left panel) and employment (right
panel)
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Note: detailed results are displayed in Tables 4.10 and 4.11 in the appendix.
Source: SIRENE and DADS, 1995-2013.
Figure 4.5: Impact of ZFU on the number of plant location and closure (left panel)
and plant relocations and creations (right panel)
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Note: detailed results are displayed in Tables 4.10 and 4.11 in the appendix.
Source: SIRENE and DADS, 1995-2013.
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As illustrated by Figures 4.4 and 4.5, our estimates also confirm that prior to the
implementation of the ZFU program, the trend of economic activity was similar in
future ZFU and in zones used as a control group. Indeed, when applying the same
estimation method to periods before the introduction of the ZFU initiative (corre-
sponding a “placebo” or “falsification” test), we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
a null impact of the ZFU before the implementation of tax exemptions in 1997. In
addition, we provide a placebo test on a longer time period at the municipality level,
since precisely located firm data are not available before 1995 (see Table 4.13 in the
appendix). We highlight a similar trend between control and treated municipalities
between 1990 and 1996, while we still find a positive impact of the ZFU program
after 1997.
4.5.2 Long-term effects
Despite a promising start, several points cast doubt on the ability of the ZFU pro-
gram to impart a long-lasting momentum to economic activity. First, the impact
appears to stabilize for both employment and firm location after 2001. This can
be explained by the fact that in-zone business locations are now canceled out by
relocations outside the ZFU, and business closures. Between 1997 and 1999, ZFU
had a notably higher impact on the creation than on the shutdown of companies
with salaried employees. From 1999, the two levels are very similar (see left panel
in Figure 4.5).
Besides, an increasing part of business location is due to relocation. The ZFU
impact grows between 1997 and 2001, which are respectively the first year out and
the fifth year out from the policy implementation. This trend is greater for reloca-
tions than for actual creations. More precisely, the estimated impact with respect
to plant relocation rises from 1.1 in 1997 to 1.7 in 2001 whereas it only increases
from 0.6 to 0.9 for real creations (see right panel in Figure 4.5). To put it another
way, in 2001 the number of firm relocations in ZFU was 5.6 times higher than the
level that would have prevailed without tax exemptions, while the number of true
business creations was 2.6 times higher than its counterfactual level. Firm creations
are still predominant among firm locations (at its highest, the share of relocations
is 35% in 2001 while it was 19% in 1995).6
Furthermore, whereas both newly located and existing plants benefit from tax
exemptions, the ZFU initiative has no impact on employment in existing plants (see
Table 4.11 in the appendix). The higher level of employment (compared to the level
that would have prevailed in the absence of the ZFU policy) appears to be solely
due to plants established in ZFU after 1995.
Finally, the number of plant locations, and especially relocations, increases sharply
in ZFU in 2001 but this impact declines in the subsequent year. This suggests that
firms do anticipate the end of tax exemptions scheduled for 2001, the terminal date
for the policy when it was first announced. Businesses were required to locate in a
ZFU before December 31, 2001 to benefit from tax exemptions. The return of the
6In 1995, 35 firms were created and 8 firms were relocated per ZFU on average. Using our
estimates for 1997 (resp. 2001), we find that 74 (resp. 92) firms were created and 26 (resp. 48)
firms were relocated per ZFU.
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conservative party to power in 2002 led to the reactivation of the ZFU program after
2003 and firm creation almost recovered to the initial level. This temporal profile
suggests that ZFU would not have created economic momentum in targeted areas
that outlives the (costly) tax incentives.
4.5.3 Impact on ZFU residents
The original purpose of ZFU was to contribute to urban renewal. The rise in eco-
nomic activity of firms was viewed as a way to improve the situations of local res-
idents. Concerning this primary objective, our estimates suggest that the ZFU
program suffers from a lack of accurate targeting. Indeed, low priority outcomes
are much more affected by the ZFU program than the hiring of residents and the
development of local services.
Our data allow us to distinguish between resident employees, namely employees
who live in the municipality in which the ZFU in located and who work in the ZFU,7
with non-resident ones. Indeed, local employment may increase both because more
residents are hired, and also because of the hiring of commuters who live further
afield. We observe that resident employment does increase at a steady pace between
1997 and 2002 thanks to the ZFU initiative (see Table 4.4). However, the share
of residents in the total employment is significantly lower compared to the pre-
treatment situation. In addition, with the exception of 1997, we do not find that the
hiring of unemployed people is more frequent in ZFU, while the program aims to
help them back into work. The finding is in line with Gobillon et al. (2012) who focus
on the Paris metropolitan region specifically, and show that the ZFU initiative has
only a small and non-persistent effect on the unemployment rates of people living
in the cities targeted by the ZFU program. Finally, we find no evidence that people
would more frequently settle down and live in the ZFU where they work after the
program implementation. This suggests that the local employment clause has not
been manipulated by employers asking their employees to move in the ZFU.
Additionally, we decompose the impact of ZFU on local employment by skill
(see Table 4.5). As low-skilled residents are over-represented in ZFU and low-paid
workers benefit from higher subsidies, a positive effect on low-skilled workers could
be counted as an achievement of the ZFU program. We observe that the program
does have a positive impact on unskilled workers. After five years, our estimates
reveal that the quantity of unskilled employment in the areas is up to 3.1 times the
level we should have expected in the absence of the policy. However, these figures
are not significantly different from those observed for skilled employment.
Finally, we break down results at the industry level, in order to evaluate whether
or not the ZFU program helps to improve local services. Policy makers originally
intended to support local amenities, for instance, small retail shops such as conve-
nience stores, and professional services such as physicians. These correspond to the
industrial sectors defined respectively as ”trade” and “health, education and commu-
nity services.” According to our results, the ZFU initiative has a positive impact on
both sectors (see Table 4.5). However, the impact is smaller than the overall effect
7Resident employment can only be defined at a municipality level, as the place of residence of
workers is not as precisely known as firm location.
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Table 4.4: ZFU effect on changes in local employment compared to 1996 level
Residents Non-residents % residents % new % previously
residents unemployed
1996 0.018
[−0.126,0.161]
0.085
[−0.072,0.242]
−0.028
[−0.114,0.058]
−0.023
[−0.094,0.049]
0.128
[−0.239,0.495]
1997 0.224∗∗
[0.045,0.402]
0.391∗∗∗
[0.201,0.581]
−0.081
[−0.191,0.029]
−0.034
[−0.114,0.046]
0.458∗∗
[0.107,0.809]
1998 0.424∗∗∗
[0.228,0.62]
0.639∗∗∗
[0.413,0.865]
−0.118∗∗
[−0.235,−0.001]
−0.024
[−0.1,0.052]
0.251
[−0.125,0.627]
1999 0.599∗∗∗
[0.373,0.826]
0.815∗∗∗
[0.543,1.088]
−0.119∗∗
[−0.228,−0.01]
−0.003
[−0.062,0.055]
0.041
[−0.302,0.385]
2000 0.821∗∗∗
[0.592,1.05]
1.034∗∗∗
[0.732,1.336]
−0.107∗
[−0.231,0.017]
−0.008
[−0.074,0.058]
0.138
[−0.212,0.487]
2001 0.943∗∗∗
[0.707,1.178]
1.169∗∗∗
[0.861,1.477]
−0.118∗
[−0.252,0.017]
−0.056
[−0.14,0.028]
0.186
[−0.164,0.535]
2002 0.987∗∗∗
[0.737,1.237]
1.189∗∗∗
[0.874,1.505]
−0.107
[−0.25,0.036]
−0.043
[−0.162,0.075]
0.187
[−0.231,0.605]
2003 0.988∗∗∗
[0.734,1.242]
1.174∗∗∗
[0.855,1.493]
−0.095
[−0.235,0.044]
−0.02
[−0.116,0.076]
0.127
[−0.281,0.536]
2004 0.933∗∗∗
[0.651,1.215]
1.126∗∗∗
[0.785,1.466]
−0.1
[−0.248,0.049]
−0.017
[−0.101,0.067]
0.056
[−0.3,0.412]
2005 0.915∗∗∗
[0.634,1.197]
1.131∗∗∗
[0.785,1.478]
−0.114
[−0.272,0.043]
−0.019
[−0.1,0.062]
0.085
[−0.271,0.441]
2006 0.805∗∗∗
[0.523,1.088]
1.062∗∗∗
[0.714,1.409]
−0.137
[−0.303,0.028]
0
[−0.078,0.079]
0.048
[−0.322,0.418]
2007 0.769∗∗∗
[0.479,1.059]
1.067∗∗∗
[0.718,1.416]
−0.159∗∗
[−0.31,−0.007]
0.013
[−0.059,0.085]
−0.021
[−0.373,0.33]
2008 0.749∗∗∗
[0.469,1.03]
1.068∗∗∗
[0.7,1.436]
−0.184∗∗
[−0.346,−0.022]
−0.019
[−0.093,0.055]
0.18
[−0.214,0.574]
2009 0.743∗∗∗
[0.455,1.031]
1.076∗∗∗
[0.697,1.454]
−0.197∗∗
[−0.377,−0.018]
0.022
[−0.051,0.095]
0.057
[−0.348,0.463]
2010 0.788∗∗∗
[0.484,1.091]
1.163∗∗∗
[0.776,1.55]
−0.231∗∗∗
[−0.405,−0.058]
−0.008
[−0.078,0.062]
0.036
[−0.376,0.447]
2011 0.752∗∗∗
[0.438,1.065]
1.158∗∗∗
[0.767,1.549]
−0.233∗∗∗
[−0.404,−0.063]
0.001
[−0.07,0.071]
−0.167
[−0.554,0.221]
2012 0.748∗∗∗
[0.424,1.072]
1.121∗∗∗
[0.725,1.516]
−0.216∗∗∗
[−0.378,−0.054]
−0.01
[−0.079,0.059]
−0.075
[−0.468,0.317]
Nb obs
ctrl/treat
351/45 351/45 351/45 351/45 351/45
Notes: Estimates of the fact of being ZFU on ∆1996log(Yit + 1), the difference in log outcomes
between year t and 1996. Estimations are based on propensity score and subclassification (five
strata based on the propensity score) using all covariates in Table 4.3 and the number of inhabitants
in the area. Confidence intervals at 95 % in brackets. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
Source: SIRENE and DADS, 1995-2013.
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estimated. Indeed the number of trade plants is 1.5 time higher than its counterfac-
tual, whereas the overall effect estimate suggests that the number of plants should
have doubled thanks to the ZFU program. As well, a closer look suggests that
business service firms are the most responsive to tax breaks. The impact of ZFU is
impressive here, as the estimated impact for the number of business service plants
in the area peaks at 1.4 in 2001, meaning that the observed level is 4.1 times higher
than the counterfactual level. These plants correspond for instance to IT services or
office cleaning services, meaning companies whose activities are not necessarily car-
ried out in the neighborhood, but whose legal address can easily be located within
the ZFU. Such companies may also relocate easily when they no longer benefit from
tax exemptions.
4.5.4 Regression discontinuities design results and other ro-
bustness checks
We perform several robustness checks. First, as described earlier, RDD yields similar
results. Second, we check that our control group provides an accurate counterfactual
of a situation without local taxes.
As discussed above in section 4.4, the selection process for ZFU is suitable for
a regression discontinuity method. Indeed, Figures 4.8 and 4.9 (in the appendix)
suggest a discontinuous jump in the number of plants and the employment growth
rate at around the 10,000-inhabitant threshold. Table 4.6 provides estimates for
the number of plants8 using the fuzzy RDD. The first two columns correspond to
the method based on propensity score and subclassification, the results of which
have already been discussed. The next two columns both correspond to fuzzy RDD
estimates. Column (3), is based on a regression on the whole sample correcting for
dependence on size, corresponding to model (4.2). Column (4) is a two-stage least
squares regression using a smaller window around the threshold.
The main conclusions remain unchanged. Using RDD, there is no significant
difference between groups before the implementation of the program and the effect
is similar and even higher in magnitude subsequently. However, running such RDD
estimates entails a loss of precision; this is partly due to the small sample size, as
the sample size is limited to 103 areas with 12 ZFU when restricting to a close
bandwidth.
Finally, we check whether using ZRU as a control group does not lead to un-
derestimate the impact of the ZFU policy. The counterfactual situation we want
to measure is a total absence of any tax exemptions, which is not the case here, as
firms located in ZRU benefit from some (limited) tax exemptions. To ensure this
does not invalidate our identification strategy, we estimate the impact of the ZRU
program, applying the same methodology as for ZFU, using disadvantaged urban
areas that do not benefit from tax breaks as a control group (i.e. ZUS, the first tier
of French urban policy, see section 4.2). According to our estimates, the tax exemp-
tions provided by the ZRU program are inefficient at fostering economic activity
(see the first two columns of Table 4.12). The evolutions of the stock of plants in
8For the sake of clarity, we present the estimates only for the stock of plants, but similar
conclusions are obtained for all outcomes. Results available upon request.
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Table 4.5: ZFU effect on changes in the number of plants compared to 1995 level by
industry
Business Trade Health, Construc- Manufac-
services education, tion turing
community
work
1995 −0.005
[−0.13,0.121]
−0.025
[−0.09,0.04]
−0.007
[−0.06,0.045]
−0.004
[−0.128,0.119]
0.005
[−0.088,0.099]
1996 0.074
[−0.087,0.236]
0.023
[−0.064,0.11]
−0.029
[−0.117,0.059]
−0.02
[−0.176,0.135]
0.026
[−0.11,0.162]
1997 0.53∗∗∗
[0.345,0.715]
0.167∗∗∗
[0.065,0.27]
0.058
[−0.06,0.177]
0.242∗∗∗
[0.071,0.413]
0.189∗∗
[0.036,0.341]
1998 0.877∗∗∗
[0.652,1.101]
0.218∗∗∗
[0.107,0.328]
0.161∗∗
[0.024,0.299]
0.443∗∗∗
[0.261,0.624]
0.345∗∗∗
[0.179,0.511]
1999 0.979∗∗∗
[0.76,1.199]
0.286∗∗∗
[0.161,0.411]
0.243∗∗∗
[0.086,0.4]
0.561∗∗∗
[0.362,0.759]
0.386∗∗∗
[0.201,0.571]
2000 1.156∗∗∗
[0.928,1.384]
0.344∗∗∗
[0.213,0.475]
0.281∗∗∗
[0.116,0.445]
0.649∗∗∗
[0.414,0.883]
0.514∗∗∗
[0.312,0.715]
2001 1.403∗∗∗
[1.167,1.639]
0.424∗∗∗
[0.288,0.561]
0.395∗∗∗
[0.228,0.562]
0.774∗∗∗
[0.534,1.014]
0.628∗∗∗
[0.407,0.848]
2002 1.344∗∗∗
[1.11,1.578]
0.41∗∗∗
[0.263,0.557]
0.399∗∗∗
[0.225,0.573]
0.815∗∗∗
[0.578,1.051]
0.624∗∗∗
[0.405,0.844]
2003 1.272∗∗∗
[1.04,1.504]
0.423∗∗∗
[0.27,0.577]
0.427∗∗∗
[0.247,0.607]
0.73∗∗∗
[0.486,0.975]
0.678∗∗∗
[0.456,0.9]
2004 1.201∗∗∗
[0.964,1.438]
0.378∗∗∗
[0.213,0.543]
0.375∗∗∗
[0.195,0.556]
0.66∗∗∗
[0.399,0.921]
0.716∗∗∗
[0.469,0.962]
2005 1.2∗∗∗
[0.941,1.459]
0.39∗∗∗
[0.23,0.549]
0.396∗∗∗
[0.217,0.574]
0.652∗∗∗
[0.387,0.917]
0.711∗∗∗
[0.468,0.955]
2006 1.096∗∗∗
[0.839,1.354]
0.356∗∗∗
[0.202,0.511]
0.444∗∗∗
[0.258,0.63]
0.592∗∗∗
[0.333,0.852]
0.719∗∗∗
[0.457,0.981]
2007 1.015∗∗∗
[0.751,1.279]
0.386∗∗∗
[0.236,0.536]
0.485∗∗∗
[0.281,0.688]
0.564∗∗∗
[0.309,0.819]
0.654∗∗∗
[0.394,0.914]
2008 1.017∗∗∗
[0.749,1.284]
0.373∗∗∗
[0.223,0.522]
0.467∗∗∗
[0.257,0.677]
0.675∗∗∗
[0.416,0.934]
0.648∗∗∗
[0.404,0.893]
2009 1.009∗∗∗
[0.719,1.299]
0.378∗∗∗
[0.218,0.539]
0.45∗∗∗
[0.234,0.667]
0.645∗∗∗
[0.383,0.908]
0.667∗∗∗
[0.406,0.927]
2010 1.012∗∗∗
[0.727,1.297]
0.401∗∗∗
[0.231,0.571]
0.504∗∗∗
[0.271,0.737]
0.578∗∗∗
[0.316,0.839]
0.663∗∗∗
[0.391,0.935]
2011 1.017∗∗∗
[0.722,1.312]
0.409∗∗∗
[0.24,0.577]
0.512∗∗∗
[0.266,0.757]
0.603∗∗∗
[0.344,0.863]
0.669∗∗∗
[0.396,0.941]
2012 1.049∗∗∗
[0.749,1.349]
0.386∗∗∗
[0.202,0.57]
0.527∗∗∗
[0.271,0.782]
0.574∗∗∗
[0.302,0.846]
0.571∗∗∗
[0.308,0.834]
Nb obs
ctrl/treat
351/45 351/45 351/45 351/45 351/45
Notes: Estimate of the fact of being ZFU on ∆1995log(Yit + 1), the difference in log outcomes
between year t and 1995. Estimations based on propensity score and subclassification (four strata
based on the propensity score) and using all covariates in Table 4.3 and the number of inhabitants
in the area. Confidence intervals at 95 % in brackets. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
Source: SIRENE and DADS, 1995-2013.
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Table 4.6: ZFU effect on changes in plant creations 1995 - robustness test
Propensity score RDD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1995 −0.005
[−0.049,0.038]
−0.004
[−0.082,0.074]
−0.072
[−0.283,0.14]
−0.053
[−0.174,0.068]
1996 0.028
[−0.031,0.087]
0.087∗∗
[0.017,0.156]
−0.22
[−0.532,0.091]
−0.129
[−0.289,0.031]
1997 0.221∗∗∗
[0.155,0.287]
0.187∗∗∗
[0.112,0.262]
−0.085
[−0.438,0.267]
0.036
[−0.143,0.214]
1998 0.353∗∗∗
[0.272,0.433]
0.312∗∗∗
[0.169,0.455]
0.153
[−0.193,0.5]
0.21∗
[−0.004,0.424]
1999 0.452∗∗∗
[0.359,0.544]
0.435∗∗∗
[0.26,0.609]
0.325∗
[−0.047,0.698]
0.334∗∗
[0.064,0.603]
2000 0.554∗∗∗
[0.445,0.662]
0.595∗∗∗
[0.376,0.813]
0.494∗∗
[0.094,0.894]
0.524∗∗∗
[0.202,0.846]
2001 0.692∗∗∗
[0.576,0.808]
0.759∗∗∗
[0.505,1.013]
0.88∗∗∗
[0.43,1.329]
0.773∗∗∗
[0.358,1.189]
2002 0.673∗∗∗
[0.553,0.794]
0.715∗∗∗
[0.454,0.976]
0.82∗∗∗
[0.351,1.289]
0.764∗∗∗
[0.34,1.189]
2003 0.675∗∗∗
[0.552,0.798]
0.726∗∗∗
[0.447,1.005]
0.748∗∗∗
[0.258,1.238]
0.744∗∗∗
[0.309,1.179]
2004 0.637∗∗∗
[0.504,0.769]
0.697∗∗∗
[0.394,1.001]
0.729∗∗∗
[0.215,1.242]
0.764∗∗∗
[0.308,1.22]
2005 0.638∗∗∗
[0.502,0.774]
0.715∗∗∗
[0.396,1.034]
0.84∗∗∗
[0.309,1.37]
0.829∗∗∗
[0.387,1.271]
2006 0.598∗∗∗
[0.463,0.732]
0.61∗∗∗
[0.272,0.948]
0.844∗∗∗
[0.315,1.374]
0.79∗∗∗
[0.293,1.286]
2007 0.597∗∗∗
[0.461,0.733]
0.651∗∗∗
[0.303,1]
0.86∗∗∗
[0.322,1.399]
0.752∗∗∗
[0.263,1.241]
2008 0.616∗∗∗
[0.478,0.753]
0.681∗∗∗
[0.335,1.026]
0.825∗∗∗
[0.282,1.368]
0.778∗∗∗
[0.278,1.278]
2009 0.612∗∗∗
[0.468,0.755]
0.68∗∗∗
[0.342,1.018]
0.887∗∗∗
[0.302,1.473]
0.844∗∗∗
[0.321,1.368]
2010 0.621∗∗∗
[0.474,0.768]
0.706∗∗∗
[0.355,1.057]
0.893∗∗∗
[0.306,1.479]
0.896∗∗∗
[0.361,1.43]
2011 0.642∗∗∗
[0.488,0.796]
0.762∗∗∗
[0.406,1.119]
0.893∗∗∗
[0.268,1.517]
0.971∗∗∗
[0.415,1.527]
2012 0.631∗∗∗
[0.473,0.789]
0.768∗∗∗
[0.388,1.148]
0.929∗∗∗
[0.3,1.558]
0.953∗∗∗
[0.384,1.523]
Nb obs ctrl/treat 351/45 91/12 351/45 91/12
1st stage F-stat 22.95 14.93
Sample all ZRU ZRU and ZFU all ZRU ZRU and ZFU
and ZFU between and ZFU between
7 000 & 13 000 h. 7 000 & 13 000 h.
Control variables X X X
Notes: Estimates of the fact of being treated on ∆1995log(Yit + 1), the difference in log outcomes
between year t and 1995. Column (1) corresponds to the method based on propensity score
and subclassification; columns (2) and (3) both correspond to a regression discontinuity design
method (respectively regression on the whole sample correcting for dependance on size and 2sls
local regression on a small window around the threshold); column (4) corresponds to the estimation
of being ZRU by a method based on propensity score and subclassification using the sample of ZUS
(excluding ZFU) as control group. Confidence intervals at 95 % in brackets. Significance levels:
∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
Source: SIRENE and DADS, 1995-2013.
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ZRU are almost never significantly different from the the one observed for ZUS over
the whole period.9 The ZRU program thus has no significant impact on economic
activity and provides actually an adapted control group.
4.6 Discussion and conclusion
All in all, our results provide new evidence on the efficiency of place-based programs.
The overall assessments are mixed, however. To the question “can such a program
attract firms into disadvantaged areas,” the answer is clearly yes. French firms
appear to be strongly reactive to tax breaks proposed by the ZFU initiative. The
changes in the stock of firms and the local employment are impressive. Five years
out from the introduction of the policy, the number of firms doubles compared to
the level that would have prevailed without the tax exemptions. On the resident
population, the consequences are also positive if not as impressive. We observe a
sharp increase in resident and unskilled employment, as well as a clear but weaker
rise in the location of firms providing local services.
However, analysis of the long term impacts mitigates these positive results. In-
deed, the initial goal of the ZFU policy was not to subsidize local economies endlessly.
The first financial impulse was expected to create self-sustaining economic activity,
and was thus planned to be temporary. Gauged in this light, the ZFU initiative is
less successful. After the first five-year period of tax exemptions, the flow of new
firms, while still steady, does not lead to an increase in employment: this is due to a
higher rate of business failure or relocations outside ZFU. In other words, once firms
cease to benefit from the tax rebates, they seem to be replaced by new firms which
enter the program for the first time and can thus benefit from full tax exemption.
Indeed, the program was eventually restarted in 2003, meaning that the stabilization
in employment level and firm stock observed since this date has been achieved at
substantial cost. The brief attempt to halt the program in 2002 results in a sig-
nificant decrease of firm location for this year. This highlights that the economic
attractiveness of ZFU remains largely dependent on tax rebates. Besides, as already
noted by previous research on the French ZFU, a large part of the inflow of new
firms is due to relocation. Subventions do not create genuine new economic activity,
and may have negative externalities on the not-so-advantaged neighborhoods close
to the ZFU, as observed by Givord et al. (2013). Another drawback of the program
may lie in its lack of clear targeting. The program has certainly achieved one of its
main objectives, that of increasing resident employment and revitalizing the neigh-
borhoods. But the impact appears relatively modest compared to the overall cost of
the program (estimated at 300 million euros in 2001 according to an official report
by the French Parliament). Besides, Gregoir and Maury (2012) for instance observe
a negative impact on house prices in some French ZFU of the second wave, which
9We observe a small and non-significant impact on the firm stock from 2005 to 2009 and a
significant impact on firm creations in 2007. This may reflect the fact that some ZRU became ZFU
in 2004 and 2007. As our control group includes some treated areas, it might be “contaminated”:
our main results could thus have been underestimated for the end of the period. Reassuringly, we
obtain similar conclusions when excluding areas selected for the second and third generation of the
ZFU program from the control group (see the last two columns of Table 4.12 in the appendix).
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they interpret as a negative signaling effect of ZFU status on the population.
Many questions still remain open, about why and where EZ programs work.
The optimal settings of such a place-based policies need to be evaluated, as they
propose a wide range of services, tax rebates and subsidies on certain inputs. Recent
papers emphasize strong discrepancies linked to the variety of tax cuts (Lynch and
Zax, 2011), the services provided (Bondonio and Greenbaum, 2007), the manner in
which the zone is managed (Neumark and Kolko, 2010), or the industry to which
the firm belongs (Hanson and Rohlin, 2011, Burnes et al., 2012). For France, Briant
et al. (2015) highlight the importance of geographic context in the success of the
second wave of ZFU.
The mixed success of French place-based policy also raises some questions. In
the short run, the impact of the first wave of the ZFU was much higher than that
obtained in the second wave by Givord et al. (2013) with similar data and close
identification strategy (see also Mayer et al., 2012). Several explanations can be
adduced to explain the apparent decline in the attractiveness of ZFU. First, a large
program of payroll tax cuts was implemented on a national level and reduced the tax
gap between ZFU and the rest of the country. Second, after 2003 the subsidies were
more strictly contingent on hiring local workers. This so-called local employment
clause (“clause d’emploi local” in French) was already in effect between 1997 and
2001, but it may not have been strictly enforced (see Appendix 4.A). Difficulties in
hiring skilled workers locally may have discouraged new firms from locating there.10
Lastly, land availability may have played an important role in this differential
impact. Table 4.9 (in the appendix) shows that a larger part of the land is dedicated
to industrial and commercial zones, that are likely to host companies, in the ZFU
belonging to the first generation, compared to the subsequent ones. This proportion
is even larger in fast-growing zones. We also notice that this share rises after the
implementation of the program, at the expense of farmland. Consequently, there are
grounds for thinking that a ZFU can only host a bounded number of firms, because
of limited space. However, this bound is likely to be larger in zones belonging to the
first generation. This could also explain why the impact of the program no longer
increase after 2002.
10In 2008, according to a qualitative survey in the ZFU, companies in these zones declare major
difficulties in hiring employees inside the area (and minor difficulties in hiring outside the area), as
reported in Givord et al. (2013).
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4.A A brief description of the French ZFU tax
cuts system
Plants located in ZFU as well as plants in ZRU benefit from several tax exemptions,
the extent of which varies from ZFU to ZRU in terms of the amount concerned and
the duration of the relief (see Table 4.1). The amounts and the eligibility conditions
are modified yearly, but the main elements may be summarized as follows:
First, plants located in ZFU and ZRU benefit from exemptions for employer
payroll taxes (occupational injury, transportation, housing, family benefit and so-
cial insurance contributions). Employees with open-ended or fixed-term employment
contracts of more than 12 months are exempt from employer payroll taxes, on the
fraction of their salary lying beneath 1.5 times the minimum wage (Smic). In 2006,
the ceiling was lowered to 1.4 times the minimum wage. Tradesmen and shopkeepers
benefit from a total exemption from health insurance contributions until the salary
reaches a level of 1.5 times minimum wage. The duration of this exemption is only
one year in ZRU, while in ZFU it comes from 5 years of completed exemption com-
pleted by decreasing exemption. Besides, the exemptions concern only new hires
in ZRU while they benefit all salaried workers in ZFU, conditional upon the fact
that the plant hired 20% of its labor force locally (“clause d’embauche locale”). This
condition was not applied in practice in the first years of the ZFU, so in December
2000 a new law reinforced the firms’ obligations in this respect (a specific declaration
is required to benefit from tax cuts, and their amounts were reduced for transferred
jobs). In December 2002, the needed proportion of local hiring was increased from
20% to 33%.
All plants in ZFU benefit from a full exemption from corporate income tax
for five years starting from the date they locate in the zone. However, this tax cut is
restricted to profit below a certain amount, which implies a maximum gain limited
to around 20,000 euros per year. In ZRU the exemption is limited to newly created
plants in the area, which benefit from full exemption for 2 years and decreasing
exemption for the next 3.
All plants in ZFU with less than 50 employees on 1 January 1997 (or at the
time of the first location in the ZFU) also benefit from a full exemption from local
business tax for five years. In ZRU the exemption concerns plants with less than
150 employees at the current date. This exemption is limited, however, and in ZFU
the ceiling is much higher than in ZRU: FF3,000,000 (around 460,000 euros) per year
in 2001 while it was only FF920,000 (around 139,000 euros) per year for companies
created after 1997 in ZRU (and FF410,000 - around 62,000 euros- for companies
present prior this date).
Finally, all buildings located in ZFU belonging to plants liable for the property
tax on buildings are exempt for 5 years. No such exemption exists in ZRU.
Companies in ZFU also benefit from additional exemptions on specific taxes, such
as the tax on property transfer for shops (to a maximum FF700,000, i.e. around
107,000 euros), fees for the creation of new office buildings in Ile-de-France (Paris
metropolitan region), or total exemption from local land tax for 5 years.
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4.B A simulation of the amount of tax cuts at the
firm level
In order to assess the magnitude of the incentives at the firm level, we use the
individual tax returns database prior to the implementation of the program, and
simulate tax cuts using the precise program tax cuts scheme. More specifically, we
apply the precise scheme of the ZFU program, as described in Table 4.1, to the
distribution of wages and sales in the firm observed in 1995 and compared it to the
common tax scheme that applied to all French firms. Using the year 1995 also allows
us to avoid having to reckon with any potential changes in the financial structure or
wage distribution due to the implementation of ZFU. We perform the simulation on
all French firms with less than fifty employees, meaning those eligible for the ZFU
program.
The main components are payroll and corporate income tax exemptions. For the
former, we use the DADS database that provides gross wages for each employee.
We thus apply both national and ZFU payroll tax rates at the worker level, and
consolidate these data to simulate the gain a firm derives from locating in ZFU (see
Table 4.7). The national payroll tax rates have sharply decreased since 2003 (loi
Fillon) for the lowest wages (Figure 4.B), and this change may have reduced the
attractiveness of the ZFU somewhat. We thus apply both the tax scheme prevailing
in 1997, and the one in force after the implementation of the loi Fillon. For corporate
income tax exemptions, we observe the precise amount of corporate income tax paid
by firms in 1995. At this date, most of the small firms were not paying corporate
income tax (for instance because their yearly sales were too low). So instead of an
average amount, we provide the proportion of these firms (meaning those for whom
the exemption from tax cuts is not expected to have a direct incentive effect) as well
as the median of the corporate income tax paid, conditionally upon having paid a
strictly positive amount (see Table 4.8).
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Table 4.7: Simulation of labor cost in French small firms and ZFU payroll tax cuts,
1997 and 2005 tax schemes. (thousand of euros)
1997 payroll tax scheme 2005 payroll tax scheme
Labor cost ZFU payroll Labor cost ZFU payroll
(national level) tax cuts (national level) tax cuts
Total 40.4 5.9 38.3 4.5
Manufacturing:
- Food 37.7 6 35.1 3.8
- Final goods 68.2 9.5 65.7 7.7
- Car 148.5 22.1 145.8 18.6
- Capital goods 111.8 15.8 109.2 13.5
- Intermediate goods 136.0 19.2 131.8 15.5
Construction 44.6 7.3 42.3 4.9
Energy 63.6 9.1 63.1 8.5
Trade 44.6 6.6 42.5 4.7
Transportation 70.5 10.6 67.8 8.4
Finance 42.4 5.8 41.3 4.7
Real estate 19.4 2.9 18.1 1.8
Business services 60.0 7.7 58.5 6
Household services 23.1 3.6 21.1 1.7
Health, educ. 23.5 3.8 21.9 1.8
Note: Using 1997 tax schemes (respectively 2005 tax scheme), the estimated median labor cost in
French small companies is 40.4 thousand of euros (resp. 38.3). The estimated median payroll tax
cuts for being in ZFU is 5.9 thousand of euros (resp. 4.5). Only eligible plants (with less than 50
employees) are considered.
Source: DADS 1995.
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Table 4.8: Summary statistics on corporate income tax (1995)
Share of untaxed firms Median tax paid
(in %) (for taxed firms)
(in ke)
Total: 76.2 3.7
Manufacturing:
- Food 84.9 3.8
- Final goods 68.5 3.5
- Car 52.0 6.1
- Capital goods 62.5 5.5
- Intermediate goods 55.1 7.2
Construction 83.7 3.2
Energy 58.9 7.5
Trade 73.9 3.8
Transportation 79.5 4.1
Finance 51.7 8.2
Real estate 83.0 2.6
Business services 60.5 3.8
Household services 85.4 2.0
Health, educ. 57.0 3.8
Reading note: for all French firms present in 1995, we estimate the proportion that did not pay
any corporate income tax and estimate the median corporate income tax paid for those having a
strict positive corporate income tax.
Sources: Fiscal database (BRN-RSI) 1995.
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Figure 4.6: Gap between national payroll tax rate and ZFU payroll tax rate accord-
ing to earning level.
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4.C Database construction
Two administrative database from INSEE have been merged. The DADS database
provides yearly employment for each company. The SIRENE database follows all
French firms. It contents several files which provides the stock of companies on Jan-
uary 1st, each year, as well as firm relocation (the number of new firms created from
the 1st of January to the 31st of December of each year). Each company is identi-
fied by a registration number. In case of relocation of the company, this registration
number changes (in this case, the file corresponding to the flow of companies re-
lates the new and the old registration number). More important, firms are precisely
georeferenced. It is crucial for our study as the enterprise zone boundaries do not
correspond to the usual administrative borders. The SIRENE database indicates
whether the company is located within these boundaries or not, each year from 1995
to 2013.
As a convention, in the text the year t corresponds at a measure at January 1st,
t + 1 for data on employment and number of firm (which are stock data), while it
corresponds to the year t for data on business creation and relocation (which are flow
data). This makes the reading of the results easier, as the ZFU effects are expected
in 1997 for all data.
The data have been modified for the needs of the study. First, georeferenced
creation and relocation data are yearly available over the whole period 1995-2013
while the precise location is missing for some years in the data providing the “stock”
of firms recorded on January the 1st of each year. More precisely, the geolocation
are not available in this database in 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2001. This information
can be extrapolated from others year, however; we indeed have access to the precise
identification number of each firm. This identification number change in case of a
relocation, the presence of the same identification number in year t1 and t2 means
that the firm have not moved over the period. To be more specific, consider the
case of 1998 stock data, where all firms are registered, but without precise location.
If this very same firm is already registered on database of the previous years, we
can use the location variable available in these database. Otherwise, it means that
the firm has just located in 1998: in this case we find a record in the database for
creation and relocation, that contains a location variable for all years. All in all,
geolocation, and more precisely ZFU location, can be retrieved for all firms.
Second, the geolocation is not always time-consistent: a company may be reg-
istered within a ZFU one year and not the other, even if it is located at the exact
same address, and even if ZFU boundaries are not modified. This is due to some
inaccuracies in the GIS. If rare, this missclassification can introduce noise in the
estimation. When it is the case, we use, by convention, the first location.
Third, we take into account a subtlety of the enterprise zone boundaries. Recall
that enterprise zones are selected among most disadvantaged urban areas (ZUS). In
some rare cases, a ZFU merges more than one ZUS. As propensity score variables
are available at the ZUS level and the ZFU level, our study unit is the ZUS. That is
why our treated group contains 44 areas whereas only 38 ZFU where implemented in
continental France in 1997. In addition, ZFU boundaries and ZUS boundaries may
not exactly match. For the sake of consistency, we choose to restrict to companies
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located within both a ZUS and a ZFU.
Finally, using the DADS database we define a measure of business closure rate.
Indeed, as we know precisely the level of employment for each firm and each year, we
are able to know when a firm dismisses its last employee. More concretely, a company
with employees closes in year t− 1 if it declares at least one employee on year t and
zero employee on year t + 1. This measure captures potential relocations outside
the area as the identification number of the companies changes in this case. This
measure is preferred to this provided directly by administrative data on bankruptcies
(due to insolvency, i.e. when a company is no longer able to repay its debts), as it is
not a reliable measure of discontinuance in business. Not all legal decisions to open
bankruptcy proceedings (company filing for bankruptcy as part of legal proceedings)
lead to liquidation. Besides, this captures only a little part of discontinuance of
business. A plant can, for instance, put a stop to its activity because its owner
decides to retire and his assets are not taken over. For the sake of comparison we
also define an alternative measure for plant creation. The creation of business with
salaried employees corresponds to plants which declare salaried employees for the
first time.
4.D Supplementary Figures
Figure 4.7: Share of ZFU areas amongst ZRU as a function of the number of inhab-
itants
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Figure 4.8: Growth rate of the number of plants between 1995 and 2001 - linear fit
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Figure 4.9: Growth rate of the employment between 1995 and 2001 - linear fit
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Table 4.9: Land use in the three ZFU waves from 1990 to 2006 (in percent)
Type of zone ZFU ZRU
ZFU generation 1st 2nd 3rd
Growth path All Slow Fast
Ind. or com. zone (1990) 17 11 24 12 10 10
Urbanized area (1990) 70 78 63 81 77 85
Natural area (1990) 2 2 1 2 3 1
Farmland (1990) 11 10 12 6 10 4
Ind. or com. zone (2000) 19 12 27 13 11 10
Urbanized area (2000) 71 78 64 81 74 86
Natural area (2000) 1 1 1 2 5 1
Farmland (2000) 8 8 8 4 10 3
Ind. or com. zone (2006) 21 14 29 14 14 10
Urbanized area (2006) 71 78 64 83 73 86
Natural area (2006) 1 1 2 1 5 1
Farmland (2006) 6 7 5 2 9 3
Ind. or com. zone (2012) 24 18 29 16 15 11
Urbanized area (2012) 70 74 66 82 71 86
Natural area (2012) 1 1 2 1 4 1
Farmland (2012) 5 6 3 1 9 2
Note: ZFU are considered as fast growing if the firm stock more than doubled between 1995 and
2002.
Source: Corine Land Cover, 1990, 2000, 2006 and 2012.
4.E Detailed results
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Table 4.10: ZFU effect on changes in flows and stock of plants compared to 1995
level
Stock Plant Plant New Plant Plant closure (DADS)
of plant creation relocation (DADS) all established
plants before 1995
1995 −0.005
[−0.049,0.038]
1996 0.028
[−0.031,0.087]
0.05
[−0.19,0.291]
0.115
[−0.17,0.399]
0.141
[−0.148,0.43]
−0.105
[−0.379,0.169]
−0.043
[−0.336,0.251]
1997 0.221∗∗∗
[0.155,0.287]
0.552∗∗∗
[0.324,0.78]
1.055∗∗∗
[0.728,1.381]
0.281∗
[−0.019,0.58]
−0.172
[−0.41,0.066]
−0.145
[−0.397,0.106]
1998 0.353∗∗∗
[0.272,0.433]
0.622∗∗∗
[0.383,0.861]
1.134∗∗∗
[0.798,1.469]
0.443∗∗∗
[0.145,0.741]
0.214∗
[−0.035,0.464]
0.041
[−0.229,0.311]
1999 0.452∗∗∗
[0.359,0.544]
0.627∗∗∗
[0.369,0.884]
1.079∗∗∗
[0.763,1.396]
0.484∗∗∗
[0.188,0.78]
0.546∗∗∗
[0.316,0.776]
0.059
[−0.22,0.337]
2000 0.554∗∗∗
[0.445,0.662]
0.803∗∗∗
[0.567,1.038]
1.425∗∗∗
[1.122,1.728]
0.441∗∗∗
[0.14,0.741]
0.598∗∗∗
[0.353,0.842]
−0.024
[−0.299,0.251]
2001 0.692∗∗∗
[0.576,0.808]
0.948∗∗∗
[0.68,1.215]
1.715∗∗∗
[1.393,2.036]
0.561∗∗∗
[0.248,0.875]
0.715∗∗∗
[0.468,0.962]
0.041
[−0.218,0.299]
2002 0.673∗∗∗
[0.553,0.794]
0.405∗∗∗
[0.111,0.698]
0.762∗∗∗
[0.443,1.082]
0.903∗∗∗
[0.584,1.223]
0.865∗∗∗
[0.616,1.114]
−0.041
[−0.331,0.248]
2003 0.675∗∗∗
[0.552,0.798]
0.623∗∗∗
[0.314,0.933]
0.917∗∗∗
[0.54,1.294]
0.799∗∗∗
[0.474,1.123]
0.724∗∗∗
[0.441,1.006]
−0.075
[−0.386,0.235]
2004 0.637∗∗∗
[0.504,0.769]
0.528∗∗∗
[0.249,0.806]
0.959∗∗∗
[0.626,1.293]
0.653∗∗∗
[0.334,0.973]
0.9∗∗∗
[0.645,1.155]
0.151
[−0.119,0.421]
2005 0.638∗∗∗
[0.502,0.774]
0.557∗∗∗
[0.306,0.808]
0.748∗∗∗
[0.428,1.069]
0.605∗∗∗
[0.326,0.883]
0.88∗∗∗
[0.601,1.159]
−0.003
[−0.308,0.302]
2006 0.598∗∗∗
[0.463,0.732]
0.557∗∗∗
[0.281,0.833]
0.891∗∗∗
[0.547,1.236]
0.573∗∗∗
[0.259,0.888]
0.798∗∗∗
[0.545,1.052]
0.019
[−0.281,0.319]
2007 0.597∗∗∗
[0.461,0.733]
0.473∗∗∗
[0.234,0.712]
0.927∗∗∗
[0.58,1.274]
0.7∗∗∗
[0.391,1.009]
0.612∗∗∗
[0.331,0.894]
−0.329∗∗
[−0.627,−0.032]
2008 0.616∗∗∗
[0.478,0.753]
0.463∗∗∗
[0.185,0.74]
0.83∗∗∗
[0.487,1.173]
0.78∗∗∗
[0.491,1.068]
0.623∗∗∗
[0.352,0.895]
0.125
[−0.169,0.42]
2009 0.612∗∗∗
[0.468,0.755]
0.526∗∗∗
[0.224,0.828]
0.661∗∗∗
[0.309,1.013]
0.472∗∗∗
[0.158,0.785]
0.722∗∗∗
[0.453,0.992]
0.044
[−0.203,0.29]
2010 0.621∗∗∗
[0.474,0.768]
0.535∗∗∗
[0.252,0.818]
0.719∗∗∗
[0.393,1.046]
0.54∗∗∗
[0.222,0.857]
0.738∗∗∗
[0.467,1.008]
−0.06
[−0.327,0.207]
2011 0.642∗∗∗
[0.488,0.796]
0.568∗∗∗
[0.266,0.871]
0.721∗∗∗
[0.394,1.047]
0.504∗∗∗
[0.192,0.817]
0.807∗∗∗
[0.532,1.082]
0.059
[−0.238,0.355]
2012 0.631∗∗∗
[0.473,0.789]
0.558∗∗∗
[0.282,0.833]
0.672∗∗∗
[0.306,1.038]
0.531∗∗∗
[0.214,0.849]
0.771∗∗∗
[0.501,1.041]
0.042
[−0.243,0.327]
2013 0.649∗∗∗
[0.357,0.941]
0.791∗∗∗
[0.443,1.139]
Nb obs
ctrl/treat
351/45 351/45 351/45 351/45 351/45 351/45
Notes: Estimates of the fact of being ZFU on ∆1995log(Yit + 1), the difference in log outcomes
between year t and 1995. Estimations based on regression and subclassification (four stratas based
on the propensity score) using all covariates in Table 4.3 and the number of inhabitants in the
area. Confidence intervals at 95 % in brackets. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
Source: SIRENE and DADS, 1995-2013.
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Table 4.11: ZFU effect on changes in the employment compared to 1995 level, de-
tailed by qualification and type of firms
Total Low- Skilled High- Employ. Employ.
employ- skilled employ- skilled of plans of plans
ment employ- ment employ- established established
ment ment before 1995 after 1995
1995 0.007
[−0.142,0.156]
0.013
[−0.167,0.194]
0.039
[−0.135,0.212]
0.007
[−0.159,0.172]
−0.046
[−0.16,0.067]
1996 0.065
[−0.134,0.265]
0.13
[−0.123,0.383]
0.112
[−0.126,0.35]
−0.027
[−0.248,0.194]
0.074
[−0.089,0.236]
0.035
[−0.445,0.514]
1997 0.365∗∗∗
[0.147,0.583]
0.435∗∗∗
[0.173,0.697]
0.446∗∗∗
[0.205,0.686]
0.271∗∗
[0.023,0.518]
0.099
[−0.087,0.284]
0.678∗∗∗
[0.194,1.163]
1998 0.595∗∗∗
[0.361,0.829]
0.602∗∗∗
[0.303,0.9]
0.705∗∗∗
[0.445,0.966]
0.506∗∗∗
[0.246,0.767]
0.117
[−0.1,0.334]
0.908∗∗∗
[0.424,1.392]
1999 0.801∗∗∗
[0.534,1.068]
0.889∗∗∗
[0.566,1.212]
0.852∗∗∗
[0.54,1.164]
0.744∗∗∗
[0.47,1.019]
0.08
[−0.216,0.375]
1.03∗∗∗
[0.548,1.512]
2000 0.941∗∗∗
[0.654,1.229]
1.038∗∗∗
[0.686,1.39]
1.026∗∗∗
[0.689,1.364]
0.884∗∗∗
[0.594,1.174]
−0.013
[−0.288,0.263]
1.215∗∗∗
[0.7,1.73]
2001 1.091∗∗∗
[0.796,1.386]
1.117∗∗∗
[0.76,1.473]
1.125∗∗∗
[0.788,1.462]
1.101∗∗∗
[0.786,1.416]
0.044
[−0.266,0.354]
1.338∗∗∗
[0.811,1.865]
2002 1.12∗∗∗
[0.823,1.416]
1.228∗∗∗
[0.875,1.58]
1.15∗∗∗
[0.821,1.479]
1.041∗∗∗
[0.711,1.371]
0.072
[−0.256,0.399]
1.363∗∗∗
[0.844,1.882]
2003 1.111∗∗∗
[0.8,1.422]
1.282∗∗∗
[0.911,1.653]
1.094∗∗∗
[0.737,1.452]
1.04∗∗∗
[0.718,1.361]
0.092
[−0.254,0.438]
1.314∗∗∗
[0.782,1.847]
2004 1.074∗∗∗
[0.752,1.396]
1.32∗∗∗
[0.933,1.707]
1.066∗∗∗
[0.697,1.436]
0.903∗∗∗
[0.565,1.241]
0.027
[−0.361,0.414]
1.242∗∗∗
[0.698,1.786]
2005 1.071∗∗∗
[0.738,1.404]
1.268∗∗∗
[0.889,1.647]
1.057∗∗∗
[0.67,1.443]
0.972∗∗∗
[0.627,1.317]
0.032
[−0.334,0.399]
1.197∗∗∗
[0.666,1.728]
2006 0.979∗∗∗
[0.647,1.312]
1.177∗∗∗
[0.813,1.542]
0.943∗∗∗
[0.563,1.322]
0.915∗∗∗
[0.562,1.268]
0.062
[−0.321,0.446]
1.04∗∗∗
[0.506,1.575]
2007 0.999∗∗∗
[0.671,1.327]
1.175∗∗∗
[0.793,1.558]
1.014∗∗∗
[0.641,1.386]
0.927∗∗∗
[0.577,1.278]
0.21
[−0.197,0.617]
1∗∗∗
[0.458,1.542]
2008 1.004∗∗∗
[0.658,1.35]
1.029∗∗∗
[0.646,1.412]
1.252∗∗∗
[0.856,1.648]
0.886∗∗∗
[0.528,1.244]
0.152
[−0.274,0.578]
0.992∗∗∗
[0.445,1.538]
2009 0.978∗∗∗
[0.627,1.329]
1.052∗∗∗
[0.648,1.457]
1.2∗∗∗
[0.796,1.604]
0.814∗∗∗
[0.451,1.177]
0.089
[−0.368,0.545]
0.979∗∗∗
[0.433,1.526]
2010 1.049∗∗∗
[0.687,1.411]
1.128∗∗∗
[0.722,1.535]
1.177∗∗∗
[0.758,1.596]
0.934∗∗∗
[0.552,1.316]
0.172
[−0.334,0.678]
1.033∗∗∗
[0.491,1.574]
2011 1.009∗∗∗
[0.637,1.382]
1.041∗∗∗
[0.613,1.469]
1.168∗∗∗
[0.75,1.586]
0.947∗∗∗
[0.546,1.347]
0.253
[−0.268,0.774]
0.96∗∗∗
[0.409,1.512]
2012 0.983∗∗∗
[0.598,1.369]
1.019∗∗∗
[0.593,1.446]
1.125∗∗∗
[0.687,1.562]
0.887∗∗∗
[0.478,1.296]
0.228
[−0.294,0.751]
0.937∗∗∗
[0.377,1.496]
Nb obs
ctrl/treat
351/45 351/45 351/45 351/45 351/45 351/45
Notes: Estimates of the fact of being ZFU on ∆1995log(Yit + 1), the difference in log outcomes
between year t and 1995. Estimations are based on propensity score and subclassification (five
strata based on the propensity score) using all covariates in Table 4.3 and the number of inhabitants
in the area. Confidence intervals at 95 % in brackets. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
Source: SIRENE and DADS, 1995-2013.
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Table 4.12: ZFU effect on changes in plants creation, transfer and stock - alternative
zones
Stock Plant Stock Plant
of plant creation of plant creation
1995 −0.011
[−0.049,0.027]
−0.017
[−0.068,0.033]
1996 −0.02
[−0.069,0.029]
−0.017
[−0.16,0.125]
0.011
[−0.062,0.083]
0.015
[−0.273,0.302]
1997 −0.02
[−0.074,0.033]
0.107
[−0.029,0.243]
0.189∗∗∗
[0.1,0.277]
0.403∗∗∗
[0.136,0.67]
1998 −0.002
[−0.057,0.052]
0.105
[−0.042,0.251]
0.33∗∗∗
[0.226,0.434]
0.595∗∗∗
[0.302,0.887]
1999 0.02
[−0.04,0.08]
0.183∗∗
[0.026,0.341]
0.436∗∗∗
[0.318,0.554]
0.553∗∗∗
[0.252,0.855]
2000 0.024
[−0.041,0.09]
0.017
[−0.134,0.168]
0.538∗∗∗
[0.401,0.675]
0.75∗∗∗
[0.467,1.033]
2001 0.019
[−0.05,0.088]
0.068
[−0.091,0.227]
0.688∗∗∗
[0.534,0.842]
0.938∗∗∗
[0.646,1.23]
2002 0.023
[−0.053,0.099]
−0.01
[−0.175,0.155]
0.673∗∗∗
[0.514,0.833]
0.431∗∗∗
[0.108,0.755]
2003 −0.003
[−0.08,0.074]
−0.056
[−0.23,0.118]
0.677∗∗∗
[0.507,0.847]
0.634∗∗∗
[0.285,0.982]
2004 −0.012
[−0.092,0.069]
0.009
[−0.152,0.17]
0.666∗∗∗
[0.489,0.844]
0.541∗∗∗
[0.208,0.873]
2005 0.025
[−0.062,0.112]
0.1
[−0.061,0.261]
0.7∗∗∗
[0.52,0.88]
0.612∗∗∗
[0.317,0.907]
2006 0.039
[−0.044,0.121]
0.024
[−0.138,0.186]
0.704∗∗∗
[0.532,0.876]
0.765∗∗∗
[0.448,1.081]
2007 0.07
[−0.014,0.153]
0.141∗
[−0.005,0.287]
0.722∗∗∗
[0.544,0.9]
0.588∗∗∗
[0.317,0.858]
2008 0.033
[−0.048,0.113]
0.038
[−0.125,0.202]
0.77∗∗∗
[0.588,0.953]
0.609∗∗∗
[0.283,0.934]
2009 0.028
[−0.057,0.114]
0.003
[−0.165,0.171]
0.763∗∗∗
[0.566,0.959]
0.639∗∗∗
[0.294,0.984]
2010 −0.013
[−0.098,0.071]
0.036
[−0.131,0.203]
0.784∗∗∗
[0.589,0.98]
0.736∗∗∗
[0.412,1.061]
2011 −0.016
[−0.106,0.075]
0.042
[−0.125,0.209]
0.802∗∗∗
[0.594,1.011]
0.689∗∗∗
[0.346,1.031]
2012 0.004
[−0.086,0.093]
0.142
[−0.029,0.313]
0.794∗∗∗
[0.589,1]
0.649∗∗∗
[0.338,0.959]
2013 0.077
[−0.094,0.248]
0.695∗∗∗
[0.368,1.023]
Nb obs ctrl/treat 320/351 320/351 286/45 286/45
Treatment group all ZUS 1st generation ZFU
Control group all ZRU ZRU w/o 2nd and 3rd
generation ZFU
Notes: Estimate of the fact of being ZFU on ∆1995log(Yit + 1), the difference in log outcomes
between year t and 1995. Estimations based on propensity score and subclassification (four strata
based on the propensity score) and using all covariates in Table 4.3 and the number of inhabitants
in the area. Confidence intervals at 95 % in brackets. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
Source: SIRENE and DADS, 1995-2013.
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Table 4.13: ZFU effect on changes in stock of flows of plants compared to 1990 level
at the municipality level
Stock Plant Stock Plant Stock Plant
of plant creation of plant creation of plant creation
1990 0.001
[−0.01,0.011]
0.002
[−0.008,0.013]
0.005
[−0.003,0.014]
1991 −0.001
[−0.015,0.013]
−0.003
[−0.079,0.072]
0
[−0.015,0.015]
−0.008
[−0.091,0.074]
0.003
[−0.009,0.015]
−0.02
[−0.084,0.044]
1992 −0.007
[−0.026,0.012]
−0.018
[−0.088,0.052]
−0.008
[−0.028,0.012]
−0.02
[−0.093,0.052]
−0.001
[−0.017,0.015]
−0.005
[−0.064,0.054]
1993 −0.017
[−0.041,0.006]
−0.013
[−0.097,0.071]
−0.019
[−0.043,0.006]
−0.011
[−0.101,0.079]
−0.003
[−0.023,0.017]
0.009
[−0.062,0.08]
1994 −0.017
[−0.043,0.009]
−0.034
[−0.109,0.042]
−0.018
[−0.045,0.008]
−0.034
[−0.113,0.046]
−0.002
[−0.023,0.02]
0.005
[−0.058,0.069]
1995 −0.016
[−0.045,0.013]
−0.056
[−0.133,0.022]
−0.017
[−0.048,0.013]
−0.064
[−0.146,0.018]
−0.002
[−0.026,0.023]
−0.022
[−0.088,0.043]
1996 −0.016
[−0.048,0.017]
0.013
[−0.073,0.098]
−0.016
[−0.051,0.018]
0.018
[−0.074,0.111]
0
[−0.027,0.028]
0.02
[−0.053,0.092]
1997 0.016
[−0.019,0.051]
0.119∗∗∗
[0.035,0.203]
0.015
[−0.022,0.052]
0.117∗∗
[0.027,0.208]
−0.006
[−0.036,0.024]
−0.029
[−0.101,0.043]
1998 0.036∗
[−0.002,0.074]
0.115∗∗∗
[0.031,0.198]
0.036∗
[−0.004,0.076]
0.121∗∗∗
[0.032,0.21]
−0.006
[−0.038,0.026]
0.005
[−0.066,0.077]
1999 0.049∗∗
[0.009,0.089]
0.108∗∗
[0.02,0.195]
0.048∗∗
[0.006,0.091]
0.103∗∗
[0.01,0.196]
−0.011
[−0.045,0.023]
−0.04
[−0.114,0.035]
2000 0.067∗∗∗
[0.023,0.111]
0.121∗∗
[0.024,0.219]
0.067∗∗∗
[0.02,0.114]
0.123∗∗
[0.016,0.23]
−0.014
[−0.051,0.024]
−0.014
[−0.097,0.069]
2001 0.099∗∗∗
[0.052,0.146]
0.188∗∗∗
[0.093,0.283]
0.099∗∗∗
[0.049,0.149]
0.192∗∗∗
[0.092,0.293]
−0.018
[−0.059,0.023]
−0.015
[−0.096,0.067]
2002 0.094∗∗∗
[0.045,0.143]
0.099∗∗
[0.011,0.188]
0.094∗∗∗
[0.042,0.146]
0.102∗∗
[0.008,0.196]
−0.017
[−0.06,0.025]
−0.007
[−0.082,0.069]
2003 0.102∗∗∗
[0.051,0.153]
0.142∗∗∗
[0.045,0.24]
0.102∗∗∗
[0.047,0.156]
0.141∗∗∗
[0.036,0.247]
−0.019
[−0.063,0.025]
−0.028
[−0.111,0.055]
2004 0.105∗∗∗
[0.053,0.157]
0.09∗∗
[0.002,0.178]
0.107∗∗∗
[0.051,0.163]
0.09∗
[−0.002,0.182]
−0.011
[−0.056,0.034]
−0.013
[−0.087,0.062]
2005 0.104∗∗∗
[0.051,0.158]
0.079
[−0.016,0.173]
0.108∗∗∗
[0.051,0.165]
0.082
[−0.017,0.18]
−0.004
[−0.05,0.042]
−0.001
[−0.081,0.079]
2006 0.107∗∗∗
[0.052,0.162]
0.078
[−0.017,0.172]
0.113∗∗∗
[0.054,0.171]
0.085∗
[−0.014,0.184]
0.003
[−0.044,0.051]
0.016
[−0.064,0.096]
2007 0.113∗∗∗
[0.055,0.171]
0.074∗
[−0.012,0.159]
0.122∗∗∗
[0.06,0.184]
0.085∗
[−0.002,0.171]
0.015
[−0.035,0.064]
0.031
[−0.041,0.104]
2008 0.114∗∗∗
[0.054,0.174]
0.04
[−0.047,0.128]
0.125∗∗∗
[0.061,0.189]
0.049
[−0.042,0.14]
0.023
[−0.029,0.075]
0.027
[−0.047,0.101]
2009 0.116∗∗∗
[0.054,0.178]
0.092∗∗
[0.005,0.178]
0.129∗∗∗
[0.064,0.195]
0.105∗∗
[0.017,0.194]
0.031
[−0.023,0.084]
0.037
[−0.036,0.111]
2010 0.137∗∗
[0.009,0.265]
0.075
[−0.026,0.176]
0.128∗∗∗
[0.061,0.196]
0.087
[−0.017,0.192]
−0.057
[−0.166,0.051]
0.035
[−0.05,0.12]
2011 0.14∗∗
[0.011,0.269]
0.082
[−0.037,0.201]
0.133∗∗∗
[0.064,0.203]
0.088∗
[−0.008,0.184]
−0.049
[−0.159,0.06]
0.009
[−0.092,0.109]
2012 0.136∗∗
[0.006,0.267]
0.04
[−0.081,0.161]
0.131∗∗∗
[0.059,0.203]
0.047
[−0.054,0.147]
−0.044
[−0.154,0.067]
0.019
[−0.083,0.121]
2013 0.031
[−0.09,0.151]
0.025
[−0.076,0.126]
−0.027
[−0.129,0.074]
Nb obs
ctrl/treat
284/45 284/45 215/45 215/45 260/69 260/69
Treatment 1st generation ZFU 1st generation ZFU 2nd and 3rd
group generation ZFU
Control all ZRU ZRU without 2nd and 3rd
group generation ZFU
Notes: Estimates of the fact of being ZFU on ∆1990log(Yit + 1), the difference in log outcomes
between year t and 1990. Estimations based on a linear regression without controls. Confidence
intervals at 95 % in brackets. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
Source: SIRENE and DADS, 1995-2013.
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Chapter 5
The Impacts of Housing
Subsidies on the Rental
Sector:
the French Example
This chapter is cowritten with Ce´line Grislain-Letre´my (Crest and PSL*).
5.1 Introduction
Housing subsidies are a main tool for housing policy in many developed countries.
In France, the budget weight of subsidies to tenants reached 16.8 billions of euros in
2014 (CGDD, 2015), namely 0.8% of GDP. These subsidies aim to limit the budget
share of housing for tenants and to improve their housing conditions for a given
budget share. Despite the rising spending allocated to housing subsidies since the
mid-1990s, the proportion of household expenditure that low-income tenants devote
to rent has continued to increase, in particular in the private rental sector (Arnault
and Crusson, 2012). This suggest a potential incidence of housing subsidies on
the level of the rents. Considering that housing supply may be considered as little
elastic, at least in the short run, a demand subsidy would lead to a high increase
in rents and a small increase in the number and quality of rental dwellings. Under
these conditions, housing allowance would be partly captured by landlords.
Several concordant empirical studies have already highlighted and measured the
impact of housing subsidies targeting tenants on rents.1 In the United States, Susin
(2002) finds a positive impact of rent vouchers on rents for recipients but also for
unsubsidized low-income households. Similarly, Gibbons and Manning (2006) show
that a reduction in UK housing benefits decreases rents and that these benefits
1Subsidies can also target building suppliers. Eriksen and Rosenthal (2010) and Sinai and
Waldfogel (2005) show that the impact of subsidized construction of low-income housing on the
housing stock in the United States is limited, because this crowds out equivalent housing that
otherwise would have been provided by the private sector.
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were massively captured by landlords. For Finland, Kangasharju (2010) yields a
similar impact of housing allowances provided to low-income households in the pri-
vate housing sector. In France, Laferre`re and Blanc (2004) and Fack (2006) find a
positive effect of housing subsidies on rents in the 1990s.2 These two articles use
the natural experiment provided by the reform of housing subsidies between 1991
and 1993, which aimed at increasing the number of beneficiaries from housing sub-
sidies. Laferre`re and Blanc (2004) highlight that the significant impact of housing
subsidies on rents is only slightly explained by an increase in dwelling quality, us-
ing the Rents and Charges survey between 1987 and 1999. Fack (2006) determines
the impact of housing subsidies on rents for French low-income households. By
comparing the evolution of rents for households belonging to the first quartile of
standard of living and households belonging to the second one, she finds that the
reform of housing subsidies between 1991 and 1993 led to an increase of rents that
represented 78% of subsidies. Her results are established by applying a method of
difference-in-differences and using the Housing survey between 1973 to 2002.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we offer a new identification strategy to
measure the impact of housing allowance on rents. Our study is based on on a fuzzy
geographic discontinuity in the calculation of housing subsidies. In France, subsidies
are approximately 15 to 40 euros per month higher in agglomerations of more than
100,000 inhabitants. This population threshold has not been strictly used to deter-
mine the zones with higher subsidies. Some agglomerations with less than 100,000
inhabitants can receive higher subsidies, but they have specific features. Thus, treat-
ment, namely, higher housing subsidies, is endogenous. We use as an instrument a
dummy for agglomerations with more than 100,000 inhabitants. We estimate this
way a local average treatment effect of housing subsidy on rents in agglomerations
relatively close to the discontinuity, that is between 50,000 and 180,000 inhabitants.
Second, we extend the results of Laferre`re and Blanc (2004) and Fack (2006), as
we measure the potential impact of housing subsidies on rents in France between
1984 and 2012. We find no significant impact in the 1980s, when the expenditure for
housing benefit were lower, while we highlight that tenant-based subsidies caused an
increase in the rents in the next two decades. This long-lasting impact of housing
benefit on the level of the rents suggests that housing supply is inelastic in the
long term. This could be the case if local authorities implement restrictive land use
policies (Gyourko and Molloy, 2015). Finally, the impact of subsidies on rents is
heterogeneous. It is stronger for the dwellings with two rooms or less, for flats and
for the recipients of the subsidy.
Third, our method makes it possible to assess the effect of housing allowance
on the quality and the quantity of housing supply. Higher subsidies seem to have
almost no effect on housing quality and no impact on the size of the privately-rented
sector. This is consistent with the idea that the housing supply is quite inelastic.
To test this hypothesis, we break down our model on rents depending on a proxy
of the tightness of housing markets (namely, the past population growth of the
agglomeration). We actually find that housing allowance pushed up rents only in
fast-growing cities. Finally, we show that the share of one-room flats in the rental
2See Laferre`re and le Blanc (2002) and Fack (2005) for companion papers in French of these
two works.
150
Chapter 5 – The Impact of Housing Subsidies on the Rental Sector
stock is significantly higher where housing benefits are more generous. This type
of dwelling is actually more likely to be occupied by the beneficiaries of housing
assistance, especially students.
The chapter is organized as follows: section 5.2 describes the French housing ben-
efit policy and especially its spatial heterogeneity; section 5.3 explains the empirical
method; section 5.4 presents the data; section 5.5 details the results and section 5.6
finally concludes.
5.2 Housing subsidy in France
In France, public spending for housing aims at easing the burden of housing spending
and to improve housing conditions. It targets either housing suppliers or consumers.
The share of public spending for housing in the French GDP varies around 2% in the
last three decades, namely 40.9 billions of euros in 2014. Housing benefit accounts
for half of the spending, 20.5 billions of euros in 2014. Housing subsidies to tenants
constitute the most important tool, as they represent 16.2 billions of euros, of which
6.9 billions of euros for the social rental sector (CGDD, 2015).
Housing allowance to tenants, which was created in the post-war years, was
massively extended since 1977. After this pivotal year in the French housing policy,
public finance was directed in the favor of subsidies to households to the expense
of building subsidies, which used to prevail. Consequently, the budget weight of
subsidies to tenants has kept increasing since 1977 (see figure 5.1). The main fac-
tor behind this increase is the growing number of eligible tenants (see figure 5.2).
From the 1990s, the whole set of low-income households, including students, could
benefit from these subsidies. In the privately-rented sector, the share of subsidized
households rose from 27% in 1989 to 44% in 1998. Since the 2000s, the number of
beneficiaries is almost constant.
Figure 5.1: Housing subsidies targeting tenants – amounts and weight in the GDP
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Figure 5.2: Share of housing subsidies in rents and share of subsidized households
in the private rental sector
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Three main housing subsidies target tenants: personal housing subsidy (“aide
personnalise´e au logement”, APL), mainly for social housing tenants; family housing
allowance (“allocation de logement familiale”, ALF); and social housing allowance
(“allocation de logement sociale”, ALS), given to students, childless couples, young,
old or disabled people. Even though each subsidy is dedicated to some households
or to some dwellings, their method of calculation is common since 2001. These
subsidies benefit to the tenants of social or private dwellings, to some homeowners
with outstanding loans. The subsidies can be paid to the tenant or directly to
the landlord. The calculation of the amount of housing subsidies, which is quite
complex (Ministe`re de l’e´galite´ des territoires et du Logement (2012) and Trannoy
and Wasmer (2013), Box 12 pp. 51-52), takes into account household characteristics
and resources, as well as, in a very limited extent, on the rent level.
The amount of subsidy also depends on the location in one of three zones. Zone I
comprises Paris agglomeration and the new towns in Paris region. Zone II comprises
agglomerations of more than 100,000 inhabitants, fringes of Paris region and some
agglomerations with a specific housing market (especially tight, such as costal or
border zones, or especially depressed, such as areas affected by industrial decline).
Zone III corresponds to the rest of the country (Figure 5.3). The amount of housing
subsidies is higher in zone II than in zone III, all other things being equal. In zone
I, the amount is even higher. This zoning was determined in 1977 and has been
little modified since then, mainly for budgetary reasons. The difference in subsidies
between the three zones is not constant and depends on the characteristics of the
household. It amounts approximately from 15 to 40 euros per month between zone
II and zone III (see Table 5.1 for an example).
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Figure 5.3: Housing subsidy zones in France
Zone I
Zone II
Zone III
Table 5.1: Example of housing subsidy amounts depending on location and income
Monthly disposable income 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Monthly subsidy in zone II 425 425 340 196 51 0
Monthly subsidy in zone III 398 398 314 173 31 0
Difference in monthly subsidy 27 27 26 23 20 0
Note: housing subsidy amount for a single-parent family with two children, for a monthly rent of
500 euros, according to the 2012 scheme. Authors’ calculations.
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Table 5.2: Population trend, and shares of private and social housing in zones II
and III – average value by municipality
Zone II Zone III
Gross rate of agglomeration pop1982−09 8.1% 8.7%
Share of private rental housing1982 26.1% 28.5%
Share of private rental housing2009 24.2% 26.2%
Share of social rental housing1982 18% 21.6%
Share of social rental housing2009 18.8% 21.5%
Sources: Census 1982 and 1999, agglomerations between 50,000 and 180,000 inhabitants.
5.3 Evaluation method
5.3.1 Evaluation strategy
We apply a method of instrumental variable that relies on the link between the
subsidy amount and the dwelling’s location detailed in the previous section. We only
use the discontinuity between the two last zones. In fact, zone I includes the Paris
region which is too specific to be compared with agglomerations of the other zones.
On the contrary, we argue that there are very comparable agglomerations in zones
II and III, that mainly differ by the amount of received subsidies. These comparable
agglomerations are the ones of which population is just below or just above the
population limit between these two zones, i.e. 100,000 inhabitants. Besides, the
zoning for other housing subsidies, such as landlord subsidies for rental investment,
does not match with this housing subsidies zoning (Table 5.10 in appendix 5.A).
Other housing policies could not bias our estimation.
Comparing these agglomerations makes it possible to determine the impact of
the payment of housing subsidies on the level of rents. A similar method is used
by Bono and Trannoy (2012) to estimate the impact of a rental investment subsidy
scheme (the Scellier program) on building land prices. However, they compare
the evolution of building land prices for bordering municipalities between which real
estate markets are potentially interdependent. When comparing here agglomerations
and not municipalities across the border, this dependency effect is likely negligible.
The population limit of 100,000 inhabitants between zones II and III has not
been strictly used to determine the outlines of the two zones, as some less populated
agglomerations were included in zone II (see Table 5.3). In this framework, being
located on one side or on the other side of the threshold modifies the probability
to be assigned to zone II or III (and so to receive or not higher housing subsidies),
without fully determining this assignment.
The treatment effect estimator δ is computed by using the rents of dwellings
located in the agglomerations between 50,000 and 180,000 inhabitants (Figure 5.4).
This window can be considered as wide but reducing it would lead to keep too
few agglomerations in the estimations, and descriptive statistics support the idea
of great similarity from both sides of the discontinuity. Even if the average rent
per square meter is always higher in the treatment group, its level does not increase
with population in both groups for agglomerations under 180,000 inhabitants, which
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Table 5.3: Frequency and average rent in function of the agglomeration population
Agglomeration Number of Rent per
population agglomerations square meter
in 1975
untreated treated untreated treated
(zone III) (zone II) (zone III) (zone II)
20000-40000 48 3 7.2 8.6
40000-60000 27 7 7.8 8.6
60000-80000 21 3 7.5 8.8
80000-100000 9 1 7.1 9.6
100000-120000 0 9 . 8
120000-140000 0 7 . 8.5
140000-160000 0 4 . 8.9
160000-180000 0 1 . 7.2
180000-200000 0 4 . 9.7
200000-220000 0 6 . 9.7
220000-250000 0 2 . 10.4
Source: Rents and Charges survey between 2005 and 2012.
suggests that there is no population trend in the rent level here (Table 5.3). In
addition, these agglomerations have a similar population trend, and comparable
shares of private and social housing (Table 5.2).
Zone delineation has not been modified much in the forty last years; in our
sample, no zoning modification was performed after 1991. Consequently, treatment
assignment does not rely on the present population but on the population in the
1970s. It thus can be considered as independent of recent demographic changes in
the population of the metropolitan areas. However, agglomerations in which the
housing subsidy zoning was modified between 1977 and 1991 are excluded; they
represent 4% of the observations. Besides, agglomerations in border areas also are
excluded, because they often belong to a wider international metropolitan area,
about which we have no information.3
We use the instrumental variable method in a standard linear hedonic model.
We regress the logarithm of the rent per square meter R on the treatment T and
the characteristics X of the dwelling.4 X comprises characteristics that are intrinsic
to the dwelling (living area, completion year, etc.) and relative to its location (past
growth of agglomeration, median fiscal income of the municipality, share of open
space in the municipality). We also add year fixed effects. Finally, we instrument
the treatment T with the threshold P of 100,000 inhabitants, using a two stage least
squares model. {
T = ηP + γX + ν
R = δT + βX + 
3For example, Annemasse (Haute-Savoie) is part of the metropolitan area of Geneva.
4Results are robust when regressing the total rent.
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The threshold of 100,000 inhabitants is relative to agglomeration size. As in our
data observations are dwellings, residuals are clustered by agglomeration to take
into account spatial autocorrelation of rents.
Figure 5.4: Agglomerations used for estimations
< 100,000
− untreated
− treated
> 100,000
− treated
5.3.2 Sample selection
The simplest way to compute the estimation would be to compare all dwellings lo-
cated in agglomerations inside our window. This solution is inadequate, because the
treatment is not homogenous within an agglomeration. While, in treated agglomer-
ations, the central part is classified in zone II, the outskirts are classified in zone III
and the subsidies are the same than in untreated agglomerations. Thus, comparing
the whole agglomerations would not provide the treatment effect.
To our knowledge, the delineation of targeted areas refers neither to existing
administrative nor to statistical zoning. Thus, we observe the exact border of the
central part of the agglomeration only for the treatment group. We need to assess
what this central zone would have been in the control group to compare similar
treated and untreated municipalities and to provide unbiased estimates.
The French National Institute of Statistics and Economics Studies (INSEE) pro-
vides a delineation of agglomeration called urban areas (“aires urbaines”) that are
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similar to the metropolitan statistical areas in the US. These urban areas are di-
vided into a central part and a peripheral part. We notice that the central part of
urban areas often coincides with the zone II of housing subsidy. In fact, in treated
agglomerations, the central part of the urban areas correctly predicts the treatment
assignment for 96% of dwellings of our sample.5 Figure 5.5 provides an example
for the Valence agglomeration. Consequently, we use the central part of the urban
areas as defined by INSEE in 2010 for the central zone in the control group.6 All
population variables at the agglomeration level, including the 100,000 inhabitants
threshold, are computed according to this zoning.
Figure 5.5: Coincidence of the central part of urban areas with the zone II of housing
subsidy: the example for Valence agglomeration
Valence
Municipality border
Housing subsidy zone II border
Central part of MSA
5In our data, in treated agglomerations, 89% of dwellings are located in both the central treat-
ment zone and the central part of the urban areas; 7% of dwellings are located outside the two
groups; 3% of dwellings are located in the central part of the urban areas but are not treated; 1%
are treated but located in the outskirts of the urban areas.
6In treated agglomerations, we use the central part of the agglomeration as defined by housing
policy makers (i.e., the part of the agglomeration where housing subsidies are higher).
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5.4 Data
Given that we estimate our model on a small sample of agglomerations, we use
two different surveys to obtain a sufficient number of observations. First, we use
the Rents and Charges survey between 1987 and 2012.7 About 5,000 households
are questioned during five consecutive quarters and answer about their dwelling
features, their renting conditions and the amount of their rents and charges. We
also use the Housing survey from 1984 to 2006.8 Each four to six years, more that
40,000 households are interviewed accurately about their own characteristics and
the characteristics of their housing. Given that we use two different datasets, we do
not include survey weights in our regressions. However, we do not find significant
differences between weighted and unweighted estimation using only the Rents and
Charges survey. To measure the dwelling quality, we use the following variables
provided by both surveys: the area, the number of rooms, the number of dwellings
in the building and the presence of a bathroom, toilets, a bath, a garden, a balcony,
a garage or safety device (alarms, reinforced doors).
The characteristics of the housing market at the municipality level are given
by the population Census between 1982 and 2011:9 the tenancy status, the type of
dwelling (house or apartment), the number of rooms and the presence of a bathroom.
These data are supplemented with other variables relative to municipalities: the
zoning for housing subsidies, the dispersion of income in the municipality, the ag-
glomeration population in 1975 and the population trends between 1975 and 2009,
the share of open space in the land cover, as a proxy for natural amenities, and the
average housing price. The aim of including those geographic control variables is to
fully take into account the differences in local housing markets.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Impact of housing subsidy zoning on rents
Housing subsidy zoning has a significant and positive impact on rents in the pri-
vate sector.10 Location in zone II, where housing subsidies are higher, significantly
increases the level of rents (see Table 5.4).
Adding variables that control for the dwelling quality reduces this impact, from
9% to 6%, suggesting a positive link between the location in zone II and the housing
quality. It might mean that a part of the gap in rents between zone II and III is
used to increase the quality of the dwelling or that there are preexisting differences
in the housing characteristics between the two zones. However, taking the housing
7In France, there is no comprehensive recording of rents (contrary to dwellings sales, which are
recorded by solicitors). Except for Paris region, available sources are heterogeneous. Harmoniza-
tion of data collection is ongoing in order to enable some rent control. This comprehensive and
homogenous data set will be available only in a few years.
8More precisely, the 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2002 and 2006 Housing Surveys.
9More precisely, the 1982, 1990, 1999, 2006 and 2011 Census. It is not possible to include
previous census releases as social and private rental sectors are not distinguished before 1982.
10Many characteristics of municipalities are added as control variables; the regressions here
presented include the significant ones only.
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characteristics separately, we do not find any significant impact of location in zone
II on the dwelling quality (section 5.5.3). Finally, the effect of the treatment drops
from 6% to 4% when we include geographic control variables. It is probably the sign
that the instrumental method does not fully control for disparities between zones,
which is expected when comparing cities of different size. Finally, the estimate is
almost stable when we add the average housing price variable, this means that the
model seems to appropriately take into account the geographic features that could
influence housing market at the municipality level.
The impact of the housing subsidy zoning on rents is of important magnitude,
as location in zone II increases the rents by 4%. Given that the average rent is 475
euros, it means the zoning increases the rent by 20 euros. This impact had already
been evidenced in the context of a rapid increase in the total amount of aid during
the 1990s (Fack, 2006, Laferre`re and Blanc, 2004). Our results show that it holds
in the long run (between 2005 and 2012), suggesting that housing supply remains
quite inelastic.
The instrumental variable method relies on a first stage equation, which explains
the treatment (being located in zone II for housing subsidies) with respect to the
location in an agglomeration of more than 100,000 inhabitants. The threshold of
100,000 inhabitants significantly explains the treatment (Table 5.11 in Appendix
5.B); indeed, it is the main predictor for location in zone II for housing subsidies.
Besides, the F-test of joint nullity of coefficients in this first step equals 43, which
guarantees that the threshold of 100,000 inhabitants is not a weak instrument.
5.5.2 Treatment heterogeneity
The impact of location in zone II on rents is heterogeneous, depending on the housing
characteristics (Table 5.5). When restricting the sample to the dwellings with two
rooms or less, this impact is higher (5%); it is smaller and less significant (3%)
when estimated for the dwellings with three rooms or more. Besides, the treatment
is significant for flats, while it is not for home. These findings suggest that the
increase in rents caused by housing subsidies is stronger on the segments of the
housing market that are dedicated to low-income households.
Table 5.6 confirms this partial segmentation of the housing market. We find that
the raise in rents is stronger and more significant among housing subsidy recipients
(5%) than among households who do not receive the allowance (3%). This result is
important for two reasons. First, this backs our identification strategy because it is
consistent with the idea that landlords increase rents charged to tenants, provided
that they receive housing subsidies. Second, housing subsidies also impact the rents
paid by unsubsidized households, which is in line with the finding of Susin (2002)
in the United-States. Indeed, the French private rental sector is quite competitive
and the rent could be set without legal constraint at the tenant’s arrival, until 2012.
However, the annual rent increase is controlled, once the tenant moved in. Sub-
stantial rises in rents should thus occur at the start of the tenancy. Considering
that more of 40 percent of private sector tenants are subsidized (see figure 5.2), a
landlord looking for a tenant is likely to receive applications from subsidized house-
holds. Thus, he might demand for a rent taking into account the level of the housing
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Table 5.4: Effect of housing subsidy zoning on rents
Intercept 2.035∗∗∗
(0.0449)
4.665∗∗∗
(0.0771)
2.287∗∗
(1.153)
2.279∗∗
(1.082)
Zone II for housing subsidies 0.0934∗∗
(0.0428)
0.0609∗∗
(0.0271)
0.0421∗∗
(0.0164)
0.0404∗∗∗
(0.0156)
log(size) −0.676∗∗∗
(0.0239)
−0.657∗∗∗
(0.0216)
−0.654∗∗∗
(0.0216)
Number of rooms 0.0561∗∗∗
(0.00943)
0.0521∗∗∗
(0.00950)
0.0510∗∗∗
(0.00941)
Length of the tenancy −0.0122∗∗∗
(0.00110)
−0.0121∗∗∗
(0.00108)
−0.0122∗∗∗
(0.00109)
Completion year < 1914 −0.131∗∗∗
(0.0265)
−0.0972∗∗∗
(0.0269)
−0.0980∗∗∗
(0.0266)
Completion year 1915-1948 −0.134∗∗∗
(0.0209)
−0.101∗∗∗
(0.0214)
−0.101∗∗∗
(0.0212)
Completion year 1949-1967 −0.133∗∗∗
(0.0168)
−0.106∗∗∗
(0.0169)
−0.105∗∗∗
(0.0167)
Completion year 1968-1990 −0.0969∗∗∗
(0.0162)
−0.0803∗∗∗
(0.0169)
−0.0821∗∗∗
(0.0167)
Completion year > 1990 ref. ref. ref.
Bathroom 0.0482∗
(0.0258)
0.0490∗
(0.0252)
0.0510∗∗
(0.0252)
Bath 0.0696∗∗∗
(0.0174)
0.0597∗∗∗
(0.0161)
0.0609∗∗∗
(0.0160)
Garden 0.0568∗∗∗
(0.0142)
0.0563∗∗∗
(0.0155)
0.0597∗∗∗
(0.0155)
Balcony 0.0377∗∗∗
(0.0131)
0.0323∗∗∗
(0.0113)
0.0289∗∗∗
(0.0111)
Home security device 0.0294∗∗
(0.0135)
0.0274∗
(0.0140)
0.0274∗∗
(0.0136)
House 0.0453∗∗
(0.0180)
0.0371∗∗
(0.0162)
0.0354∗∗
(0.0164)
Share of open space2000 0.182
∗∗∗
(0.0590)
0.151∗∗∗
(0.0582)
Share of rental housing1999 −0.402∗∗∗
(0.0943)
−0.403∗∗∗
(0.0943)
log(population density1999) 0.0252
(0.0191)
0.0260
(0.0188)
log(median city income2001) 0.199
∗
(0.109)
0.177∗
(0.101)
IQR city income2001 0.114
∗∗∗
(0.0312)
0.103∗∗∗
(0.0287)
∆ MSA pop1975−99 0.451∗∗∗
(0.0716)
0.416∗∗∗
(0.0727)
Average housing price2004 0.0343
∗∗∗
(0.0117)
Observations 2159 2159 2159 2159
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions
are run using the IV method and year fixed effects; standard errors are clustered by agglomera-
tion. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the rent per square meter. The sample includes
privately rented dwellings located agglomeration in with a population between 50,000 and 180,000
inhabitants. The time period extends from 2005 to 2012. IQR stands for interquartile range.
Sources: Rents and Charges survey, Housing survey.
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Table 5.5: Effect of housing subsidy zoning on rents – Treatment heterogeneity
depending on housing type
Intercept 2.467∗∗
(1.230)
2.425
(1.770)
1.901
(1.391)
1.972
(1.600)
Zone II for housing subsidies 0.0327∗
(0.0187)
0.0540∗∗∗
(0.0186)
0.0479∗∗∗
(0.0166)
0.0161
(0.0290)
Housing characteristics X X X X
Share of open space2000 0.187
∗∗∗
(0.0609)
0.204∗∗
(0.0832)
0.192∗∗∗
(0.0549)
0.109
(0.0897)
Share of rental housing1999 −0.266∗∗
(0.121)
−0.596∗∗∗
(0.136)
−0.628∗∗∗
(0.102)
0.130
(0.199)
log(population density1999) 0.0332
∗
(0.0172)
0.0155
(0.0241)
0.0374∗
(0.0197)
−0.00875
(0.0141)
log(median city income2001) 0.175
(0.117)
0.204
(0.173)
0.239∗
(0.133)
0.246
(0.157)
IQR city income2001 0.105
∗∗∗
(0.0361)
0.107∗∗
(0.0465)
0.116∗∗∗
(0.0363)
0.146∗∗
(0.0681)
∆ MSA pop1975−99 0.468∗∗∗
(0.0702)
0.452∗∗∗
(0.100)
0.483∗∗∗
(0.0756)
0.260∗∗
(0.107)
Observations 1260 899 1658 501
Subsample More than Less than House Flat
3 rooms 2 rooms
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions
are run using the IV method and year fixed effects; standard errors are clustered by agglomera-
tion. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the rent per square meter. The sample includes
privately rented dwellings located agglomeration in with a population between 50,000 and 180,000
inhabitants. The time period extends from 2005 to 2012.
Sources: Rents and Charges survey, Housing survey.
subsidy, before knowing whether the tenant benefits from housing allowance. All in
all, this policy increases the willingness to pay of a large part of tenants and might
consequently increase the equilibrium rent of all dwellings, including those that are
not occupied by subsidy recipients.
We also find that the impact of housing allowance is only significant in fast
growing cities, where the population growth between 1975 and 1999 exceeds 5%.
We interpret this result as an additional evidence of the link between housing sup-
ply elasticity and the upward impact of housing subsidies. Indeed, housing market
should be tighter when population grows because the housing supply adjusts slowly.
It implies that landlords are in a stronger position to impose increases of rents. Sim-
ilarly, for the United States, Hilber and Turner (2013) show that mortgage interest
deduction raises the share of home-owners where land use regulation is lax while it
is capitalized in housing prices where land use regulation is strict.
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Table 5.6: Effect of housing subsidy zoning on rents – Treatment heterogeneity
depending on housing market characteristics
Intercept 3.765∗∗
(1.563)
1.720
(1.435)
3.237∗∗∗
(1.156)
0.965
(1.556)
Zone II for housing subsidies 0.0174
(0.0294)
0.0690∗∗∗
(0.0193)
0.0497∗∗∗
(0.0163)
0.0330∗
(0.0195)
Housing characteristics X X X X
Share of open space2000 0.141
(0.0967)
0.235∗∗∗
(0.0477)
0.250∗∗∗
(0.0583)
0.0689
(0.0760)
Share of rental housing1999 −0.324∗∗∗
(0.121)
−0.367∗∗
(0.150)
−0.317∗∗∗
(0.112)
−0.494∗∗∗
(0.127)
log(population density1999) 0.00809
(0.0187)
0.0415∗∗∗
(0.0116)
0.0255∗
(0.0137)
0.0186
(0.0267)
log(median city income2001) 0.0620
(0.147)
0.236∗
(0.143)
0.116
(0.113)
0.257∗
(0.147)
IQR city income2001 0.169
∗∗∗
(0.0624)
0.0710∗∗
(0.0346)
0.0772∗∗
(0.0350)
0.153∗∗∗
(0.0407)
∆ MSA pop1975−99 0.679∗∗∗
(0.240)
0.498∗∗∗
(0.0892)
0.422∗∗∗
(0.0773)
0.528∗∗∗
(0.0992)
Observations 920 1239 1258 901
Housing subsidy recipient All All Yes No
MSA pop. growth 1975-1999 <5% ≥5% All All
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions
are run using the IV method and year fixed effects; standard errors are clustered by agglomera-
tion. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the rent per square meter. The sample includes
privately rented dwellings located agglomeration in with a population between 50,000 and 180,000
inhabitants. The time period extends from 2005 to 2012.
Sources: Rents and Charges survey, Housing survey.
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5.5.3 Almost no significant impact on housing quality or
quantity
A demand subsidy should lead not only to an increase in rents but also to an in-
crease in the quality of dwellings or in the number of rental dwellings, unless housing
supply is fully inelastic. Results show that location in zone II, where housing sub-
sidies are higher, has no impact on housing quality, as measured by some intrinsic
characteristics of the dwelling (number of housing in the building, number of rooms,
presence of a bathroom, and the size) (Table 5.7). However, these characteristics
cannot be easily improved by the landlord.11
Table 5.7: Effect of housing subsidy zoning on housing quality
Number of Number of Presence of Living
housing rooms a bathroom area
in the building
Intercept 1183.4
(3046.5)
13.31∗∗∗
(4.959)
1.120
(0.821)
9.268∗∗∗
(2.125)
Zone II for housing subsidies 11.92
(28.63)
−0.0669
(0.0681)
0.0123
(0.0119)
−0.0145
(0.0321)
∆ MSA pop1975−99 186.4
(165.7)
0.104
(0.249)
−0.0385
(0.0461)
−0.0536
(0.120)
Share of open space2000 −93.89
(60.96)
0.0740
(0.210)
−0.117∗∗
(0.0481)
0.0319
(0.0857)
Share of rental housing1999 −80.20
(167.6)
−1.955∗∗∗
(0.572)
−0.0680
(0.0951)
−0.330
(0.269)
log(population density1999) 18.52
∗
(10.15)
−0.0754
(0.0574)
0.00389
(0.00769)
−0.0698∗∗∗
(0.0247)
log(median city income2001) −116.9
(307.6)
−0.955∗∗
(0.484)
−0.0165
(0.0806)
−0.459∗∗
(0.206)
IQR city income2001 −67.90
(67.12)
−0.154
(0.152)
0.0237
(0.0319)
−0.0992
(0.0724)
Observations 2159 2159 2159 2159
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions
are run using the IV method and year fixed effects; standard errors are clustered by agglomeration.
The sample includes privately rented dwellings located agglomeration in with a population between
50,000 and 180,000 inhabitants. The time period extends from 2005 to 2012.
Sources: Rents and Charges survey, Housing survey.
Similarly, when using data at the municipality level, results show that the housing
subsidy zoning has no impact on the proportion of rental housing in the total housing
stock (Table 5.8).12 This result holds when distinguishing between fast- and slow-
growing agglomerations. These two findings suggest that housing supply remains
inelastic in the long run. They also confirm that the dwellings below and above the
threshold are indeed comparable, which validates our approach.
We do not find either any significant treatment impact on the share of privately-
rented home or furnished rentals (see Table 5.9). However, we highlight an increase
11Contrary to other proxies for quality, such as the painting or the presence of a fully fitted
kitchen, such housing characteristics are not present in the rent and charges survey. The sampling
design of the housing survey does not allow to use only this dataset for the estimation.
12These results hold when considering the variation of the number of rentals.
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Table 5.8: Effect of housing subsidy zoning on the private rental sector in 2011 at
the municipality level
Intercept −0.419
(0.460)
−1.882∗∗
(0.770)
0.476
(0.444)
Zone II for housing subsidies 0.00320
(0.0143)
−0.0156
(0.0206)
0.0165
(0.0154)
Share of open space2006 0.00139
(0.0254)
−0.0514
(0.0388)
0.0315
(0.0308)
log(population density2011) 0.00980
∗∗
(0.00479)
0.00443
(0.00727)
0.0127∗
(0.00687)
log(median city income2011) 0.0322
(0.0435)
0.176∗∗
(0.0727)
−0.0531
(0.0406)
IQR city income2011 0.0378
(0.0236)
0.0876∗∗
(0.0375)
−0.00497
(0.0242)
∆ MSA pop1990−2011 0.222∗∗∗
(0.0566)
0.323∗∗
(0.148)
0.198∗∗
(0.0769)
Average housing price2010 0.00255
(0.00178)
0.00702∗
(0.00415)
0.00108
(0.00164)
Zone A for landlord subsidies −0.0633∗∗∗
(0.0196)
−0.0590∗∗∗
(0.0196)
Zone B1 for landlord subsidies −0.00744
(0.0220)
−0.00537
(0.0249)
Zone B2 for landlord subsidies 0.0177
(0.0113)
−0.0179
(0.0141)
0.0160
(0.0151)
% rental housing1982 0.574
∗∗∗
(0.0642)
0.604∗∗∗
(0.0756)
0.637∗∗∗
(0.0647)
Observations 310 116 194
MSA pop. growth 1975-1999 All <5% ≥5%
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions
are run using the IV method and year fixed effects; standard errors are clustered by agglomeration.
The dependent variable is the share of rental housing in the total housing stock in 2011. The
sample includes municipalities located agglomeration in with a population between 50,000 and
180,000 inhabitants.
Sources: Population Census.
in the share of a one-room rentals in the privately rented housing stock. It suggests
that local housing markets in zone II experienced a demand shift toward one-room
apartments. Laferre`re and le Blanc (2004) show that the extension of housing al-
lowance to student in the 1990s, regardless of their parents’ income, allowed some
of them to move out of the parental home. Our finding could be due to the entry of
a greater number of students in housing markets belonging to zone II.
5.5.4 Robustness checks
Results are provided for a sample including dwellings located in agglomerations be-
tween 50,000 and 180,000 inhabitants and rented between 2005 and 2012 (Tables 5.4
to 5.8): this sample includes 2,159 dwellings located in 63 agglomerations. Results
are robust when using different windows or different study periods (see Table 5.13
in the appendix). A wider window of 30,000-250,000 inhabitants (4,081 dwellings
located in 101 agglomerations) provides a slightly larger and positive impact of lo-
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Table 5.9: Effect of housing subsidy zoning on the private rental sector in 2011 at
the municipality level – Treatment heterogeneity depending on housing type
Proportion in the privately rented housing stock in 2011
Dependent variables rental furnished 1 room 2-4 rooms ≥5 rooms
home rentals rentals rentals rentals
Intercept 1.243
(0.819)
−0.499
(0.399)
−1.154∗∗∗
(0.309)
1.437
(1.001)
0.369
(0.587)
Zone II for housing subsidies −0.0156
(0.0209)
0.00991
(0.00885)
0.0216∗∗
(0.00863)
0.00541
(0.0259)
−0.00835
(0.00930)
Share of open space2006 −0.101∗∗∗
(0.0373)
0.0292
(0.0195)
0.0689∗∗∗
(0.0206)
−0.111∗∗
(0.0433)
0.00520
(0.0246)
log(population density2011) −0.0290∗∗
(0.0121)
0.00501
(0.00366)
0.0248∗∗∗
(0.00452)
−0.00349
(0.0115)
−0.00270
(0.00589)
log(median city income2011) −0.0623
(0.0763)
0.0411
(0.0380)
0.0881∗∗∗
(0.0301)
−0.102
(0.0902)
−0.00697
(0.0569)
IQR city income2011 0.0000243
(0.0397)
0.0120
(0.0208)
0.0305∗
(0.0171)
0.0129
(0.0414)
−0.00784
(0.0241)
∆ MSA pop1990−2011 −0.191∗∗
(0.0902)
−0.0384
(0.0430)
−0.0524
(0.0501)
−0.190∗
(0.108)
−0.113∗∗
(0.0567)
Average housing price2010 −0.00505
(0.00720)
0.00163
(0.00112)
−0.000642
(0.00180)
0.00292
(0.00459)
0.0000291
(0.00270)
Zone A for landlord subsidies 0.0369
(0.0338)
0.0411∗∗∗
(0.00859)
0.0502∗∗∗
(0.0120)
0.214∗∗∗
(0.0449)
−0.0613∗∗∗
(0.0193)
Zone B1 for landlord subsidies −0.0139
(0.0403)
0.0610∗∗∗
(0.00965)
0.0103
(0.0175)
0.0277
(0.0504)
−0.0581∗∗∗
(0.0208)
Zone B2 for landlord subsidies −0.0290
(0.0254)
0.0115∗
(0.00606)
0.0105
(0.00976)
−0.0362
(0.0407)
−0.0354∗
(0.0197)
% rental home1982 0.459
∗∗∗
(0.0457)
% furnished rentals1982 0.0728
(0.0771)
% 1 room rentals1982 0.332
∗∗∗
(0.0681)
% 2-4 rooms rentals1982 0.302
∗
(0.167)
% ≥5 rooms rentals1982 0.402∗∗∗
(0.0607)
Observations 310 310 310 310 310
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions
are run using the IV method and year fixed effects; standard errors are clustered by agglomeration.
The sample includes municipalities located agglomeration in with a population between 50,000 and
180,000 inhabitants.
Sources: Population Census.
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cation in zone II on rents (5%). Reducing the window to 75,000-140,000 gives a less
significant impact, but very similar (4%), as this new sample contains 888 dwellings
located in 21 agglomerations only. The two estimations validate our identification
strategy as the estimated impact is very stable and does not consequently depend
on the population size of the agglomeration on either side of the discontinuity.
Performing the estimation on previous periods (1987-1991 or 1992-2004, instead
of 2005-2012) confirms the impact of location in zone II on rents. Indeed, before the
rapid increase of housing subsidies in the early 1990s (see figures 5.1 and 5.2), the
effect of the treatment is found to be positive (3%) but not significant. This result
allows to reject the hypothesis that the impact we find is only due to the preexisting
differences between zone II and III housing markets. Besides, the impact of higher
housing subsidies is significant in the 1992-2004 period and the treatment coefficient
is higher than during the subsequent period (7%). This larger effect could reveal a
small adjustment of housing supply in the 2000s, after the period of the rapid increase
in housing subsidies in the 1990s. This could also be explained by a reduction of the
share of housing subsidies in the rents in the 2000s (see figure 5.2).13
When considering social housing only, the interpretation of the impact is difficult,
because the housing subsidy zoning matches with the rent threshold zoning (Table
5.14). Thus, the impacts of the two different zonings cannot be disentangled: the
impact of the location in zone II on rents may correspond to the ability for the
lessor to fix a higher rent. Results are robust when adding the zoning for landlord
subsidies, meaning that this housing policy does not explain the increase of rents.
Placebo tests do not reveal any unexpected impact (Table 5.15). Other discon-
tinuities at 50,000 or 200,000 inhabitants are non significant and point estimates
are close to zero. When restricting the sample to the untreated agglomerations of
less than 100,000 inhabitants, the threshold of 50,000 has a non significant impact
on rents. Similarly, when restricting the sample to the treated agglomerations of
more than 100,000 inhabitants, the threshold of 200,000 is non significant. Reassur-
ingly, the point estimate of the 100,000-inhabitant dummy variable is very similar
to the treatment effect. Finally, the population trend (here the log of the agglom-
eration size) is non significant but negative, which suggest a collinearity issue with
the 100,000 inhabitant threshold. All these four tests confirm that the estimated
treatment effect is not due to a non modeled population trend effect.
5.6 Conclusion
We measure the impact of housing subsidies on the private rental sector. To do
so, we use an instrumental variable method based on a spatial discontinuity in the
subsidy scheme. We show that housing subsidies has a positive impact on rents.
This impact is stronger for the low-income households and the dwellings with two
rooms or less. Besides, higher subsidies seem to have almost no effect on housing
quality and to have no impact on the number of offered rental dwellings, except on
the share of one-room dwellings in the privately rented housing stock.
13This is due to the fact that the annual allowance revaluation is indexed to inflation, which was
lower that rent growth.
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5.A Comparison of housing subsidies zones crossed
with the landlord subsidies zones
Table 5.10: Number of dwellings in the housing subsidies zones (zones II and III)
crossed with the landlord subsidies zones
Zone II Zone III
Landlord sub. zone A 0 43,252
Landlord sub. zone B1 177,584 55,784
Landlord sub. zone B2 1,208,007 1,201,865
Landlord sub. zone C 29,297 90,245
Source: Population Census.
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5.B Supplementary estimates
Table 5.11: First stage of the instrumental variable method – regression on dwellings
Intercept 16.33∗∗∗
(4.735)
1 (MSA pop < 100000) 0.917∗∗∗
(0.0479)
log(size) −0.0106
(0.0190)
Number of rooms 0.00110
(0.00603)
Length of the tenancy −0.000199
(0.00116)
Completion year < 1914 0.00353
(0.0262)
Completion year 1915-1948 −0.0308
(0.0248)
Completion year 1949-1967 0.0325
(0.0232)
Completion year 1968-1990 0.00853
(0.0204)
Completion year > 1990 ref.
Bathroom −0.0292
(0.0221)
Bath 0.00888
(0.0168)
Garden −0.0464∗
(0.0260)
Balcony 0.0215
(0.0241)
Home security device −0.0247
(0.0185)
House 0.0355∗
(0.0210)
Share of open space2000 0.311
(0.294)
Share of rental housing1999 −0.548
(0.371)
log(population density1999) −0.0518
(0.0654)
log(median city income2001) −1.630∗∗∗
(0.472)
IQR city income2001 −0.106
(0.106)
∆ MSA pop1975−99 0.190
(0.239)
Observations 2159
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
Sources: Rents and Charges survey, Housing survey.
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Table 5.12: First stage of the instrumental variable method – regression on munici-
palities
Intercept 1.291
(1.256)
1 (MSA pop < 100000) 0.904∗∗∗
(0.0475)
Share of open space2006 0.0490
(0.167)
log(population density2011) −0.0305
(0.0400)
log(median city income2011) −0.144
(0.116)
IQR city income2011 0.256
∗∗
(0.120)
∆ MSA pop1990−2011 −0.163
(0.427)
Observations 401
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
Sources: Population Census by INSEE.
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Table 5.13: Effect of housing subsidy zoning on rents – Robustness checks: window
and study period
Intercept 1.193
(1.362)
1.473
(0.954)
−5.913
(4.042)
−1.884
(1.274)
Zone II for housing subsidies 0.0413∗
(0.0234)
0.0500∗∗∗
(0.0156)
0.0302
(0.0395)
0.0723∗∗∗
(0.0236)
Housing characteristics X X X X
Share of open space2000 0.0926
(0.0664)
0.208∗∗∗
(0.0526)
Share of rental housing1999 −0.181
(0.159)
−0.223∗∗
(0.101)
log(population density1999) 0.0317
∗∗
(0.0142)
0.0335∗∗
(0.0147)
log(median city income2001) 0.259
∗
(0.142)
0.271∗∗∗
(0.0933)
0.953∗∗
(0.396)
0.627∗∗∗
(0.126)
IQR city income2001 0.140
∗∗∗
(0.0333)
0.0967∗∗∗
(0.0300)
0.332∗∗∗
(0.121)
0.237∗∗∗
(0.0436)
∆ MSA pop1975−99 0.746∗∗∗
(0.124)
0.452∗∗∗
(0.0646)
Share of open space1990 −0.130
(0.133)
−0.0206
(0.0688)
Share of rental housing1990 −0.0157
(0.202)
log(population density1990) 0.0152
(0.0255)
∆ MSA pop1968−90 0.578∗∗∗
(0.174)
Share of rental housing1982 −0.259∗∗
(0.132)
log(population density1982) 0.00451
(0.0160)
∆ MSA pop1962−82 0.201∗∗
(0.0806)
Observations 888 4081 1098 3256
Period 2005-2012 2005-2012 1984-1991 1992-2004
Agglomeration population 75,000- 30,000- 50,000- 50,000-
140,000 250,000 180,000 180,000
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions
are run using the IV method and year fixed effects; standard errors are clustered by agglomeration.
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the rent per square meter. The sample includes only
privately rented dwellings.
Sources: Rents and Charges survey, Housing Survey.
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Table 5.14: Effect of housing subsidy zoning on rents. Robustness checks: OLS,
social housing, and other housing policies
Intercept 2.105∗
(1.168)
2.870∗∗
(1.375)
1.160
(1.108)
Zone II for housing subsidies 0.0565∗∗∗
(0.0174)
0.0349∗∗
(0.0170)
0.0455∗∗∗
(0.0147)
Housing characteristics X X X
Share of open space2000 0.177
∗∗∗
(0.0597)
0.00974
(0.0566)
0.0976∗
(0.0541)
Share of rental housing1999 −0.391∗∗∗
(0.0995)
−0.267∗∗
(0.117)
−0.424∗∗∗
(0.0886)
log(population density1999) 0.0244
(0.0190)
0.0145
(0.0100)
0.0221
(0.0186)
log(median city income2001) 0.203
∗
(0.112)
0.188
(0.136)
0.323∗∗∗
(0.104)
IQR city income2001 0.109
∗∗∗
(0.0332)
0.0331
(0.0453)
0.135∗∗∗
(0.0280)
∆ MSA pop1975−99 0.449∗∗∗
(0.0735)
0.0157
(0.0847)
0.311∗∗∗
(0.0650)
Zone A for landlord subsidies 0.228∗∗∗
(0.0329)
Zone B1 for landlord subsidies 0.0757∗∗
(0.0362)
Zone B2 for landlord subsidies −0.0248
(0.0235)
Observations 2159 2686 2159
Estimator OLS IV IV
Sample private sec. social housing private sec.
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions
are run using year fixed effects; standard errors are clustered by agglomeration. The dependent
variable is the logarithm of the rent per square meter. The sample includes dwellings located
agglomeration in with a population between 50,000 and 180,000 inhabitants. The time period
extends from 2005 to 2012.
Sources: Rents and Charges survey, Housing Survey.
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Table 5.15: Effect of housing subsidy zoning on rents – Placebo tests
Intercept 1.585
(1.564)
2.799∗∗
(1.188)
1.000
(0.766)
1.636∗
(0.980)
Housing characteristics X X X X
Share of open space2000 0.133
∗∗∗
(0.0506)
0.195∗∗∗
(0.0643)
0.128∗∗
(0.0546)
0.142∗∗
(0.0600)
Share of rental housing1999 −0.468∗∗∗
(0.120)
−0.425∗∗∗
(0.0941)
−0.224
(0.140)
−0.383∗∗∗
(0.0988)
log(population density1999) 0.0541
∗∗∗
(0.0106)
0.0231
(0.0220)
0.0511∗∗∗
(0.0129)
0.0334∗∗
(0.0138)
log(median city income2001) 0.241
(0.153)
0.131
(0.111)
0.309∗∗∗
(0.0761)
0.376∗∗∗
(0.113)
IQR city income2001 0.136
∗∗∗
(0.0487)
0.110∗∗∗
(0.0335)
0.0516
(0.0315)
0.145∗∗∗
(0.0311)
∆ MSA pop1975−99 0.444∗∗∗
(0.0545)
0.459∗∗∗
(0.0725)
0.534∗∗∗
(0.0943)
0.353∗∗∗
(0.0836)
1 (MSA pop < 50000) 0.00802
(0.0175)
1 (MSA pop < 100000) 0.0386∗∗
(0.0152)
1 (MSA pop < 200000) 0.00324
(0.0166)
Zone II for housing subsidies 0.115∗∗∗
(0.0283)
log(MSA pop1975) −0.105∗∗∗
(0.0402)
Observations 1953 2159 2646 2159
Estimator OLS OLS OLS IV
Subsample private sec. private sec. private sec. private sec.
untreated treated
Agglomeration population 30,000- 50,000- 100,000- 50,000-
100,000 180,000 300,000 180,000
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions
are run using year fixed effects; standard errors are clustered by agglomeration. The dependent
variable is the logarithm of the rent per square meter. The sample includes privately rented
dwellings. The time period extends from 2005 to 2012.
Sources: Rents and Charges survey, Housing Survey.
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